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MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

AND THE VALIDITY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

BY

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PREFACE

It gives me as a teacher great pleasure to write this preface to the work of one who was once taught by me, and in whose thought I can find some traces of my own. That pleasure is enhanced by the fresh value of much that he has here written, so that in turn I have become a learner from him. His range of reading in modern psychology has been wider than my own; and he has used it in what appears to me a very convincing fashion in his application of it to the proof of the validity of Christian experience. He shares the conviction that has guided my theological labours that the basis of Christian theology must be Christian experience, but an experience which can be shown to be not merely subjective, but to contain in itself, not as individual but as corporate, not as occasional but as continuous, the adequate evidence of its objectivity.

In the first part of the volume he has in my judgment been successful in meeting the challenge of this objectivity by modern psychology, and has shown that this challenge has not a strictly scientific character, but involves unjustified, disguised metaphysical assumptions. In the second part he shows what value psychological theory has for the restatement of Christian doctrine. More interesting still does the third part appear to me, in which he indicates the surer guidance, because truer understanding of Christian experience which psychological practice gives. As in Part I metaphysical assumptions in modern psychology were detected and exposed, so in Part IV a justification is offered for the philosophical implication of Christian doctrine and

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experience. If all the inferences, theoretical and practical, are not always to my mind convincing, yet I have always found them suggestive and deserving consideration. The book is timely, as at the present hour it is psychology which is popularly believed to be the most dangerous menace to the Christian view of life; as biology was in a former generation, and geology in a still earlier time. This first-born of the author's pen is not only of real value for the present, but also of certain promise of the future; and I deem it a pleasure to bid him God-speed upon his way.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

NEW COLLEGE,
LONDON.
June 28th, 1926.

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INTRODUCTION

The Bishop of Manchester, in the preface to a recent book written by Mr. Balmforth, entitled *Is Christian Experience an Illusion?* agrees with the author of that excellent little book that "the most formidable objections now urged against the Christian Faith come from the side of psychology." Some of these objections it is the intention of this thesis to examine. More particularly attention will be given to the various forms of challenge which come to-day from psycho-analysis. The literature of this subject has become popular, and its bearing upon religion seems to need careful examination.

In this examination, since it is the validity of Christian experience which has to be vindicated against the challenge of modern psychology, an excursion into metaphysics is rendered inevitable. For part of the criticism levelled against modern psychology will be an exposure of its assumption of a false metaphysic as soon as it passes out of its own region and pronounces judgment upon the meaning and value of experience as a whole. Wherefore, if it is declared illegitimate for psychology to deny the validity of religion because the judgments which psychology employs involve an impossible metaphysic, it will be necessary in affirming the validity of religion to do so according to principles derived from a metaphysic which is at least more acceptable than the one rejected. When, therefore, the time comes to examine various psychological theories side by side with Christian doctrines and practices, it will be helpful to the following of the main argument if the philosophical standpoint is first made clear.

In broad outline the schools of thought with which most sympathy is felt are such as accept the principles of creative evolution, vitalism and personal idealism. For wide use will here be made of the concepts of personality and value. Indeed, these ideas will be made to yield the principle of

interpretation which is to be applied to all experience. It is assumed that if reality is knowable, then it is through human personality that it must be known. It is with personality as a unity that we must begin and end, if it be allowed that the universe can be understood by man. What is meant in saying this is that the understanding of anything is an act of the whole personality as a unity, and cannot be achieved by one aspect of personality alone. Pure thought does not exist. All that we know, or have any evidence of, is personality thinking. And, as modern psychology amply proves, the process of thinking will be influenced by the other factors in personality. For thought to be successful, therefore, the whole personality must be so organized that no element in it can vitiate the process of thinking. One conclusion which we may safely draw from modern psychology is that the character of personality as a whole must be such that reason shall not be degraded to mere rationalizing. In other words, the qualifications necessary for the discovery of truth are more than simply intellectual.

But since personality is a unity in the sense that every part influences for good or ill every other part, a further demand must be made. It is necessary that the object of its understanding should be satisfactory to the whole personality—intellect, will and emotion—if truth is to be discoverable by unified personality. This assumption is of the utmost importance. Let it be supposed for a moment that some aspect of ultimate truth could be discovered which would be unsatisfactory to the will and emotion, although complying with all the demands of the intellect. The result would be that the baffling of the will and baulking of the emotion would cause a disruption of personality, with the consequence that the intellect would be affected for ill by this disorganization in personality as a whole. That would mean that the discovery of one aspect of ultimate truth would tend to disqualify the mind for the discovering of other aspects. Thus complete truth would be increasingly difficult to discover as more and more truths were understood. This would be an impossible regress. It must be assumed, therefore, that the understanding by personality of one phase of truth produces in personality an integration of the whole towards the further understanding of those truths which satisfy the personality as a whole.

It follows from this that it is a most serious mistake to attempt to understand by intellect alone those aspects of reality which contain more than reason can detect or measure. It will be fatal, therefore, to seek to interpret reality with only intellectual qualifications. But if intellectual qualification alone is inadequate for the tasks of understanding reality, it follows that the other conditions involved must also be discovered and fulfilled. Emotion and volition must both be disciplined and brought to play their part in the one great act wherein personality as a whole seeks to discover the interpretation of reality.

What has been said about the necessity to begin with the unity of personality implies already not a little about the nature of the reality which can be understood by personality. Reality must satisfy the needs of personality. But now it must be noticed that it is not any and every need that is to be satisfied, any more than it is any and every fancy of the mind that is to be found true. We have spoken of the personality as a unity, but it may be a unity in two senses. There is the well-known truth about personality that it is a whole in the sense that thought leads to action, that emotion strengthens will, that the stirring of one emotion often arouses another, and that any stimulus may have effects more or less marked throughout the whole range of personality—and so on. But there is another unity which comes from the integration and organization of personality, from its development and subordination to some single purpose. Personality *must* be a unity in the former sense, but *may* fall far short of perfect unification according to some accepted principle. According to the first meaning, the unity of personality might result in the disorganized passions hampering the just use of the intellect; but, according to the second meaning, the whole of personality would be organized about some single end which had been adopted as the highest good for personality as a whole.

Now, the needs which reality must satisfy in order to be understandable are the inherent needs of the morally, emotionally and intellectually developed and integrated personality. That is to say, personality must be adapted to the knowledge of reality before such knowledge can be gained. And the assumption must be made that reality responds to the claims made upon it by a personality that is

inwardly ordered towards the end of understanding reality. This necessary assumption carries with it the further implication that, if reality is to satisfy the full needs of developed personality, it must itself be able to respond under the form of personality. Only in terms of personality can human personality understand reality.

All this means at last that personality must be prepared morally, emotionally and intellectually so that it may stand in such a relation to reality as a whole that the understanding of reality shall be possible to it, not fully of course, but in a measure, and true as far as it goes. It means further that reality, although it may also be more and greater than personality, as we know personality in ourselves, must at least be truly known in and through a personal relation. Only a relationship of personality to personality can give full satisfaction to personality as we know it. Something more, then, than mere intelligibility must be posited of reality—it must also express the moral attribute of love in such a way as to meet the inherent needs of our moral and emotional nature.

The aim of this introduction is simply to give the standpoint of the essay. Such problems as arise in connexion with the personality of God and the relation of God to reality (not to mention some others) will call for fuller treatment at a later stage. Here it is enough to say that fully developed personality, and not merely trained intellect, is necessary for the knowledge of God; and that reality, to be understandable by personality, must respond in a personal relationship to the soul that is seeking knowledge and communion. If knowledge be expressed by the formula, A X B, where A is the subject of knowing, B the object known, and X the process of knowledge, then what is being said here is that when B stands for reality conceived as God, then A must stand not merely for intellect but for fully developed personality, and X, if it is to yield understanding of B, must stand for a relationship of reciprocal love between A and B.

The initial assumption here made—viz. that we must take personality, and not some abstract attribute of personality which has no existence independently of personality, as the key to the interpretation of the world—carries with it further implications about the nature of the world. Personality thus used will become a principle for estimating values. A scale

of degrees must be drawn up, according to which various parts and aspects of the objective world will be judged to have higher or lower place. Personality will be the highest value known. But it will be seen that individual persons differ greatly in the manifestation of personality. Accordingly, a conception of perfect personality will be formed. And the highest value of all will be claimed for perfect personality. This value, approximated to, but fallen far short of, by human personalities, will then be seen to be realized only in God. God may be more than perfect personality, but cannot be less than what is the highest value we are able to conceive. It might be true to describe Him as supra-personal—but it must be false to think of Him as other than all that we mean by the perfection of personality. In the scale of approximation to perfection it is claimed that human personality does attain to its full height and realization in Jesus Christ. The question of Christ's sinless perfection will be discussed more fully later; but assuming for the moment that personality is fully developed on all sides in Christ, then a most important deduction can be drawn. In that case Christ would be altogether qualified to occupy the position of A in the formula expressing the knowledge of God—A X B. It will be argued in this thesis that Jesus Christ does fulfil all the subjective conditions stipulated by modern psychology as necessary to valid knowledge of reality. All the objections which can be brought to disparage the objective truthfulness of human reasoning will be found to fail when applied to the personality of Christ. From this it will be inferred that if Christ's teaching can be shown to be wholly acceptable to personality, then modern psychology cannot legitimately question its validity.

But to follow further the principle of values. Although personality is the highest value, yet values are not limited to the range of developing personalities. Objects which are non-personal have value by reference to personality. The whole of reality is a system of graded values, with God as the highest value. All other values must, therefore, be estimated ultimately by reference to God. That means that we can only understand the world in so far as we are able to value all things as God values them. In other words, we can only truly know anything when we know it in God. The only knowledge of reality that is possible for us is the

knowledge of reality as interpreted according to God's scale of values. Or, since reality cannot be conceived as external to God, it may be said that we can only know reality as God.

Now, the communion and love of God, which are the conditions of our knowledge of God, bring with them the sharing of the same scale of values and the seeking of the same ends as those approved by God. This understanding of God through communion implies, on the one side, the development of personality in such a way as to qualify it for knowledge of God, and, on the other side, a revelation (partial and gradual no doubt, but actual) of the mind of God and of God's method of evaluation.

The more perfect the personality the truer would be its standard of values. Our quest for truth is, therefore, an inquiry into the mind of perfect personality. But here a difficulty has to be faced: how can imperfect personality ascertain the criterion of perfect personality, unless the higher point of view be revealed? If such revelation be accepted, then the sharing by lower personality of the spiritual standpoint of perfect personality would inevitably lead to the gradual uplifting of the lower personality. This means that revelation, if given, would be redemptive. Christianity meets this difficulty by giving to mankind, in Christ, the revelation of the standard of values used by God in the estimation of reality as a graded system of increasing spirituality. Such a revelation of the heart and mind of God as is declared to us in Christ effects our redemption in the measure in which we let that mind be in us that was also in Christ Jesus—or, in as far as we accept Christ's standard of spiritual values.

Now, let us inquire a little more in detail what is the nature of reality thus conceived. We are familiar with the philosophical doctrine of degrees of truth and reality. But it needs to be noticed that the appropriateness of the conception of degree still leaves us free to ask—Degree of what? To answer this question by saying that reality consists of degrees of reality can only mean that there is, for us, an appearance of degree, but that ultimately degree is not real. We are thus landed in the monistic position of Spinoza and Bradley, where everything which depends upon degree for its meaning lacks ultimate reality. Professor Mackenzie suggests that it is better to substitute the phrase degrees of

belief for degrees of truth,* and perhaps similarly it is better to think of degrees as degrees of value rather than of reality. Higher and lower degrees of value may be equally real, and each equally necessary to the other. The variation in the degrees of truth and reality is not to be sought amongst separate entities, but between different principles according to which their values may be estimated. As we have said, value is reference to personality; and the more perfect the personality the nearer will its scale of values approximate to the true and real gradation. The only scale which is ultimately true and real is a system of values expressive of the purpose of God.

Reality is to be conceived, then, as a graded system of values, and our understanding of it depends upon our interpretation according to the correct principle of evaluation. In order to understand the existence of the world we must ascertain what is its meaning for God Who created it. The great problem of philosophy ought to be the discovery of the right meaning, or value, of reality for perfect personality. For this task the philosopher must adopt the religious attitude towards reality. For the most valuable knowledge of reality is that gained through religious experience. He must enter into the position of a disciple of Christ, and by so doing learn to study reality from God's point of view.

This mode of thinking on the nature of ultimate reality leads us to the view that, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "the universe is to be thought of, in the last resort, as an experience." † That is to say, that reality itself is the experience A X B, where A stands for God the Father, X for God the Holy Spirit and B for God the Son. Thus the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is a statement of the nature of ultimate reality conceived as a divine experience. And to have any meaning which we can understand experience must be personal. Therefore the doctrine safeguards personality, while allowing, or even insisting, that the God in Three Persons is supra-personal. The doctrine declares also that the highest experience is personal fellowship and communion of spirit in holiness and love. Wherefore Holy Communion expresses the nature of ultimate being.

If, then, the foundational fact be experience—if the nature

* Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 121.
† Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 390.

of reality be A X B—then, since neither A nor B can fall outside reality, it follows that both A and B must somehow belong to the one absolute experience which is the mind of God. In the equation of knowledge there is never any cleavage or gulf between subject and object, as if one belonged to one order and the other to a different order. This consideration strengthens the former contention that reality as the object to be understood by personality cannot repudiate the claims upon it made by a personality that is developing Godward. In the human act of understanding or experiencing reality, somehow both the mind knowing and the reality known fall within the one system of ultimate being. The scale of values which developing human personality applies to the world becomes more and more satisfactory to its own inherent needs as it approximates more and more closely to the divine scale of values, according to which everything exists because it has value for the mind of God. This is another way of saying that with developing personality there proceeds side by side a spiritualizing of the material universe. Rightly viewed, there is nothing unspiritual, and everything is divine. But at the same time there are degrees of spirituality and divinity, and it cannot be said that all is equally spiritual or equally divine. God is the highest value, and all else acquires its measure of spirituality and divinity according to the degree of value which it has when referred to the purpose of God.

This leads us to speak of the principle of interpretation. In view of all that has gone before it must be clearly wrong to attempt to explain any fact by reference to what is lower in the scale of value. Meaning always comes from above, never from below. If the falsity of any other principle of explanation can be exposed and a teleology agreed upon, much confusion of thought will be saved. But the false method of explanation employed by mechanism still lingers in some psychology, and is specially evident in psychoanalysis. It behoves us, therefore, to make quite clear the inadequacy of all attempts at explaining meaning and value upon the basis of mechanism, whether material or psychical. It may be said that to explain a fact is to assign its causes—that is, to give the preceding set of facts out of which it arose. This contention is met by Professor Pringle-Pattison, who argues that this principle of explanation covers

a subtle and very serious fallacy. "For the true nature of the antecedents is only learned by reference to the consequents which follow; or, in other words, the true nature of the cause only becomes apparent in the effect. All ultimate or philosophical explanation must look to the end. Hence the futility of all attempts to explain human life in terms of the merely animal, to explain life in terms of the inorganic, and ultimately to find a sufficient formula for the cosmic process in terms of the redistribution of matter and motion. If we are in earnest with the doctrine that the universe is one, we have to read back the nature of the latest consequent into the remotest antecedent. Only then is the one, in any true sense, the cause of the other." * In another place he deals with the same point, and concludes: "What we have to deal with is the continuous manifestation of a single power whose full nature cannot be identified with the initial stage of the evolutionary process, but can only be learned from the course of the process as a whole, and most fully from its final stages." †

While, then, the mechanistic principle of explanation fails to meet the demands of philosophy, the teleological method satisfies all the requirements. And the philosophical standpoint here taken yields a canon of interpretation which gives a true explanation of the facts according to their meaning or value as parts in a complete system of values.

This conception of the meaning of things as coming from above finds expression in the Christian religion as the doctrine of sacramentalism and the principle of symbolism. The nature of reality as outlined in this thesis is sacramental and acquires its meaning from the presence of God. What is ultimate is held to be the experience of communion; and the universe is conceived as just a vehicle or instrument for conveying God to man. The purpose of creation is to induce us gradually to learn God's values therein, and thus to enter into perfect fellowship with Him by sharing the same scale of spiritual values. Everything exists for its meaning or value, and in a sense the explanation of any fact must be supernatural. The only satisfactory explanation, that is to say, must be given by reference to what lies upon a higher plane of spirituality. Thus the limit of explanation is

* Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 12.
† Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 210.

reached only when any fact has been given its proper setting in that scheme of values which is the purpose of God.

All human discovery of truth is also at the same time divine revelation of truth. Only as human personality is qualified to know God can it know the truth about reality. But, on the other hand, only the knowledge which comes from communion with God can educate and develop the human personality so that it can fulfil the conditions of discovering the truth. Thus the initiative must come from God, and revelation must be given before the meaning of the creation can be discovered. That there should be such a revelation of God as is given in Christ is altogether in keeping with the presuppositions of this theory of truth and reality. Without some disclosure of the purpose of God, and without the redemptive effect produced in personality by the acceptance of that revelation as a guiding principle of life, although up to a point science might be possible, the understanding of the true meaning of things would be unobtainable.

This introduction does not attempt to be an argued philosophy. It merely seeks to give in briefest outline the philosophical approach to the more detailed discussions to follow hereafter. It is hoped, however, that sufficient illustration has been given of the principle of interpretation here adopted and of the canon of verification to be used for testing the validity of Christian experience. But in attempting to use experience to test theories or doctrines there are pitfalls which must be carefully avoided. Dr. Waterhouse points out a danger: "One of the earliest results of the psychological study of religion was to bring into prominence the argument from experience. Such an argument must command respect. But naïvely stated, as if the subjective experience guaranteed the truth of the experient's own explanation of it, the argument carries no weight." * There is a similar warning given by Professor Matthews, to which it is well to give attention: "I am inclined to wonder whether the advocates of an uncritical acceptance of religious experience have ever troubled to learn by introspection what religious experience really is. It is surely a complete misreading of the order of events to suppose that experience comes first, and afterwards gives rise to belief about God and the world. On the contrary, ideas of God and of His

* Waterhouse, *The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, p. 29.

relation with the soul, of redemption and the aim of life, are accepted from the social environment on authority. Experience grows round them. The vigour of the religious life depends upon the degree in which these ideas become living centres of emotion and will, and progress in religion is closely connected with the work of the mind upon these concepts, whereby it deepens and purifies them in the light of the total experience of the self and its advancing powers of moral and intellectual insight. From the beginning, religious experience is indissolubly connected with affirmations about the universe, which are capable of philosophical criticism and interpretation." *

Despite, however, the obstacles in the way of the argument from experience, it is only in experience that we can test the truth of religious teachings, and it is a fact of great significance that religion survives the continuous test which life affords.

Remembering how large a part is played in religious experience by tradition and by the will-to-believe, the attempt to prove the validity of Christian experience would seem to involve two lines of inquiry. First, the tradition of a religious social environment which provides the interpretation of the ultimate object in which belief is willed must be examined. For Christian experience this factor can be traced back to the teaching and experience of Christ. The question is, What are the conditions which must be fulfilled in Christ for His evidence to be acceptable as a valid revelation of the nature of reality conceived as God? Now, as already indicated, if the personality of Christ is fully developed, sinless and perfect, then He is qualified to know and reveal God. We shall find later that psycho-analysis can bring no charge of rationalizing against One Who is without any taint of imperfection. Accordingly, what seems to be crucial for the argument from experience is the validity of Christ's teaching. If philosophically a Christian theory of the universe is acceptable, and if psychologically Christ is free from every mental trait which might vitiate the purity of His understanding of truth, then it must surely be concluded that so far there is no justification for questioning the validity of Christianity. The argument must then proceed to the second stage. Confirmatory evidence of the

* Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 8, 9.

validity of Christ's teaching is to be sought in the human experience of those who have accepted the teaching and made it the centre of thought, feeling and action. Clearly the only just test in this case is that applied to those who accept Christian faith, and the greater the faith the surer the test. The most dependable evidence will be that given by those who have themselves become most Christlike. It is in the Christian saints and martyrs that the Christian faith is put upon its greatest trial, and their witness must be allowed considerable weight.

But this second and confirmatory verification in human experience needs further examination. What has to be tested at bottom is a theory of the nature of ultimate reality. There is a Christian metaphysic and a Christian epistemology. It is claimed that both these theories are true. The outlines of a Christian philosophy have been already indicated. Now we have to notice the method of verification which will be most suitable.

On the Hegelian assumption that the real is the rational, it is obvious that the test of reality must be entirely rational. But on the theory that reality is personal experience, the test must be applied to the full experience of the whole personality. The moral and emotional elements in experience will have to be taken into account no less than the intellectual. But, on the other hand, not any and every experience will be equally legitimate. Just as a process of reasoning must submit to the conditions of logic, so the act of experiencing will have to comply with conditions. As the thoughts of a trained mind are more likely to be valid than those of an untrained mind, so the experience of a disciplined and integrated personality is more likely to be valid than that of a crude and undeveloped personality. If the interpretation of experience is to be true, then the experience itself must first be pure.

The criterion by which experience is interpreted must be that provided in the teaching of Christ. What has to be tested is not our interpretation of our own experience, but the interpretation of His experience given by Christ. We have to accept the standard of spiritual values propounded by Christ, and to inquire what is the effect in our experience when in faith such acceptance is made. The contention is that when Christ's interpretation of the meanings and values

of life and the world is acted upon in implicit faith as a revelation of the purpose of God, then the effect is twofold. First, there is a greater unification and development of personality; and, secondly, there is more satisfactory adaptation of personality to the total environment of the universe. Herein we seek the confirmation of Christ's experience and of the teaching which was His interpretation of that experience.

The course which the argument must take is, therefore, apparent. To begin with, some objections raised by modern psychology against the fundamental assumptions of this Christian philosophy will be examined and, it is hoped, removed. Then, in detail, certain theories of psycho-analysis will be examined side by side with co-relative doctrines of Christianity. The aim in all this will be to show that Christianity can do for personality all that psychology demands as necessary, and can do it more effectively than psycho-analysis. Also an attempt will be made to show that Christianity can provide a philosophic background behind all that it teaches, and one which, after criticism, evinces itself as more acceptable than the crude metaphysic implied by the theories and practices of the new psychology. This inquiry into the psychological aspects of Christian doctrine will be followed by an examination of Christian practices. And here further confirmation will be sought for the validity in experience of the Christian way of life. In conclusion, some of the unique doctrines of a Christian metaphysic will be examined with a view to demonstrating the legitimacy and necessity for their acceptation as philosophically and psychologically sound.

PART I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

RATIONALIZING AND VALIDITY

THE charge of rationalizing is so damaging an indictment that we must be sure at the outset that it is not likely to be incurred. If any conclusion drawn is under suspicion as being merely the expression of a subjective condition, then its truthfulness will be questioned when it is applied to objective reality. What is required, therefore, is a criterion of validity which will guarantee the truth of a judgment relating to the external world. On this subject of rationalizing and validity, however, several points need to be made clear.

Mr. Tansley writes: "Rationalization may be defined as the production of a reason for, as distinct from the true cause or motive of, an act or conation." *

Unfortunately, religious teaching is not a sphere immune from the baneful effect of rationalizing. On this point Mr. Tansley is emphatic. "The rationalizations of religious beliefs that are to all appearance contradicted by experience of life constitute a regular system which we call Christian apologetics. The religious complex is not in itself an unconscious complex. On the contrary, it is stated and expounded openly and explicitly as the foundation of the particular beliefs which are supposed to form the dogmatic mental equipment of the religious man. The religious creeds draw their immense power partly from the fact that *they satisfy wholly or partially real needs of the individual,* and partly because they are the direct thinking of the herd, as represented by the Christian Church. The apologetic system by which they are made to harmonize with the facts of life forms a necessary part of the organization of religion. When the system becomes too rigid, and tends to lose its hold owing to the growth of knowledge and the widening of mental outlook, instinctive attempts to meet the danger by timely concessions result in the development within the Churches of

* Tansley, *The New Psychology,* p. 160.

such movements as those of liberal churchmanship and new theology and modernism. Religious belief is, in fact, constantly striving to adapt itself to human progress, but, owing to its inherent conservatism, it is always very late in the attempt. Nevertheless, it does not lose its hold on the great mass of people, because the vast majority are practically unaffected, or only very indirectly affected, by general mental progress, and because the satisfaction of universal spiritual needs is, after all, independent of the exact form of belief." *

Mr. Trotter is no less emphatic in what he has to say on the part played in religion by herd suggestion. He writes: "Religion has always been to man an intensely interesting matter, and when we realize its biological significance we can see that this is due to a deeply ingrained need of his mind. The individual of a gregarious species can never be truly independent and self-sufficient. Natural selection has ensured that as an individual he must have an abiding sense of incompleteness, which, as thought develops in complexity, will come to be more and more abstractly expressed. This is *the psychological germ which expresses itself in the religious feelings,* in the desire for completion, for mystical union, for incorporation with the infinite, which are all provided for in Christianity and in all the successful sub-varieties of Christianity which modern times have seen develop. This need seems, with the increasing complexity of society, to become more and more imperious, or rather, to be satisfiable only by more and more elaborately rationalized expressions. . . . It is very interestingly shown to what lengths of rationalization may be forced the consequences of that yearning in us which is identical with the mechanism that binds the wolf to the pack, the sheep to the flock, and to the dog makes the company of his master like walking with God in the cool of the evening." †

It is a temptation to the modern psychologist to believe and teach that, although some rationalization has *psychological value* and is therefore to be encouraged, yet the whole of argumentation, since it is more or less influenced by rationalization, lacks *logical validity.* It is this subtle inference that must be challenged. To begin with, a clear distinction ought to be drawn between reasoning and

* Tansley, *The New Psychology,* pp. 163, 164.
† Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,* p. 50.

rationalizing. Now, what seems to be the distinguishing mark of rationalizing is its origin in subjective states. In an act of rationalizing such and such an opinion is formulated about the world outside; but the opinion held is not the result of an unbiased study of objective reality. Its objective reference is merely a disguise: and in so far as the truth is in it, the truth concerns the self more than the world. Evidently, therefore, the whole system of theology may be but a skilful projection upon reality of what the unconscious spirit of man desires to be true. The whole of the teachings of poetry and art, no less than the doctrines of religion, are in danger of being closeted in the private boudoir of subjectivity. The qualifying phrases, which have been italicized in Mr. Tansley and Mr. Trotter, certainly indicate that *religion* is delivered from the fate which falls on *religious teaching*: and this may seem ground for comfort, until it is seen that what is left is merely religious emotion. Religion is then comparable to music. Music does not teach any theory of the universe, but it steadies and strengthens the emotions: and therein lies its value. Its truth, if indeed it may be said to have truth, means just its emotional satisfaction or its social utility. The response to the world may be rendered more firm as a result of the emotional unity and tranquillity that has been effected. And this, of course, is not a small thing for music to have done. But is it a great enough thing for religion to accomplish? Music and religion could, according to this view, be placed upon the same level, and either could be a substitute for the other. Such a conclusion is reached independently by Dr. Agnes Savill in a recent book on *Music, Health and Character.* "Great music," she says, "unifies the personality; it can inspire to action as can a noble religion." And again: "Great music arouses the same spiritual enthusiasm as can be awakened by prayer." One of her objects in writing the book is to offer music as an alternative to religion for those who lack the religious disposition. If it be enough for religion to stand thus, then there is not needed, in the interests of religion, any further examination of rationalizing. If, however, religion seeks to give more than merely emotional satisfaction or social utility, if it stands by its claim to offer revelation of truth, then the bearing of rationalizing on religious teaching must be further considered.

Reason, then, as distinct from rationalizing, must be free from this subjective origin in unrecognized wishes and desires. Clearly, one possible activity of reason is the unmasking of the unconscious driving motives. To know the danger of rationalizing is to be freed from its dominance. This may seem merely a negative advantage; but more is implied in such discovery of motivation than simple exposure. Rationalizing comes about owing to inward disharmony, and maladjustment between the self and the world. Reason, however, is able to influence both the unity of the mind and also the response of the mind to the environment; and so its work becomes positive gain. It is not to be assumed, therefore, that all thinking is rationalizing. Reasoning and directed thinking are possible: and, moreover, such activity is necessary both to inward harmony and also to satisfactory response to the world. Mere rationalizing cannot effect either of these results. Thus, if it should be claimed by Freudians that every type of thinking is the expression of wish fulfilment; and that the characteristics of every system of philosophy are the results of idiosyncrasies in the philosopher: * then it must be remembered that a distinction has to be drawn between two ways of thinking, viz. directed thinking or reasoning and undirected thinking or rationalizing. The mark of rationalizing (we have said) is its subjective origin. But since we have not yet established the objectivity of reason, a more precise differentia may seem preferable here. It may be said further, then, that rationalizing is an attempt to justify actions or beliefs which are already existent facts and which have resulted from instinct or emotion. Reason, on the other hand, is an intellectual activity which precedes action and belief; which seeks to discover the true motives of action; and which aims at producing an inward harmony from which alone can come a steady and just reaction to the objective reality.

Now we want to go a step further and vindicate what we have claimed for reason—its objectivity, as opposed to the subjectivity of rationalizing. And this is the point at which we must insist that the Freudians' neglect of metaphysics invalidates some of their more sweeping assertions. Metaphysics cannot be dismissed as rationalizing: this or that system might be so designated—but not metaphysics as such.

* Cf. Pfister, *The Psycho-analytic Method*, pp. 387-388 and foot-notes.

When an escape from the tribunal of metaphysics is sought by the flinging of such a taunt at its authority, then the rebels become the victims of their own attack. The inconsistency of their extreme position may not be evident to those who flout all philosophical supervision; nevertheless, if, as they say, all thinking is rationalizing, then the very sweeping denunciations uttered by the Freudians may be dismissed as merely the symptoms of their own unresolved complexes. Freudian psychology, as a system interpreting experience, may itself be but a piece of rationalizing. To press the point against the Freudians as they press it mercilessly against others; the preoccupation of Freudian psychology with sex would only indicate the sexual complexes and obsessions of the exponents of the theory.

The writings of Freud and his disciples are not free from metaphysical assumptions. And it is just these uncriticized assumptions that need to be exposed and examined. When the charge of rationalizing is pressed too far, the question is raised of the possibility of any true knowledge of the external world. Since, however, psycho-analysis is offered as an aid to the adaptation of the self to the world outside and to reality at large, knowledge of that real world must be possible, at least in degree. Assumptions are made by psychology about the nature of the world: as, for instance, that it is so constituted that this teaching of modern psychology offers to man the best response he can have to the world. Accordingly, the Freudian psychology must fall unless knowledge of the world outside is possible. It will not do to say that psychology is concerned simply with the inner consciousness of man and aims merely at producing harmony there. In such a contention there is lurking still a big assumption, viz. that the harmonious self is not made impossible by the environment. The naïve neglect of metaphysics by Freud's disciples is reminiscent of the positivism of the followers of Comte.

There is a contradiction in the Comtian hypothesis that a reality lies beyond, of which we can know only the phenomena. A similar contradiction is involved in the Freudian hypothesis that there is a reality to which we must adapt ourselves, but that we can know only our own conscious states. Both arguments are variants of Locke's teaching concerning the "ideas," which stand between the mind and

reality, and for ever preclude knowledge of the world as it is. But the whole doctrine of representative perception is false. Even Kant's hypothetical noumenon is no less false a notion than Locke's substance.

There is, however, a difficulty in all this, and it may be defined thus: Since all knowledge has its subjective side, it can never be purely objective. Now, such a contention may be true; but the further inference, that all so-called knowledge is thereby rendered invalid, cannot pass so easily, for it implies the very assumption we have noticed, viz. that the thing to be known is the reality of Comte, the world outside the ideas of Locke, the noumenon of Kant. The admission that the subjective conditions of all reasoning make error possible, is very different from the affirmation that all reasoning is thereby rendered invalid. As soon as a sound metaphysic is accepted in place of the discredited one tacitly assumed, the difficulty in question is removed.

It must be impossible, after due reflection, to allow that reality is merely a part of totality. Were it accepted that totality is greater than reality, then the unavoidable consequence would be that beyond reality, but still within the totality of things, there would be entities, which, as distinct from realities, might be called phenomena. Nevertheless, whatever is outside of reality must be unreal. Wherefore, such entities in the totality would be simply unrealities. Thus, if a phenomenon be a part of reality, then it is real, and not merely phenomenal: if it is not part of reality then it is simply unreal and non-existent, and therefore cannot form any part of a totality beyond reality. For, although there may be reality beyond the sphere of existence, there cannot be any existence that is not real. To exist is to be real, although to be real is not necessarily to exist, since reality may well be greater than existence. But existence which lies outside reality is just unreal: and unreal existence can mean nothing but non-existence. The point is that either the phenomena and ideas are a part of reality, or they are quite unreal. If they do not fall within reality, they can have no place in totality, for there is no part of totality which lies beyond the sphere of reality. Since, then, ideas or objects of knowledge must be part of reality, it follows that to know them is to know reality, partially of course, but directly.

Now, knowledge is—a mind A knowing an object B. If

X be the relation between A and B in the act of the mind knowing an object, then knowledge is A X B. Suppose reality be defined as B, then obviously A X B is possibly different from B. In that case A X may for ever distort B. But in order even to do that, surely A X must have some sort of reality. Existence it undoubtedly has, and unreal existence is meaningless. Somehow, then, A X is also part of reality. A X B, therefore, has the nature of reality. Reality contains a subject-object-relationship. B is not the whole of reality; and A X may not fully apprehend B. A X is the mind knowing; B is the world known. Whether a mind that knows nothing is really a mind, and whether a world that is wholly unknown is really a world, are questions that need not trouble us. We are concerned only with the reality of A X B. The difficulty is that A is not simply observant of B or merely impressionable by B. The process X is not conditioned wholly by B, but often very largely by A. Nevertheless, B is not, for sane minds, entirely eliminated. The act of knowledge for another mind may be A Y Q B, where Y is the process of knowing perverted by the mind, so that Q may be discerned in the place of B. This is, however, not the same as a process A X Q. We are able to examine knowledge and to discover just that subjective influence in A Y Q B the correction of which can then be effected. The difficulty is not there, but at the next stage; for it may be asserted that A X B is as much conditioned by A, as is A Y Q B. This difficulty must be met.

In this doubt thrown upon the validity of A X B, a demand is being made to know B without an act of knowledge directed towards B. The act of knowing B, it is assumed, changes B. What we want, it is urged, is knowledge of B as B, and not of B as known. This, of course, is an impossible demand; yet it is often being tacitly made when the objectivity of knowledge is questioned. Knowledge is concerned only with B as known. For B in itself, and not as known, is the impossible noumenon again. The assumption is that the B as known is unreal, whereas the B not conditioned by being known would be the real B. This lands us back in the position of excluding from reality the very things that are known by us. In the end this will drive us on to the admission that the real is the unknowable, and the knowable is the unreal. Far from the B, not conditioned

by the process of knowledge, being the real B, such a B may simply lack all reality. The real B, the only B that has any meaning, is the B which stands as part of an act of knowledge A X B.

This false theory of knowledge, implicit in so many of the apparently damaging inferences from modern psychology, is no less false in its implicit use to-day than it has been in its explicit use by Locke and Comte. With this impossible metaphysic rejected, much of the negative criticism of modern psychology falls away. Professor Pringle-Pattison insists strongly upon the need for exposing this dangerous error. "There are not a few philosophical writers who clamour for a knowledge of God, not as He reveals Himself in nature and in human experience, but as something to be known, it would seem, directly, apart from His manifestation altogether. And when this craving for the impossible is not satisfied, they either deny His existence or proclaim His nature to be unknowable. . . . But to know a thing through its qualities or phenomena—its mode of action—is to know the real thing in the only way in which God or man can know anything. . . . It is the noumena or real things that we know, the phenomena are what we know about them." *

The fact that knowledge of reality is subjectively conditioned, though it does not render true knowledge impossible, does indicate the necessity to discover and fulfil those subjective conditions which will guarantee the validity of knowledge thus gained. But to deny the validity of all knowledge because of the conditions under which it can alone be gained, as when the unity of the universe is questioned owing to the ego-complex of the philosopher, is coming perilously near to the rejection of the first postulate of logic. This postulate may be expressed either as the rationality of the universe, or as the competence of the mind to know the world. To deny this postulate is to destroy all thought. It cannot be contended, in view of a sound metaphysic, that the presence of A X in all knowledge renders B unknowable. The whole study must be the discovery of the conditions of A X which enable B to be increasingly known.

Psychology, then (it may be concluded), cannot deny the possibility of true knowledge of the world. One contribu-

* Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 158, 162, 163.

tion, however, it does make to the subject of validity. Valuable and necessary as logic is in precluding much that is invalid, its net is not fine enough to ensure pure truth. It may be asserted that whatever logic excludes is undoubtedly false, but it cannot be admitted that everything which it accepts is to be credited as true. The remarkable thing about rationalizing is its show of logic. No confidence could be felt that all rationalizing would be detected by the application of logical tests. Not only must the process X be satisfactory, as logic insists. The mind A must also be qualified for its task, as psychology has discovered.

Rationalizing arises not in X, but in A; and is the result of disharmony in the mind itself. The remedy for rationalizing is not logical, but psychological. An ordered, disciplined, balanced, systematized, harmonious mind is the pre-requisite of true knowledge. "Know thyself," must be the precept for all who would know the world outside themselves. Coordination of mind and inward peace are the ethical conditions necessary to true knowledge. Self-knowledge is a form of moral discipline. Thus, although virtue is not identified with knowledge, it does appear to be closely allied as its condition. Clearly, in the light of modern psychology, all moral imperfection is a likely cause for rationalizing: and all failure in ethical development is a handicap to the acquisition of knowledge. The criterion of validity seems to be handed on from logic to psychology, and from psychology to ethics. Just as a false morality only produces inward unrest, complexes and rationalizations; so also a true moral stability must be allowed to be an aid to pure knowledge.

This consideration is of great value to the study of religious truth. The presence in the mind of sin unforgiven and of moral conflict unsettled, especially where there is accompanying repression, will be a likely cause for rationalizing. But the consciousness of sin forgiven, and the experience of moral atonement in the soul, are conditions which would free the mind for pure knowledge. Other things being equal, and within the sphere of their own observation and experience, the witness of religiously and morally good men is worthy of great respect and careful examination. In particular, if the claim to sinlessness on the part of Jesus Christ be allowed, the teaching given by Him must be accepted as all the more worthy of belief, just because, as

sinless, He would be free from the inner causes of rationalizing. It will appear once more in the following chapter, that, on the assumption of His sinlessness, the Mind of Christ was fully qualified to gain and reveal knowledge which, when tested by the demands of modern psychology, would vindicate itself as valid and dependable. If modern psychology proclaims that such and such inward conditions (e.g. repressions, complexes, conflicts, obsessions) vitiate the objective truthfulness of beliefs formed about life and the world; then it may be contended in reply that Christ, lacking all these subjective hindrances, must be allowed to be not disqualified for objective knowledge. If, then, knowledge of reality can be proved to be possible, Christ, being sinless, is not disqualified for such knowledge. In the next chapter we shall see that in addition to the negative qualification of sinlessness, the positive virtue of perfection would yield all the subjective conditions which modern psychology can stipulate as necessary to the discovery and revelation of objective truth.

CHAPTER II

PROJECTION AND INTERPRETATION

THE previous examination of rationalizing will help us here in trying to understand the disposition to project our own wishes upon the world outside. The world (as we have seen) cannot be known independently of thought; but to be known it must be freed from the projection upon it of our private ideas. If, in any particular field of study, we are reading into the object the fulfilment of our own unsatisfied cravings, then clearly we are not gaining knowledge of the world. This would be a case of the mind A using a process Y to project Q on to the surface of B. We must look more closely at this error, and study the case so that we may discover the condition of A which will allow a valid act of knowledge A X B. We must, that is to say, acquit ourselves of the charge that our conclusions are false because they are projections. And at the same time we must make certain that we are employing the method which will give us a valid interpretation of reality.

Dr. Brill writes: "There is a mechanism which we call projection by virtue of which we throw out to the outside world feelings and emotions which we have repressed. We say other people are saying or doing what we have repressed, what indeed we ourselves once would have liked to say or do." *

So far this may seem an unfortunate disability, but hardly a serious handicap in philosophy. This projection, however, may be directed not merely to individuals, but to the external world, or to God Himself. The man who habitually takes cynical or pessimistic views of life as a whole, is projecting his own bitterness and discontent upon society. There is also a tendency to project our ideas upon ultimate reality. Mr. Tansley says that primitive man "projects part of his own personality upon the forces of nature and thus per-

* Brill, *Fundamental Conceptions of Psycho-analysis*, p. 45.

sonifies and often defies them. . . . At a later stage in the process of projection we arrive at the conceptions of God and the devil. . . . At the last stage the devil is banished and God is represented as responsible for everything. . . . The projection of the most diverse human qualities upon God is discovered. Since Christianity became dominant, He is most universally the God of love, because the oppressed majority must have consolation, and also because more and more the tender instinct is felt to be the hope of humanity. God always stands for what is felt to be in the interests of humanity." This means that the whole of the teaching of religion about God is nothing other than projection. Psychologists, however, feel a need to save religion itself, even though all its teaching be rejected. Mr. Tansley goes on to say: "We cannot deny the truth of the substance of religion, though we may criticize many of its forms. *All universal and self-consistent expressions of the activity of the human spirit have a claim to the name of truth.*" This seems to offer a way of escape from subjectivity. Careful examination is required, however, for we are told that "projection seems to be as inevitable a function of the human mind as rationalization, and we cannot look forward to a time when either will fall into disuse." *

If we are ever to pass beyond the positive science of psychology to a normative study of metaphysics, a way must be found in which the mind may escape the disqualifications for truth-seeking inherent in these two activities. Surely such an escape is possible. If we are able to discover the causes of rationalization, then a remedy may be found by treatment of those inward conditions out of which this activity of the mind arises. Rationalization (it has been seen) is due to inward disharmony, to unresolved complexes, to sustained conflicts within the mind itself, to repressions of what is desired but undesirable. The correction of these evils, in the development of a stable moral character and the achievement of a unified personality, reduces, until it eliminates, this evil of rationalization. And even before such an end is accomplished, awareness of the likelihood that rationalizing will occur, puts us on our guard against its deception, and enables us to correct some of the errors it has produced. The type of mind and character already

* Tansley, *The New Psychology*, pp. 135–139.

studied as giving greatest freedom from rationalizing is also best qualified to deal with this problem of projection.

Let us inquire, at this point, what is involved in the act of projection. Referring back to those simple examples quoted at the beginning of the chapter, it is easy there to say that the thing spoken against another individual is not true, but is a mere projection of a suppressed wish of the speaker himself. This we can say with certainty, because we know the individual in question and know that what is spoken against him is untrue. Similarly with the personifications and deifications of primitive man; we know what birds and animals and trees and streams and hills and heavenly bodies are; and knowing that they are not either persons or gods, we have confidence in saying that the untrained mind is projecting its own emotions upon outside objects. It is assumed from such instances that when reality is conceived as God we have just a further instance of projection. Such may be the case; but the test which proves the other instances to be false projections is inapplicable here. No one knows reality well enough to know that it is not God. In this case, therefore, resort may be had to probability. Man, it may be urged, often does project falsely elsewhere, and so the chances are that he is projecting falsely here also.

Let us, in view of this contention, inquire into the falsity of projection in order to find out whether all projection is of necessity invalid. The conception of reality as God may be declared to be false for no other reason than just because it is a projection. Yet surely it is not the positive element in the projection that is erroneous, but the reference of that element to a wrong object. A statement is made by M concerning N which, although false of N, is true of M himself. It is a delusion of reference; but it is not a complete falsity. The attribution of personality to trees is a false reference; but the content of personality is true when referred to man himself. The reference of deity to animals is fallacious; but the idea of deity may be true, and only stand in need of proper reference. And the appropriate reference of the idea seems to be to reality. It is evident, however, so far, that the error of projection is its falsity of reference. Projection which had true reference would be true concerning the object. Projection is not of necessity false because it is projection, but because it attaches to a

wrong object. If the idea of God be a projection, its nature as projection does not of necessity imply the invalidity of the idea. In saying that man is probably projecting the idea of God upon reality, we have not proved the falsity of the conception of reality as God. That can only be proved by establishing an error in reference in attributing the idea of God to reality.

It cannot be held that because many ideas are misapplied therefore all must be, and always will be, misapplied. When we attribute personality to other men we are making a projection, but in this case the reference is justified. On witnessing a wound inflicted upon another we project our own sympathetic suffering upon the injured person and believe that he suffers what we should if the wound had been in our own flesh. This (once more) is a just reference. And with increasing knowledge and developing personality, false references in projection may be corrected by right references. Thus, projection does not necessarily cease as knowledge increases; since projection is not necessarily false. It may become perfectly true.

Accordingly, the conception of the love of God is not proved to be false because it is shown to be a projection. It may be a right reference. Again, many of the attributes of God may be falsely referred, but this does not mean that all are untrue. Here it may not be a simple alternative of true or false. The error may be a matter of degree. The question of projection upon reality, and interpretation of reality, must be examined metaphysically.

All that has been said about delusions of reference must, of course, stand. That is a matter of common experience. The point at issue is whether projection is false because it is projection, or whether it is false because of an error of reference. Is there, that is to say, a legitimate use of projection? Will the objective world receive some of our projections although it repudiates others? If projection is a fallacy as such, then, at last, we shall be driven to admit a repugnancy between reality and thought. This will mean that we shall once more be constrained to deny the postulate of logic which is the indispensable condition of any knowledge at all. For instance, some vague traces of projection could be discovered in most of our established theories about the world. Causation would be termed a projection of our

own experience of activity. Then it might be inferred that in consequence of the projection the idea of causation must be false. This, of course, is the metaphysic of Hume, which is implicitly assumed when projection as such is declared to preclude knowledge. But this metaphysic is discredited.

Instead of denying the possibility of any valid knowledge, it is more likely that the field of knowledge would be limited; and then what would be denied would be the possibility of valid knowledge beyond the limit. This, of course, would be the Kantian metaphysic. Kant said, in effect, that projection, properly tested and verified, was legitimate within the sphere of sense-perception; but projection upon what lay beyond that limit was an "illegitimate extension of the categories." To project our ideas upon the world as a whole, upon the universe, upon reality, was, according to Kant, fallacious. And such a metaphysical position would probably be taken up by the psychologist. In that case, love, mercy, goodness, fatherhood and the like attributes, might be projected upon human persons, where they would fit; but they could not be allowed to be projected upon reality conceived as God.

Two questions must be disentangled here: First, whether projections may be directed upon reality; and if so, secondly, whether such particular projections as the attributes of God are proved by experience to be errors of reference.

On the first question it may be said that the rejection of the Kantian metaphysic with its noumenon, removes all justification for saying that a projection upon reality is illegitimate and invalid, just because it is a projection. Either our minds are competent in virtue of their ideas and experience to know the world, or they are disqualified for the task. If they are competent, then it must be because their ideas and experiences, when rightly applied, fit the objective reality. Were there a complete repugnance, then there could be no knowledge. This must be the condition of knowledge, not only for parts of the world, but for reality as a whole. The attempt to set a limit to the reach of knowledge is only another effort to bolster up the noumenon, or unknowable reality beyond; and such procedure is metaphysically unsound. If the world and reality are knowable at all, it is because of the competence of the mind to know. This means that falsity is due to error of reference, and that

there are projections which are received by the world and by reality as true, at least as partially true. It may, therefore, be concluded that projections are not repudiated by reality, because they are the projections of our minds.

That some of the projections of the mind should fit reality is not strange. It only seems improbable in consequence of the tacit assumption, already noticed, that reality is reality as unknown, or reality as unrelated to all thought. As soon as it is accepted that reality is by its very nature related to mind, then the strange thing would be that all the projections of the mind should be untrue of reality. If the nature of reality is A X B, then the projection that A makes upon B does not fall outside reality. It has a place within reality, and the task is to find the place where it fits. A Y Q B is a falsity concerning B. Q does not fit reality there. A X B is the only truth in that connexion. But Q has its place elsewhere, and there in that place A X Q is the truth.

To suppose that the truth about reality is just that which we cannot know; and that what we are alone able to conceive about reality is of necessity untrue, is to think of truth as inherently independent of mind. To say that truth is unknowable is not very different from saying that truth is untrue. Truth that has essentially no relation to mind is at least a meaningless notion, if not indeed a self-contradiction. Once it is seen that all these difficulties arise through the tacit assumption of the uncriticized metaphysic which conceives reality as independent of mind, then these very things that seemed to preclude knowledge are seen to be, after all, just fresh aids to the elimination of error.

Turning now to the second question, it must be recognized that although projection does not invalidate all knowledge, nevertheless delusions of reference are very common. Wherefore, careful verification must always be made. This applies particularly to the projections which are made upon reality. Many projections upon God have been later repudiated as untrue in experience. At the same time, disproof of separate attributes, e.g. the notion of vengeance or of vindictiveness, is no disproof of God. Indeed the whole argument turns on the attributes of God, what are and what are not true, according to the only verification possible, viz. human experience of God. That various incompatible attributes have been believed of

God need not trouble us, since that is proof only that some of the attributes are untrue. In other words, it is the *nature* of God rather than the *existence* of God, which needs to be proved. First, then, it must be inquired what attributes are found in experience to be true of God; and secondly, it must be asked whether a God with such attributes can be regarded as expressing the truth of reality. The question is, which amongst the many attributes projected upon God are the truest in experience, and also the most consonant with ultimate reality? Not all these attributes are true of God, certainly are not the whole truth about the nature of God. But their origin in human needs and passions, in the consciousness of the herd, or in the moral consciousness of the individual, does not prove them all false, or any one of them wholly false. What attributes are true, and how far they are true, can only be established by consulting cumulative experience and, what is more important still, developing personality.

It is sometimes argued that when the attributes of God are tested by experience they are proved to be just delusions of reference, mere projections of our inner wishes and desires which have no place in reality and are therefore rejected by reality. Nevertheless, the belief, we are told, persists in the face of facts because of the subjective satisfaction which it yields. The eyes are shut to the repudiation of the belief by reality because we are unwilling to relinquish a faith and hope that sustain us.

First, it may be urged that the faith and hope which do sustain the mind of man are of great value. This point psychology, of course, would not only admit, but urge with insistence. When, however, psychology goes on to hint that the faith and hope may be false, surely their efficacy and value are reduced. To say of them, that they are false yet desirable, is but faint recommendation. Indeed, once their falsity is exposed their power is destroyed. And it cannot be a rational world in which deception and untruth are not only helpful, but almost indispensable, if the mind is to face reality, and not to be driven mad by the ghastly, cruel truth about the nature of ultimate things. Such a theory of the inadaptability of the mind to naked reality, and of the irreconcilability of reality to the needs of man's mind depends upon a metaphysical assumption that reality

is independent of mind. If mind is an integral part of reality, why should reality as a whole deny the claims of what is an essential part of its being? If reality is of the nature A X B, then it cannot be that hallucinations and delusions are helpful and needful to A in order that it may persist in the face of B. That any and every wish of the individual should be satisfied in reality is, of course, as absurd as the suggestion that every projection should be true. But A does not stand for any individual mind: A represents mind as such: and the demands of mind as such are likely to be met in the reality in which alone mind has its being, and in which mind is an essential element.

Tirades against nature, such as those issued by J. S. Mill and Huxley, even if true of nature, cannot be extended, without further test, to the whole of reality. Man's experience of reality is not identical with his scientific knowledge of nature. The verification of the attributes of God can only be sought in that experience which is best qualified to know God. If there is a moral condition to general knowledge, as seemed likely enough in the last chapter, much more does that hold in the case of knowledge of reality conceived as God. Only those who are capable of conceiving reality as God can possibly judge of the truth of the predicates about God. The argument leading to the moral conditioning of knowledge hinted at in the last chapter may now be amplified and made to suit the matter of projection.

Rationalizing is the outcome of repressed wishes, buried complexes and unresolved conflicts in the unconscious. It is a source of error wherever it occurs, because it colours and distorts our vision of the objective world. The removal of the causes of rationalizing increases the chance of pure knowledge. A mind free from disharmony and inward strife is thereby qualified to discover the nature of the world outside. In a given environment, two men may be found having equal mental training and equal intellectual endowment; but if one be the victim of complexes and repressions, and the other be a morally unified and stable nature, then the moral order and peace in the heart of the one will make him the better judge of the truth of the environment.

Much more even than in the case of rationalizing does this moral development of personality seem necessary if projection is to have a true reference. To take an instance,

a man who is so degraded that he is insensitive to everything in pain except the physical sensation of the moment, will not be able to know the truth about the sufferings of others. He will unwittingly project his own experience of pain upon all sufferers. It may fit the lower animals, but will be untrue of the nervous, highly cultivated animals, and will be much more untrue of the vast majority of human beings. Similarly, when it is a question of projection upon reality, spiritual poverty will be a serious disqualification. Not only is moral unification necessary to exclude rationalization, but spiritual enrichment is required in order that the projections upon reality may be high enough to have some chance of a reasonable degree of truth. With projection, as with rationalization, the way to escape error seems to be moral atonement and moral development.

The verification of the divine attributes lies exclusively with those who are able to experience them. If the astronomer sweeps the heavens with his telescope and reports that he has not found God there, we are not surprised, for God is not to be found thus. Similarly, if those who have subjective disqualifications declare that they have not found God in reality, that may be proof only that their inner state prevented the discovery. The only relevant verdict on such a subject must come from the experience of those who have the moral and religious nature. If it be objected that this is a reference to the few who are not typical of mankind, the reply must be: so much the worse for mankind. That a morally developed nature which is free from the consciousness of sin is the most competent to know truth, has already appeared. And it must be remembered that where there is development in process it is not the average which must be set up as giving the type, but the highest reach of the few who show the direction in which all are moving. The verification of the attributes of God must rest, therefore, with religious experience, and particularly with Christian experience.

Christian experience is qualified to pronounce a verdict on the nature of God because, on the one hand, it works for the salvation of man from inward strife, from self-centredness and from all other causes of rationalizing; and because, on the other hand, it brings enrichment of personality, development of self in love and all other aids to an

adequate projection upon reality. Clearly it cannot be held that the affirmations of an impoverished mind are of necessity true concerning God. What must be held, however, is that those ideas which, when believed, make for the growth and perfection of personality, are necessarily true, at least partially true, of reality. Whatever by being affirmed conduces to the perfection of personality; or whatever perfect personality is constrained by its own nature to affirm, must be the truth of reality. Otherwise, the inherent values for personality are not the truths for reality; and that means a disparity between the mind and the universe of which it is an integral part. Falsity appertains to imperfection. Increasing truth is apprehended by developing personality. The fullest and most authoritative truth is that discovered by the most perfect manhood. The moral and spiritual perfection of Jesus Christ is, therefore, the guarantee of the truthfulness of His revelation of God. Christ's teaching on God is the highest truth for man and the fullest truth of reality. Jesus Christ, being free from all inner causes of rationalizing, and having the most highly developed human nature, is the most trustworthy authority on the nature of God. The religious experience of Jesus Christ is confirmed in the experience of all the most Christlike of the saints and believers throughout the ages. But it is Christ Who, because He is sinless and perfect, is the great authority on the nature of God and the truth of reality.

Projection, then, is the only instrument we have for knowledge of reality; but, when rightly referred and relevantly tested, it becomes the key to the interpretation of the great mystery of life and existence.

We conclude, therefore, that the emphasis placed by modern psychology upon projection as a mechanism used in all attempts to gain knowledge does not preclude the mind from gaining a correct interpretation of the meaning and nature of the world of objectivity. Not merely religious knowledge, but all knowledge, would be reduced to illusion, if projection, as such, distorted the nature of the object to be known. What is false in projection, however, is its erroneous reference, and everything turns upon the test and verification. In the case of religious knowledge, discrimination between true and false projections in the attributes of God can only be sought in experience. The experience

which would be most valuable, both for the making and testing of projections upon reality conceived as God, would be the experience of a perfectly matured and perfectly balanced personality. Such a criterion we may find in the experience and teaching of Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER III

DETERMINISM AND RESPONSIBILITY

The discussion on determinism and free-will has been carried on for so long a time, and with such little result, that there is no need here to enter upon that argument. The chief value of the contest lies in the exposure of its worthlessness. For evidently enough, as it now appears, there was nothing to be gained from such a combat either for or against responsibility. The fury and relentlessness of the champions of free-will did not result from pure devotion to free-will, but from an unshakable allegiance to responsibility. When it became clear, as at last it did, that free-will was fickle and capricious and not, as had been supposed, indispensable to responsibility, then no more lances were broken. Responsibility, it appeared, had stood apart from the lists, not being greatly concerned for the issue. Therein lies the value of this passage of arms—the discovery of the serene aloofness of responsibility.

It must be made clear at once that the new Freudian postulate of psychological determinism does not destroy responsibility. The task before us is to investigate this principle of determinism, and to inquire whether in any measure it affects responsibility, and whether either determinism or responsibility conditions our knowledge of reality.

Modern psychologists are united in maintaining at once both determinism and responsibility. What we need to inquire, therefore, is how responsibility is able to rest upon a footing of determinism. To understand this we need to look further into the workings of the mind in order to discover in just what way the mental processes exhibit determinism.

The assumption made by the new psychology is that every thought, wish or act is caused by some antecedent, either in the conscious mind or, what is more frequent, in the unconscious. On this view undirected thought is the outcome

of an instinctive process, a buried complex or a disguised repression. And that much of our thought may be of this uncontrolled nature is true enough. But determinism cannot be defined in terms merely of the ill-regulated, dissociated instincts in the unconscious. Determinism, at this its lowest reach, if made absolute, would be indistinguishable from instinctive mechanism, and all thought would then be the by-product of unconscious reflexes. This assumption, however, cannot be true. Before proceeding to enunciate what seems to be the legitimate interpretation of psychological determinism, it seems advisable to make it quite clear that if such an assumption as that just noticed were made, then there would be no satisfactory explanation of mental determinism itself. Determinism, that is to say, would fail to explain its own nature. The hypothesis might be true as a description of a certain low state of life, but would be unable to offer any explanation why that state should ever change. It would be unable to tell how the state of mind thus described could come to give such a detailed account of its nature and workings as that contained in the hypothesis which is itself a product of those mental processes. A complete determinism founded upon this level of instinct and reflex proves its invalidity by defeating its own ends in a vicious circle. Somehow or other, this description given is itself as fully determined as everything else in consciousness and unconsciousness; and therefore must simply be taken as one more fact amongst the other facts, and as having no more claim to validity than any of them. A determinism of this kind does mean the denial of both responsibility and validity. And it is important to recognize this. When it is admitted that determinism is not incompatible with responsibility, the meaning is that determinism, rightly defined, upholds responsibility correctly conceived. Such an admission, that is to say, does not give sanction to any and every explanation of determinism, or to any and every view of responsibility. Passing from this false interpretation of psychological determinism to what seems to be its valid explanation, it must be insisted at the outset that the significance of the postulate of determinism lies in the fact that thought and conduct can be caused and controlled by an organized self. At a certain stage, thought and action may be very much the result of disconnected, dissociated instincts and reflexes; but there is

not precluded by determinism the possibility of order and unity being produced amongst these various "propensities." Whether this be a limitation of determinism by freedom need not be discussed. It is fortunate that determinism is sufficiently reliable to guarantee that when we have treated the root motives in the unconscious we have controlled the conscious activities. Herein lies the value of the postulate of determinism and its necessity to the moral life. What is false is any definition of determinism which rules out the possibility of treating and co-ordinating the causes of behaviour as they lie buried in the unconscious, instinctive nature of man. Since the whole of psycho-analysis aims at the treatment of the hidden sources of mental and nervous troubles, psychology cannot be holding a brief for mechanical determinism which works automatically and cannot be manipulated by the co-ordinated, integrated mind. The truth seems to be that, instead of mind being the mere product of the auto-mechanism of determinism, determinism, by its very fixity and dependability, may become, and ought to become, a most valuable instrument in the service of a developing mind. The whole question turns upon the kind of mind that can best utilize psychic determinism. What are the qualities of mind which enable it to be, not the victim, but the master of this mechanism?

The inquiry proposed by the above question will become all the simpler if, first, we make it more fully evident that determinism, in the only sense in which it can be accepted by Freudians themselves, in no way destroys the possibility of the supremacy of integrated, unified mind. This postulate, or law, of psychic determinism is framed as summarizing the truth about mind. It is not something that is imposed upon mind from outside of itself. Determinism is the law of the mind's own inner nature. So often, even to-day, a law or theory is regarded as having some sort of inherent force by which it dominates the things over which it is supposed to rule, so that whatever is swayed by law lacks "freedom." But even laws of nature are not imposed on nature. They are just statements of the truth concerning nature's ways. Much more when mind is the subject of law is this law just a description of the character of mind. If mind is determined it is only *mentally* determined. It is just because of this reliability in its own nature that mind is able

to gain self-mastery. Simple determination, however, is not the whole truth about the nature of mind. There are variations in mental determinism; and some states of mental determinism are more fully expressive of the inherent quality of mind than others. When a man has no fixed character, he will act and think according to numerous, ill-regulated motives. In his unconscious there will be no system and no unity. Now one instinct will prompt to action, now another. He will be determined, certainly; but what will be the cause of his behaviour will be now one feature of his mind, now another. He will never be determined by the whole self, just because the various inner promptings have never been blended into a stable self or fixed character. The man who has inward harmony acts and thinks always according to the law or determinism of his whole being. His thought and behaviour are integrated. In such a state, mind has come into its own. Together with determinism as a description of the nature of mind, there must go also the tendency of mind to gain full *self-determinism* through inward co-ordination.

The question raised above can now be readily answered. The condition of mind under which determinism becomes most fully the law of mind itself is the state of inner harmony.

Here it is that the bearing of responsibility upon determinism becomes evident. A man is only fully responsible when action or thought is determined by the perfectly unified mind, and so has become the expression of its true inner nature. Responsibility varies in degree with the gradual development of the self. Only the morally perfect are completely responsible. Here responsibility is used in the sense of personal responsibility. The subject of vicarious and social responsibility, though interesting and important, does not call for treatment in this place. It is a direct inference, however, that if the majority of men are only partially responsible, the remainder of the responsibility must fall, either on other separate individuals or on society as a whole. Responsibility, it will be seen, on this theory, is not proportional to the wrong done, but to the inner state of the wrong-doer. Responsibility increases with moral development.

Ethical freedom is the freedom of self-realization and of

self-determinism, and obviously this is dependent upon moral development; and the knowledge of truth is dependent upon both. Responsibility, or ethical freedom, in this sense, is indispensable to intellectual discovery, for the reasons which have already appeared. Determinism, no less than rationalization and projection, demands a full moral selfhood, as the only guarantee for true knowledge of reality.

It may safely be concluded from all that has gone before, that determinism, conceived as the expression of the inherent nature of mind and as the condition under which mind gradually comes into the realization of its true being, far from undermining responsibility, establishes it on a sure foundation. It is a qualified responsibility, just because it is a more clearly conceived responsibility. Determinism is very strict and does uncompromisingly rule out much (perhaps most) that is believed to be freedom. It lays down the inexorable rule that only the good are free: whence it follows that only the good (in a full sense) are responsible.

A further inference is also justified; only those who are responsible, good and free, are qualified to know the truth about reality. The examination of determinism brings further confirmation to the conclusion arrived at in the study of rationalizing, and again in the study of projection. Rationalizing is *determined* by inner strife and failure of integration amongst suppressed wishes and instincts. Projection with false reference is *determined* by a lack of balance and due proportion within the mind itself. When the full, harmonious personality of the morally good man has been educed, then there can be no rationalizing resulting from any repressed part of consciousness, because the whole of consciousness and unconsciousness will be organized for the one intellectual manifestation of the inward urge. The determinism will be that of the whole unified mind. The mind will think thus and thus because it is constrained, by the order and nature of its own being, so to think. Just as now it is already constrained to think certain truths (such as the axioms of mathematics and geometry), so then, because of its nature as a thinking mind in relation to the objective world, it will be likewise constrained to think certain other truths about reality. The projections of the mind upon reality will then be determined by the fullness, richness and harmony of the mind as a whole. That such projections,

constrained to be thought and believed by the inherent nature of mind that has come to itself, should be merely subjective and delusive, is an impossibility. Vagaries of thought may be fanciful enough, almost wholly false; but that what the mind is constrained to think, under the compulsions of the laws of its own being as mind, should be other than true, renders truth itself (as we have already shown) meaningless or even self-contradictory.

Mind has not yet come fully into its own, but it has so far come to itself that it can conceive wherein lies the perfection of its nature. The fullness of truth is only possible when the soul of man has attained its moral atonement. Meanwhile, truth is progressively discovered according to the degree of moral advance towards integrated selfhood.

All this has a very close bearing upon religion. For religion has as its aim just that atonement or redemption or reconciliation which is seen to be the condition of the knowledge of ultimate truth. Religion supplements and strengthens morality by giving to it a greater impetus to a complete wholeness of being. It becomes evident here once more that it is those who are truly moral and religious who, other things being favourable, are the best judges of the nature of reality. With such it is that the verification of the attributes of God must lie. The freedom from repressions and complexes which religion brings, by removing the cause of rationalizing, gives qualification for testing the truth about reality. The enrichment of nature which comes from religion fits a man for ampler and loftier projections upon reality. It is the religious who are best able to frame and test a hypothesis about the nature of God.

Accordingly, the study of the conceptions of the nature of God held by the great religious minds, and confirmed in the experience of religious souls, should be far from an unprofitable work for philosophy to undertake. In such a study, however, it will have to be borne in mind that it is the greatest religious minds who will speak with the highest authority.

The majority even of the religious are far from perfection. This means that according to the measure of their imperfection will be the likelihood of rationalizing and of projection with false reference. Against these things psychology puts

us on our guard. It would be a mistake, too, to assume that religion and morality are in themselves sufficient qualification for the interpretation of reality. It has appeared that the condition of truth-seeking is religious atonement and moral unity; but this is the *condition* for intellectual research and not its *substitute*. It is most unfortunate that so many religious men and women have left their intellects undeveloped, and so have failed of the more perfect integration and balance of their personality, just because this side of their nature has been neglected. A worse thing than neglect of intellect is, of course, suppression of thought on religious and ultimate things. Great pity it is that those who, by their religion and morality, are qualified to employ their intellect fruitfully upon the great problems of being and existence, should have left their mental talent unconsecrated and buried in the ground of their unconscious.

It is in Jesus Christ alone that we can look for that just balance between moral, spiritual and intellectual development which is the mark of full and perfect manhood. Psychologically considered, His qualifications for discovering and revealing the nature of God would be adequate and undeniable, if only the sinless perfection of His Personality could be accepted by psychology as indisputably established. Such a claim is made by Christian doctrine, and when brought to the touchstone of Christian experience its verification is also claimed as complete. The truth about God, and therefore about reality conceived as God, is believed by Christians to be declared by and in Christ. The differentia between a Christian metaphysic and any other would be found in the initial assumption of the vindicated authority of Jesus Christ as revealing in a measure the truth about ultimate reality. If the sinless perfection of Christ, which according to the argument here developed is the condition of His valid knowledge of God, can be made convincing to those who have not experience of the Christian religion, so much the better. But if not, it must be insisted that the only conclusive test of Christian teaching is Christian experience. To seek through intellect alone a proof of what can be known only by the intuition of developed moral personality is to seek what cannot thus be more than partially found. And, any way, Christian thinkers have as much right to attempt the construction of a Christian metaphysic

as any other philosophers to the exposition of their special theories of truth and reality. In saying this, the authority of Dr. Temple may be claimed. "Part of the trouble is," he writes, "that theologians have left the field of most general inquiry too largely to non-theological philosophers; they have tended to write either history or detailed discussions of particular doctrines. What is needed is the exposition of the Christian idea of God, life and the world, or, in other words, a Christocentric metaphysic." *

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 9.

CHAPTER IV

SUBJECTIVISM IN RELIGION

ANY argument from experience must be at special pains to safeguard itself against the charge of subjectivism. Whenever a conclusion is drawn from experience which purports to be true of the external world, then modern psychology is always ready to suggest that the origin of the particular judgment is to be discovered in the subjective rather than in the objective conditions. In doing this psychology to-day is fulfilling a necessary office, because it is always possible that our judgments relating to the objective world may be warped by the mind itself. There are states of mind which render the pronouncement of an unbiased, dispassionate verdict all but impossible. And what is already known to apply particularly, in cases where personal feelings are deeply stirred and personal interests widely affected, must be expected to apply also, in a measure, generally, and whatever the matter which is judged. Its application may be especially marked when the nature of reality is the subject under discussion. Systems of philosophy might, likely enough, be vitiated by deep-seated animosity in the soul of the philosopher. All this must be accepted; and in this thesis attention is constantly drawn to the subjective elements in experience; and, under the guidance of modern psychology, it is repeatedly emphasized that the validity of religious judgments cannot be allowed unless the subjective conditions of the personality passing judgment are such as to give qualification for the finding of an unprejudiced verdict.

The teaching of psychology which warns us that many objective judgments are largely coloured by the spectacles which the soul chooses whenever it views the matter, we gratefully accept, and shape our argument according to the evidence thus supplied. When, however, psychology proceeds in its confident manner to draw far-reaching epistemological conclusions without pausing to consult a critical metaphysic,

then we are justified (while accepting the psychological facts) in questioning some of the inferences drawn by the psychologists. If, for instance, it be suggested that all judgments are just working values for human consciousness, and carry with them no guarantee of objective truthfulness; then a theory of the nature of reality is being assumed which will not endure careful scrutiny. The fallacy of such an assumption can be exposed elsewhere. It is enough here to indicate that, although we must reject subjectivism as a philosophical theory, nevertheless we must examine carefully the subjective aspect of our experience before we can be entitled to pronounce any experience as valid.

Professor Matthews at this point puts us upon the right road, and the notice on his signpost should be read before beginning the journey. He says: "The confidence with which religious experience is appealed to must lead us to examine how far this appeal is justified, and to inquire how much weight may really be allowed to the intuitions of religious men. It is to be feared that the reliance upon religious experience is becoming, in many quarters, a catchword which covers destitution. . . . It may fairly be asked of those who would urge upon us the acceptance of religious experience as the solution of all our problems, that they should produce some reason for attributing to it an infallibility which is absent from all other kinds. . . . Writers who adopt the position which we are criticizing have usually in view some special type of religious life which they hold to be normative; but it must be evident that the selection of one type among many can only be made by the help of a criterion which is not religious experience. Selection implies criticism, and it may be presumed that those who, for instance, treat Christian piety as the example of religion *par excellence,* have some rational defence to offer for their choice. It will be found that no defence can be offered which will not involve, explicitly or implicitly, a view of the nature of reality." *

These necessary and useful injunctions are here being acted upon, first, by showing that the religious experience of Christ may be claimed as infallible just because the subjective conditions in the Person of Christ were unique, and such as would qualify Him for true knowledge of objective

* Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy,* pp. 6, 7, 8.

reality; and secondly, by showing that the view of the nature of reality implied in the Christian revelation is far more acceptable, philosophically, than the view implicit in those psychological theories which repudiate Christian teaching. The validity of Christ's experience is secured because Christ Himself was free from the inner causes of subjective taint. This claim to sinless perfection on the part of Christ will have to be examined later. But now, since there are subjective impediments in human experience which affect its dependableness, we must look to these inner causes of erroneous judgment. Only in so far as religious men and women are free from subjective handicaps will their evidence be of value as confirming the experience of Christ.

It is frequently necessary to defend the objectivity of religious experience against the charge of suggestion. Of course, the place of suggestion in religious experience must be allowed. What must not be allowed, however, is the assumption that as soon as any idea can be traced to suggestion its claim to objective truth is at once disproved. Suggestion is nothing but a mental process, and the content of suggestion, like any content of the process of thought, may be either true or false. The analysis which shows an idea to be the result of suggestion cannot pronounce upon its validity. Truthfulness attaches to the content of thought, and so is relatively independent both of the origin of a thought and of the process of its reception. Both the origin and process of apprehension of an idea indicate the need for careful scrutiny, but the validity of the idea itself must be verified by independent tests. The prevalence of much false suggestion would be no argument for concluding that no suggestion could be true. It is not enough to trace an idea to a process of suggestion and straightway to dismiss it as false. We have to resist this erroneous procedure. But we may notice that it is only one instance of the general charge that the subjective factors in experience render objectivity impossible.

The reason why theology is accused of subjectivism, while astronomy is allowed to escape, is not far to seek, and is of importance to the argument. In astronomy, as in mathematics, the emotions are not greatly stirred by the calculations which lead to the results. Failure in moral and emotional development would not greatly affect the accuracy

of the work, provided the intellect were well trained. If, however, the astronomer proceeded from his astronomical observations and calculations to attempt to understand the universe, then his moral and emotional deficiencies would be a serious handicap. It will be something over and above the findings of astronomical science that will lead one observer to say that he has swept the sky with his telescope and has not found God, and will lead another observer to say that he thinks God's thoughts after Him. What is important in these different cases of the theologian and the astronomer is the close reference of the one subject to human interests and feelings, and the comparative remoteness of the other. From this first consideration the proper inference to draw is, not that the study which is removed from deep human interests and has mainly intellectual attractiveness may have objective truth, while the other cannot: the proper inference is that whereas, in the one case, up to a point, intellectual qualification is sufficient guarantee of the discovery of objective truth, in the other case, since wide human needs are affected, the whole personality must be disciplined and equipped for the task of discovering truth.

In effect, the accusation of subjectivism is that all knowledge in the discovery of which the personal factor plays an indispensable part is invalid. Such sciences as can be studied without any great claims upon any aspect of personality except the intellect are allowed to reach objective truth. But when emotion and volition are also greatly affected by the matter studied, then it is said that only when cold intellect alone examines these things can truth be hoped for. We are now beginning to see what ought to be seen very clearly, that subjectivism first of all assumes (tacitly, of course) its own criterion of objectivity, and thereafter condemns everything which fails to satisfy this particular standard. That the canon of valid knowledge should be anything other than purely intellectual is not even suspected. And there it is that subjectivism may be attacked. What argument can it bring forward in support of this arbitrary procedure of taking one abstract feature of unitary personality and exalting that to the position of sole arbiter of things in heaven and on earth? Psychologically, one might have thought that such a method would be condemned as a mere survival of the faculty psychology. But perhaps the achievements of

this one faculty justify the conclusion that reason is and ought to be the lord of the passions. Let us ask, therefore, what kind of results are yielded where this principle is least hampered in its application. Take pure science—and what does it, or can it, offer, but the study of the forms and relations of things? What can a formula or a natural law tell us of the meaning of nature? What real understanding of the purpose of the universe can be afforded by astronomy? What satisfaction for the moral or emotional life can be derived from geology or biology? Such questions need not contain any exaggeration in order to bring home the point of the contention. Allow some moral and emotional satisfaction to arise from all such study. Still the question remains to be asked—Does the knowledge of the universe thus gained intellectually give an understanding of the universe which satisfies the full demands of personality? The retort that we have no right to expect that the claims of personality will be met, can be answered by the reminder that we have no right to expect that the claims of intellect alone will be met. If the moral and emotional sides of personality are as highly trained as the intellectual, then why should not the balanced demands of an integrated and developed personality be as fully met as the claims of intellect? Understanding, as distinct from mere knowledge, requires such personal qualities as meaning and purpose. And until such characters are discovered in the universe, the personality fails to understand. The assumption that it is illegitimate to seek for meaning and value or purpose and end, is due to the election of the intellect as sole guide to objectivity. Once it is seen that personality as a whole is the only dependable guide to the nature of reality, then the charge of subjectivity will have its force and be properly applied only when directed against an unbalanced, disintegrated, undeveloped personality. Then it will come as a surprise to those who have trained their intellect at the expense of their moral and emotional nature, to be told that their findings are under suspicion as being, partly at least, subjective constructions and the projections upon reality of promptings of their own unadjusted intellect.

There is a noticeable similarity between Professor Leuba's theories of the nature of God and those enunciated by psycho-analysts. And since Professor Leuba represents the

most extreme position of the psychology which repudiates the objectivity of the Christian Faith, we may well take him as the exponent of subjectivism. We have to deal now with a type of subjectivism which refuses to deny the reality of God, but affirms that what reality belongs to the idea is furnished not by ultimate reality, but by the unconscious of the race. God, in other words, is a projection of the unconscious. Yet there is a distinction between such a projection and other phantasies. For this idea of God comes not from the unconscious conceived as the result of individual repressions. It issues from the unconscious conceived as a racial memory. These two conceptions of the unconscious can be clearly distinguished, and it is a gain to recognize that the unconscious is not limited to this or that phase. The idea of God is not an individual projection: it is generic in origin. It stands for the basal humanity. Just as the totem, for instance a bear, does not mean this particular creature slain and eaten with proper ceremony, but bear-in-general; so God conceived as humanity, stands for the unconscious awareness of fundamental unity throughout mankind. It is the projection of racial gregariousness.

Professor Leuba, however, goes beyond those psychologists who are willing to equate God with the idea of humanity as a projection of unconscious racial gregariousness. He recognizes that religion demands as an object suitable for worship something higher than a mere universal proposition in relation to which the worshippers stand as particular instances. It must be an *ideal* humanity. But more than that is also recognized by Professor Leuba as necessary to the idea of God. There is not only a racial gregariousness craving satisfaction in religion, there is also what he himself terms "a cosmic gregariousness." God must be conceived as "Creative Energy," as "the centre of Psychic Power." Humanity, then, idealized and conceived as manifesting creative energy, will, according to Professor Leuba, serve as a sufficient object for religious experience.*

It must be understood that the religion for which humanity so conceived can stand in the place of God is a religion subject to certain qualifications which Professor Leuba considers justified. To begin with, religion is carefully isolated from philosophy by the refusal to allow to religion

* Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 335.

a cognitive or speculative element. "The outcome of speculative thinking is philosophy, of which religion may *make use,* but that is not a reason for confusing it with philosophy. The religious experience consists, *not in seeking to understand God,* but in fearing Him, in feeding upon Him, in finding strength and joy in Him." *

Professor Leuba seems to suggest that for all practical purposes the idea of an idealized humanity, somehow thought of as manifesting creative energy, will serve instead of a personal God of Holiness and Love. And he assumes that (since religion is only interested in the usefulness of its objects), provided the new idea works as well as the old, no complaint will be made. Philosophy may make what announcements it pleases about the nature of ultimate reality, but religion will be undisturbed so long as it can be supplied with some object which will be found to serve its practical ends. Granting that humanity, as conceived by Professor Leuba, would be a sufficient object for religious experience, as understood by him, we may, nevertheless, question his idea of religious experience, and conclude that religious experience, when more satisfactorily defined, would not rest content with the objectivity supplied by the idea of humanity.

Professor Leuba further resembles the psycho-analysts in his neglect of metaphysics. But even without very much philosophy, it might be expected of a psychologist that he would be unwilling to parcel out personality and distribute it amongst separate departments. The religious consciousness cannot rest content with a useful object to manipulate according to its own special ends. The religious consciousness must have a religious metaphysic. It must know that the object of its worship is true, and that it is the truth, not about itself, but about ultimate reality.

The criticism to be brought against the general position of Professor Leuba is, then, this—that the religious consciousness cannot be separated from the personality as a whole; from which it follows that no object can prove satisfactory to the religious consciousness which is not also satisfactory to the whole of personality. In particular it may be urged that no object which is unsatisfactory to philosophy can be satisfactory to religion. Of course, what seems true to philosophy may seem insufficient to religion;

* Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion,* p. 90.

but religion cannot continue to worship what it knows philosophy, on good authority, has declared to be false. Professor Leuba's attempt to escape from philosophy by exalting to the centre of worship an idea which no philosophy would call in question is not successful, because religion demands an object which shall be true as expressing the nature of ultimate reality. The device of conceiving humanity as manifesting creative energy will not answer, because it does not make the object of worship the ultimate reality of the universe. There is no escape offered from the circle of subjectivity wherein human subjects experience their own deeper selves. Professor Leuba says that "the conception without the belief in which no religion can exist is the conception of the source of Psychic Energy." * But here, once more, the limitation of religion to the human end is noticeable. Surely the religious man does not continue to worship because he believes that psychic energy has a source. For religion, everything turns upon the nature of that source. If the source of psychic energy be simply the unconscious in human nature, then it only needs to convince a man that his religion is the worship of the racial unconsciousness, and he will at once cease to worship, and attempt *to use* the unconscious by the practice of auto-suggestion. A God Who is simply *used* is reduced to the exact level of the unconscious in auto-suggestion, and so ceases to be God at all. Professor Leuba's failure lies in the absence of any recognition that religion implies, as its object, the ultimate reality. Everything, for the Christian religion, turns upon the question whether the ultimate reality can be conceived under the form of the God of Christian teaching.

With this estimation of Professor Leuba's general position, we will proceed to consider the special argument in his latest book. And such an investigation should prove well worth while here, since the case for subjectivism in religion is very forcibly presented in *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. The conclusion reached is that the purpose of religion has always been, as above noticed, to stand for the Life-Energy. Early in the work it is pointed out "that religion and the enhancement of life are inseparably associated. The substance of religious life is fre-

* Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*, p. 94.

quently described as communion with the Source of Life." * So we are assured at the outset; and towards the end we are told that, "it is evident that this Life-Energy does not delight in praises and thanksgiving; it is not the God worshipped in the Churches." † And again we read: "On the brink of unconsciousness, consciousness is at its simplest; it is continuity without parts and, therefore, let us say, eternal and timeless. This might be spoken of as the *urgrund*. . . . But what an incredible confusion it would be to regard the *urgrund*, so disclosed at the vanishing point of consciousness, as a revelation of the nature of the Perfect God made flesh in Jesus Christ and worshipped in the Churches." ‡ It must be recognized as a distinct gain that the Life-Energy or *urgrund* reached by mystic trance is not regarded as in any degree a substitute for the object of Christian worship. With that conclusion there can be no quarrel. The argument, however, is not content to affirm that what is left as the object of mystical experience, after psychology has tested and sifted it thoroughly, is something that supplies no sufficient ground for Christian doctrine. That would be true; and an inference therefrom would be permissible, and true, that the foundation of Christian Faith must lie elsewhere. The exhaustive examination of mystical experience carried out by Professor Leuba leaves no doubt in the mind that any "argument from experience" which depends upon the evidence of mystic trance for its verdict, must fail to carry conviction of any objective element expressive of a definitely Christian content. It is difficult, for instance, to resist the contention that "these experiences reveal not the Christian God, but the lawful workings of our psycho-physiological organism." § And again, when it is said: "For the psychologist who remains within the province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God, but of man,"‖ it is not easy to refute the argument. Clearly, therefore, it will be advisable to examine subjectivism as it is presented in the recent book by Professor Leuba.

Before indicating the manner in which the case presented

* Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 35.
† *Ibid.*, p. 318.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 316.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 316.
‖ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

in this present thesis escapes from such criticism as that just noticed, it will be well to investigate a little more fully the argument of Professor Leuba in order to estimate its legitimacy, and in order to discover whether it is altogether unquestionable, or whether, while some conclusions are irresistible, others are more open to dispute.

The method of argument in Professor Leuba's latest book is, then, briefly this: To begin with, the peculiarities of mystical experience are examined psychologically and their value for consciousness is estimated. Thereafter, exactly the same experiences, with precisely the same accompanying value, are produced artificially; that is to say, are produced entirely from the human side. To mention some of the instances: it is found that the effect of drugs may be to produce the same condition as mystic trance: under hypnotism the response of the patient may be identical with that of the mystic wrapt in ecstasy: or recovery from febrile conditions may induce the same state of feeling as we associate with religious experience: psycho-analysis is able to bring about just that change in personality which may result from the practices of the mystic way: by the stimulation of the sex organs the conditions of mystic experience may easily be produced: and the sense of presence, or of divine guidance, can be induced artificially without reference to actuality. Moreover, in whatever way it may have been induced, the value of the experience is found to be the same, a unification of mind and an influx of energy.

It must be noticed further that Professor Leuba finds that all the subjects of grand mysticism have been victims of eroticism. From this it might be inferred that mysticism is abnormal and must not be identified with general religious experience. Such an inference, however, is not allowed, for it is held that what becomes apparent owing to exaggeration in grand mysticism, is present in some measure throughout all religious experience. Certain neurotic eccentricities of the prominent mystics may be discounted, but the constant features of mysticism are incipiently present even at the earliest stages of religion. The subjectivism attaching to the mystic's experience belongs also to all religious experience. This factor in the argument is most important, although not made very apparent by Professor Leuba. For instance, the charge of subjectivism levelled against

mysticism might not seem serious when it was reflected that only a small number of religious people become subjects of grand mysticism. But that line of defence is not allowed. However objective religious practice may appear to be for the majority, its strength, we are told, is always supplied from the mystic side. We are to conclude, therefore, that for all religious experience, mysticism is the organ of divine knowledge. The human end of revelation, so to speak, is a mystic awareness of God. In mysticism, and in mysticism alone, so Professor Leuba would have us understand, do we find the evidence for our beliefs concerning the nature of God. It would follow, therefore, that if the inner experiences of mysticism can be proved conclusively to offer no support for the belief derived from them, then the Christian Faith can have no foundation.

We have now the argument of Professor Leuba before us in general outline and, it is hoped, fairly presented. We are in a position, therefore, to offer any criticism that may seem justified, and to ascertain to what extent the argument of this present thesis must be influenced by the results of Professor Leuba's inquiry. The first thing to be said is that any argument from experience must be very chary in basing its conclusions upon human experience, *as interpreted by the subjects of the experience.* After weighing the evidence brought forward by Professor Leuba, it may be necessary to explain the whole of mystic experience in a manner very different from that customary amongst the mystics themselves. The rejection of the mystic's own interpretation of his experience does not, however, necessitate the acceptance of the interpretation given by Professor Leuba. The true psychological nature of the facts may be exposed by his thorough examination conducted with such ingenuity: but the metaphysical significance of those facts must be a matter of philosophical criticism. And it must be insisted that when the meaning of the facts is in question, Professor Leuba's explanations are not to be accepted without criticism, any more than were those offered by the mystics themselves.

From the observations so carefully made, Professor Leuba draws certain conclusions about the nature of the objective element in religious experience. We say nothing about the observations, but we must point out that the conclusions are partly dependent upon two assumptions which lie quite out-

side the regions of the observations made. These two assumptions we must examine. The first assumption is implicit, and probably unrecognized. It is assumed that the only possible foundation for objective religion must be in subjective experience. The only proof we could have of the nature of God must be drawn from direct human experience of God. This being allowed, it follows that if such experience can be shown to offer no proof whatever of the nature of God, then the conclusion must be that God is unknowable. Such an argument would be irrefutable, once the premise were allowed. In point of fact, however, the argument of Professor Leuba is not quite so unexceptionable as it at first appears. For his conclusion is not that God is unknowable, but that the nature of God is such as we discover by direct mystic experience. This content of mystic trance it is that provides the true object of religion. The theological idea of God is a false projection. The objective element in all religion, we are told, is the Source of Psychic Power. Let us then, says Professor Leuba, project upon this centre, not the idea of God, but the idea of an ideal humanity. Passing over the difficulty that humanity is no less a projection than God, and a less satisfactory one, we will fix upon the one assumption under consideration, viz. that the object of religion *can* be discovered from direct experience: that—after all attributes of that object which cannot be proved from the experience itself have been discarded—the object is found to be the bare fact of the life-force: and, that the object, with its attributes, *cannot* be known in any other way than by direct experience.

Now, two kinds of knowledge are usually recognized by philosophy—knowledge by acquaintance, and knowledge by description. What Professor Leuba here says, in effect, is that all knowledge of God which comes by description must be rejected. That means that the whole of the interpretation given to experience must be denied. What can be affirmed is just what is given by acquaintance, without any interpretation whatsoever; and that, of course, is found to be (the only thing that it could conceivably be) the mere awareness which distinguishes consciousness from unconsciousness. Having stripped personality of every attribute except that of life, Professor Leuba discovers that all that is left as the object of consciousness is just life. Such a procedure is

psychologically most interesting and valuable, but epistemologically it is worthless. The process by which we gain knowledge is always complex. The object of knowledge is never a thing of which there is mere passive awareness. The object of knowledge is always actively apprehended. What Professor Leuba describes as the object of mystical experience is what Spencer and James noticed and described as the first and rudimentary awareness of untrained consciousness—it is a homogeneous, undifferentiated mass, a great big buzzing confusion. But the object of knowledge is heterogeneous, precise, correlated and differentiated. Has Professor Leuba really done more, therefore, with his observations of mystic experience than could be done similarly in reference to the whole of everyday experience? The same results could be gained by gradually simplifying the consciousness of any experient until, by such reduction of the field of attention, there should be reached at last that minimum of awareness-without-interpretation which is the mark of the very beginning of infant life. To assume, on the evidence of such an experience (as Professor Leuba assumes on the evidence of mystic trance), that the element of objectivity in the everyday world is just an unqualified life-force, would be an epistemological absurdity. Psychologically, our awareness of the objective world is limited to the psychological present which is perhaps not more than an eighth of a second. Everything else, if you like, is mere constructive interpretation resulting from tradition, and is no part of the immediate datum of consciousness. Psychologically considered, not only our religious knowledge, but also our knowledge of the physical universe is in a most parlous condition. Why are we not called upon in the name of psychology to disbelieve in the whole superstructure of interpretation projected upon the mere awareness of rudimentary consciousness, which by way of objectivity is presented with nothing more definite than a sort of a something?

In the case of our knowledge of the world, our acquired and inherited explanations are allowed to be valid because they can be verified up to a point. What, therefore, we claim for religious interpretations is that they also should be tested in the same way as other constructions upon immediate experience and that if they stand the test they also should be

deemed valid. All knowledge is in a measure foreknowledge. All perception is in large part pre-perception. Where there is no apperception-mass there is very little observation. If the psychologist should demand of us that we must remove from consciousness all foreknowledge, all pre-perception, and then see what we are left with, we could tell him at once what would remain. The object of such consciousness would resemble the object of mystical trance. But if, on the evidence of a process of verification which is just a special application of the argument from experience, we are allowed to continue our belief in the traditional attributes of the external world, why, on evidence gained by the same argument, may we not retain the traditional attributes of God?

In point of fact, Professor Leuba's position does not take into account what is fundamental for Christianity, viz. that the nature of the object of religious awareness is revealed objectively. Unless the doctrine of the Incarnation can be proved to be a metaphysical impossibility, then it must be accepted as providing a criterion of objectivity. The interpretation which the mystic brings to bear upon his experience, in so far as it is derived from individual abnormality, will probably be erroneous; but in so far as it is drawn from the revelation of God in Christ, it will be true. Once the Incarnation has given us a footing in objectivity, it need not concern us that all the subjective conditions of mystic experience can be induced artificially from the human end. And when so induced, it need be no surprise that their explanation as offered by the subject should be given in the traditional religious terms. All that is what would be expected.

Professor Leuba is at fault, epistemologically, in assuming that experience-without-interpretation gives more valid knowledge of objectivity than experience which is interpreted in the act of being received. The whole problem turns not upon the simplification of experience, but upon the verification of the complex process of apprehending the meaning of experience. The interpretation of religious experience in the light of Christian teaching is held to be valid for two reasons: first, because the nature of Christ guarantees the truthfulness of the revelation; secondly, because such a faith leads to the most complete development of personality and to the most satisfactory adjustment of personality to reality.

Since Professor Leuba's own method of treating experience when he deduces his conclusion is epistemologically unsound, it is legitimate to reject Professor Leuba's alternative to Christianity. And because Christian doctrine is able to furnish a more satisfactory metaphysic than can be offered by Professor Leuba's theory, it seems obvious to prefer instead the revelation in Christ.

This brings us to the second great assumption made by Professor Leuba. This assumption, unlike the former, is made explicitly. It is assumed that, because the Christian conception of God cannot be identified with the absolute of monist philosophers, therefore Christianity and metaphysics are for ever irreconcilable, and that Christianity accordingly must vanish. There would, however, be no gain to religion if the God of Christian revelation were rejected and the absolute of monism accepted as a substitute. The absolute is not an object suitable for worship and, therefore, is unsatisfactory to religion. The difficulty is not met by setting up as an object of worship the ideal humanity. Even though such an object might be acceptable to monism, it would fail no less than the absolute to meet the needs of religious worship. Two qualities seem to be necessary in the God Who is to constrain worship; He must be conceived under the form of personality, and He must at the same time be conceived as the ultimate reality. The assumption of Professor Leuba, that the philosophy of monism is the sufficient and final word upon the nature of ultimate reality, is not uncommon among those who make occasional excursions into the domain of metaphysics for the express purpose of seeking sanction for an anti-religious conclusion, which the facts themselves as studied in their special field of inquiry do not warrant. Monism is only one among several philosophical theories, and is showing itself to be by no means conclusive. Other systems of philosophy, such as vitalism and personal idealism, are far more consonant with Christian teaching, and in themselves are far more convincing. It is open for Christianity, however, to develop its own metaphysic and to prove that the theory of the universe invoked in its particular doctrines, is able to vindicate itself against criticism, and is able to offer the most satisfactory conception when tested by its influence upon developing personality and by its establishment of a harmonious adjustment

between personality and reality as a whole. The outline of such a metaphysic is sketched elsewhere. Here it is sufficient to expose the unjustified assumption of Professor Leuba that Christianity is incompatible with any reputable metaphysic.

In concluding the present chapter it may be reiterated that Professor Leuba's method of investigation, though psychologically justified, is inadmissible for epistemological purposes. While accepting his psychological observations, therefore, we are bound to reject his philosophical conclusions. By applying an accredited theory of epistemology to the experiences investigated, and by setting the facts thus explained in a different metaphysical environment, the conclusions would be quite changed and also better attested. Over against Professor Leuba's finding may be set the conclusion of another psychologist who has made a very thorough study of mysticism. "The spiritual world," says Professor Pratt, "from which saving experiences come, could never be the object of psychology, and could never be scientifically proved to exist except through the complete failure of psychology in some one particular spot. But the real influence of such a world, or such a God, upon the minds of men is in no wise incompatible with any descriptions of human experience which psychology has as yet given us, or seems likely ever to give." *

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 457.

INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN
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PART II

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

CHAPTER I

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN AND THE THEORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

THE attempt must be made in this and the succeeding chapters of Part II to bring together some of the main teachings of the Christian religion and certain relevant findings of modern psychology. Our study in Part I has taught us to think that the religious mind may obtain valuable knowledge concerning ultimate things. We have learnt also to understand that this knowledge is subject to development; that it is not free from admixture of error; and that the peculiar causes of error, which we have discovered, are least present in the most fully developed religious personalities. We take, therefore, the teaching of Christ as expressing the knowledge of the religious mind that is free from all moral imperfection: and that teaching we consider, on the hypothesis of Part I, to have the greatest authority. The understanding of this revelation, however, is conditioned in part by the intellectual, moral and religious state of those who seek to learn. We may assume, therefore (and we have a saying attributed to Christ in confirmation of this), that it is possible to discover yet fuller truth along the lines of investigation laid down by Christ Himself.* Accordingly, it is not unlikely that modern psychology may give us the clue to a better understanding of that knowledge of reality which was imparted in so full a measure by Christ. The task will be to seek in how far and in what ways psychology does supplement or correct or receive challenge from the teachings of religion. And here it may be said that there is little likelihood of the *facts* being called in question on either side. The need will be to adjust the interpretation of the facts so that the whole of experience may be covered.

One of the characteristics of modern psychology, as distinguished from the traditional psychology, is the importance

* John xvi. 12, 13. I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He the Spirit of Truth is come, He will guide you into all truth.

which it attaches to the unconscious. We want, therefore, to ask whether, in view of this new research, the conception of man as the subject of religious experience needs to be amplified or modified. To this end we must ascertain as precisely as may be what meaning psychology to-day attaches to the term unconscious.

Any definition of psychology which reduces it to the study of consciousness must be ruled out, because the mind has been shown to have unconscious processes. Indeed, the contention to-day is, that the greater part of the mind's energy and activity lies in the unconscious, and that there it is that our conscious actions and thoughts have their origin. The tendency is to degrade consciousness and regard it merely as the inevitable consequence of unconscious processes. Accordingly, psychology might be tempted to assume the title of the study of the unconscious. The value and meaning of the unconscious must, however, always be given in terms of consciousness, and must depend upon the relation, actual and possible, between the unconscious and the conscious sides of the mind. And it will be contended here that religion makes possible the spiritually highest and morally most desirable relations between man's conscious mind and the unconscious within him.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to state precisely what is the content of the unconscious. Any definite limitation of the unconscious would, in fact, be unjustified by our present state of knowledge. To say of the unconscious, thus far it extends and no farther, is an unwarranted assertion. The present danger is, however, that such an assertion should be made. Having ascertained certain things about the unconscious, there is a temptation to define the unconscious in terms of such discovery, and to imply thus that the unconscious is no more than these things. For instance, one of the most faithful of Freud's disciples, Dr. Ernest Jones, is able to give an exact analysis of this notion. The exactness, of course, may be justified; but has the further assumption of exhaustiveness any sufficient warrant? It is against such a tacit or implicit assumption as this that we want to guard. For, on such an assumption of the limitation of the unconscious certain things might be said against the possibility of spiritual development, which objections, without that foundation, would be groundless. Conversely, such an

assumption of the limitation of the unconscious being rejected, a conception of human personality, justified on other grounds, will not be liable to rejection on the score that it finds no support in the Freudian unconscious.

We have no concern here to give any analysis of the unconscious. That we leave to the psychologists. Our object is to learn what they have to say, and to seek the most satisfactory interpretation for the facts they have discovered. But it is necessary to protest against the exclusive definition of the unconscious which makes it identical with repression.

And now we must turn to the Christian doctrine of man to inquire how far any conception of the unconscious will suit that teaching; and to ask what conception is most consonant with the religious belief of the nature of man. Here, on the side of doctrine, it is not a theological discussion that is undertaken. It is the general consensus of Christian belief that must be studied. Detailed expositions of dogma must be sought in the writings of the theologians. Apart from all that, however, certain general beliefs are everywhere accepted by all Christians. It is to some of these that we must look. The most characteristic belief founded on Christian teaching and confirmed by Christian experience, is the conviction that the truth about man is not what he is now, but what he may become.* The Christian conception, that is to say, is distinctly teleological. That man is at present in a state which is other than that in which he would be most truly himself and would most fully realize his end or purpose, is the doctrine of sin; and that doctrine will be postponed for treatment later. The means by which a man attains to what he might be, is the doctrine of salvation; and that also is left over for another chapter. Here the consideration is that the truth about man is not found from a study of his present condition, but from the discovery of his goal or telos. Christianity teaches, then, that man has a purpose to realize, and an end to attain; and it teaches further that this state to be reached is one in which a certain relationship is established between the mind and God. The

* John i. 12. As many as received Him, to them gave He power to *become* the Sons of God.

I. John iii. 2. It doth not yet appear *what we shall be,* but we know that, when He shall appear, *we shall be like* Him, for *we shall know Him* as He is.

Eph. iv. 13. Till we all *come* unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.

conception of God belongs to another chapter, as does also the part that God plays in bringing this relationship into effect. Here the point to be emphasized is, that the doctrine of man affirms that the truth concerning man lies in the possible relationship between the mind of man and the Spirit of God.

Now this perfect state of man, which is the end or purpose of his human nature, is the attainment of an organized self, an integrated personality and a responsible moral soul. Such a state (we have seen in Part I) is the condition of the knowledge of God. Christianity sometimes defines the goal of human effort as the knowledge of God, which knowledge is declared to be the same as that type of life, the distinctive quality of which is called eternal.* Sometimes the state is described as one in which the love of God is experienced by man.† Again, sometimes, the end is said to be reached by a knowledge that is conditioned by co-ordinated, directed, purposive behaviour.‡ All such declarations are emphatic teachings which agree in making human perfection consist in the moral and spiritual unification of personality in its single direction towards God. The end of man, as sought by Christianity, is affirmed to be no partial development of thought, emotion or will, but the attainment of a full, abundant life.§ The consequences of such a realization of the self are dwelt upon as peace, joy and power; which are the attributes of a rich, balanced self.‖

* John xvii. 3. This is eternal life, that they might *know* Thee, the only true God.

Phil. iii. 8. The excellency of the *knowledge* of Christ Jesus.

† John xv. 9. Continue ye in My *love*.

I. John iv. 19. We *love* Him because He first loved us,

Rom. v. 5. The *love* of God is shed abroad in our hearts.

‡ John vii. 17. If any man will *do* His will, he shall *know* of the doctrine.

Rom. ii. 7. By patient continuance in *well-doing* seek for glory and honour, and immortality, eternal life.

§ John x. 10. I am come that they might have *life* and have it more *abundantly*.

John xiv. 19. Because I live *ye shall live also*.

Gal. ii. 20. I *live*, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.

‖ John xvi. 33. These things I have spoken that ye might have *peace*.

John xv. 11. These things have I spoken unto you, that My joy might be in you, and that *your joy* might be full.

Phil. iv. 13. I can do all things through Christ which *strengtheneth* me.

Gal. v. 22. The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance.

On the psychological side, accordingly, man comes to himself and realizes the truth about his own inherent nature, when he becomes an organized self and an integrated personality. This realization of the true manhood means liberation from complexes and repressions. Such a life is not at the mercy of unconscious motivation; but, instead, the power of the unconscious is harnessed to the conscious will.

Two questions remain to be answered on this subject of the doctrine of man. First: What is the relation between such a self and the unconscious in man? Secondly: What is the influence of religion upon man's unconscious?

The first question can be answered quite briefly. The doctrine of man is confirmed by modern psychology. And more than that, the urgency and necessity to reach the Christian ideal of manhood is made apparent. Clearly, on all views of the unconscious, it is dynamic. Whatever be the source of its power, it is evidently a store-house of energy. When there is moral anarchy, undeveloped character, dissociated personality and disintegrated behaviour, then the repressions and divisions within the mind occasion a dissipation of energy in the unconscious. When these imperfections are overcome in the development of a Christian manhood, then the complexes are released by the experience of forgiveness; the moral conflicts are resolved in the stability of a unified mind; and in consequence, the vitality is no longer sapped and wasted, but is conserved and released, giving new strength for the tasks and duties which are then deliberately and whole-heartedly chosen by a mind that is no longer distracted. Whatever view of the unconscious be taken, it is indisputable that a disorganized self means a waste of energy, while a harmonious mind means an economy of strength. Hence a Christian manhood always makes for a disciplined and controlled unconscious.

The more difficult question must now be dealt with. The various ways in which religion may be connected with the unconscious can be indicated by the following questions. Is religion an affair of the conscious self only, and unrelated directly with the unconscious? Or—Is it primarily a matter for consciousness, but also in a subordinate way, an influence unconsciously received? Or—Is it equally concerned with the conscious and the unconscious? Or—

Is it predominantly an affair of the unconscious mind? Or —Is it wholly an unconscious process?

This series of questions seems to exhaust the possibilities. The last may perhaps be ruled out at once. No religion which has any teaching at all can be exclusively concerned with the unconscious. Teaching, however, such as that of Plotinus and the mystics generally, while recognizing the conscious mind as a medium for instruction, lays stress upon the unconscious as the agent which alone is qualified to obtain knowledge of reality. Ecstasy and trance then become the conditions for closest and fullest relationship between man and God. There is much evidence of the value of mysticism, and in justice to such experience some place must be found in the complete system of religious doctrine for the mystic's direct sense of God. It is not imperative, however, that the first place shall be filled by this unconscious awareness which religion may give of the reality within or beyond the self. What has gone before in this essay seems to disqualify the unconscious from becoming the organ of religious knowledge, until it has been first disciplined and controlled by a unified and atoned consciousness. The absence of moral stamina in some mystics (which is comparable with the moral instability of some mediums) may, likely enough, result from the lack of development and discipline in the conscious mind, accompanied by an exaggerated view of the significance of unconscious processes, merely in virtue of their unconsciousness. It must be insisted here at once that the unconscious has no qualifications for gaining knowledge of reality merely because it is unconscious. What the Freudians tell us about the unconscious is at least part of the truth, and in the case of morally and spiritually ill-regulated natures, a large part of the truth. And a nature which is torn and distorted in the unconscious by repressions and complexes cannot be considered as qualified, through the unconscious, to gain knowledge of reality. Once more, though indirectly, we gain confirmation of the hypothesis that knowledge of reality as God is morally and spiritually conditioned. The knowledge of God is gained, this essay contends, not by the exercise of powers through a crude, rebellious unconscious, but through the understanding which is possible in full only to a perfectly organized mind. Hence

we must discountenance the mystics and theosophists when they claim to know God by unconsciousness as such.

The hypothesis of the moral conditioning of religious knowledge implies that religion is not concerned *primarily* with the unconscious. But before coming to a closer consideration of the influence of religion on the unconscious, it is necessary to deal with the possible objection that religion has nothing whatever to do with the unconscious. It is not difficult to understand the motive which prompts those who wish to save religion from all association with the unconscious. The popular, distorted exposition of the matter is due to a misunderstanding of Freud's conception of sex. Nevertheless, with all due allowance made for that, it may still seem undesirable, or even impossible for religion to be related to the unconscious, as conceived by Freud. And indeed, if the existence of the unconscious were due solely to repressions, then the utmost religion could do would be to destroy the unconscious by relieving the repressions. Or, alternatively, the unconscious might be maintained by religion through the support of some already existing repressions, or by the creation of new repressions. But in that case, Freudian psychology might repudiate religion as a harmful influence. It is not easy, therefore, to establish any abiding influence between religion and the unconscious as conceived by Freudians. But once it is admitted, as we contend it must be, that this analysis is not exhaustive; then the work of religion might conceivably be to change the unconscious from being predominantly Freudian, and to make it increasingly non-Freudian. Freud has discovered certain harmful activities of the unconscious. But it may also have beneficial activities unnoticed by Freud. Conceived as a source of power, its energy may be used either for advantage or disadvantage. Religion may be able to effect the desirable change and make the power of the unconscious serve good instead of evil. The strength of the instincts, let us suppose, comes from the unconscious. If the instincts be baulked, then the energy is diverted and is wasted in the unconscious, with the result that it fails to reach the level of the conscious mind. But if the instincts be satisfied, then their strength flows from the unconscious to increase the vitality of conscious life. It seems to be the case that behind the instincts there is greater power than is needed for the discharge of

their special functions. Wherefore, if they be checked, a surplus energy is wasted; and if they be satisfied, this surplus is available to increase the general vitality. We are assured by modern psychology that, whatever else may also be true of it, one characteristic of the unconscious is its dynamic nature. That being so, it will follow that one of the chief points of contact between it and religion will lie here in its energizing effect. Only, it must not be insisted by Freudians that the dynamic is due solely to repression. The energy is there already available for use. Repression means its diversion and dissipation. But the organization of the self, beginning with the instincts normally satisfied or sublimated, and ending in completely integrated behaviour, means the control and utilization of this energy.

It is being contended here that religion, by cultivating the wholeness or health of personality, provides the channel for the flow of energy from the unconscious. The only question seems to be whether religion also does anything to increase this power. For in preparing the condition which makes this energy available for the tasks of the conscious life, religion is, after all, only dealing with consciousness. If there is any bearing of religion upon unconsciousness, then (as we have seen) religion, aiming at the abundance of life, must touch the unconscious at the point where it becomes the source of power and vitality. That such an increase is actually forthcoming as a result of religious dependence and faith, receives much evidence in the experience of prayer. Whether, however, this strength comes through released complexes, or whether it really is a supplement and accession to the power of the unconscious itself, is a question that cannot be answered at this stage of the argument. It belongs to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and will only be answerable after the nature of God, according to the testimony of experience, has first been studied. In this place it is sufficient to have established the possibility of religion reaching its goal of abundant life by contact with the unconscious conceived as the source of energy. Far from wishing religion freed from all reference to the unconscious, it is evident that the end of religion may be more fully realized through some touch with the unconscious mind. The repugnance between religion and the unconscious is removed

when the Freudian conception is seen to be partial and not exhaustive.

It must have become clear, however, that even if religion does have an effect upon the unconscious, what is crucial is still the effect upon consciousness. For a supplement to the energy of the unconscious is little gain, if already the power in the unconscious is being wasted below the level of consciousness owing to the undisciplined and undeveloped state of the conscious mind. The prime condition of religion attaining its goal lies in the influence it has upon the conscious self working for the integration and wholeness of personality. Accordingly, of the series of possible questions given above, that question which is answered is the one asking whether religion is primarily concerned with the conscious self, and in a subordinate way with the unconscious too; and the answer to this is in the affirmative.

The doctrine of man, however, does not need to be modified in the light of modern knowledge of the unconscious. We may accept the finding of psychology and still remain convinced that the Christian teaching on the nature of man is the highest and fullest truth concerning our humanity.

Mr. Trotter very aptly reminds us that we are not to accept from psychology alone any final ruling on the question of the nature of ideal manhood. For what is statistically or psychologically "normal" may differ greatly from what is morally and religiously ideal. The valuable criticism he offers on this point had better be quoted in full. "*Normal* is no more than a statistical expression implying the condition of the average man. It could scarcely fail, however, to acquire the significance of healthy. If once the statistically normal mind is accepted as being synonymous with the psychologically healthy mind (that is, *the mind in which the full capacities are available for use*), a standard is set up which has a most fallacious appearance of objectivity. The statistically normal mind can be regarded only as a mind which has responded in the usual way to the moulding and deforming influence of its environment—that is, to human standards of discipline, taste and morality. If it is to be looked upon as typically healthy also, the current human standards of whose influence it is a product must necessarily be accepted as qualified to call forth the best in the developing mind they mould. . . . When the patient's mind gains, or

regains the *normal* condition, however precious such a cure may be to the patient, and however interesting to the physician, its value to the species has to be judged in relation to the value of the *normal* to which the patient has been restored—that is, in relation to the question as to whether any move, however small, in the direction of *the enlargement of the human mind* has been made." *

The justice of this criticism offered by Mr. Trotter lends confirmation to the Christian doctrine of man. Ideal manhood, as set forth by Christianity, is a far higher type than the psychologically "normal" man. Christian personality is not merely an adaptation to existing environment; it is an adaptation to the environment of the Kingdom of God. The distinguishing feature of a Christian character is its relation to God. The end of a man and the true nature of man are to be found in a certain relationship between the mind of man and the Spirit of God.

* Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,* pp. 78, 90.

CHAPTER II

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN AND THE THEORY OF COMPLEXES AND REPRESSIONS

SINCE the truth about man is to be found in the revelation of what he may become, it must be equally true of him that he has not yet attained to his full and perfect state. This falling short of the consummation of his being is designated by religion as sin. Obviously the nature and the measure of sin depends upon the idea of the goal of human nature. Christianity (we have seen) affirms that the truth about man is the possibility of his attaining to a state of being in which a certain relationship with God will be experienced. Sin, therefore, may be regarded, either as the failure to attain an ideal state of manhood, or as inability to stand in a proper relationship with God. The two conceptions are closely connected. For unless the state of perfect manhood be reached, the perfect relationship between man and God cannot be effected. The religious aim and the incentive to attainment is, however, the enjoyment of fellowship with God rather than the achievement of perfect self-development. Self-realization brings capacity for the enjoyment of God; and fellowship with God fosters self-development. Psychology stands for perfection of manhood. Religion stands for communion with God. But communion with God implies perfection of manhood. Thus we reach the end of an organized, atoned personality which is (as we have seen already) the condition of the knowledge of reality as God: and this knowledge of God, thus conditioned, is the aim of religion. Here, then, psychology and religion are once more complementary. When sin is regarded as failure in moral and spiritual adjustment, that is one aspect of what may also be regarded as error in the knowledge of God. Sin means either, on the side of psychology, an unatoned, dissociated personality; or, on the side of religion, a false relationship between the soul and God. Each implies the other.

The knowledge of reality as God lies in the field of epistemology, and so is partly outside the region of psychology. Nevertheless, psychology is called up to study those conditions which alone make such knowledge possible, and also those conditions which vitiate or preclude any such knowledge of God. Psychology, that is to say, must carry the investigation up to a point, and there must hand it over to epistemology or to religion. Thus, psychology will cover the doctrine of sin as moral failure. But in religion this will be continued as sin against God, that is, as both theological transgression and epistemological falsity. Remembering, then, that the religious doctrine goes beyond the psychological theory, as the effect and consequence lie beyond the condition; let us study the psychological aspect as the condition of freedom from sin and knowledge of God.

As we progress with the argument, what has gone before makes easier of treatment the new subject under discussion. That complexes and repressions are the causes of rationalizing and projecting with false reference has become sufficiently clear. That undeveloped personality makes unavoidable a poor and inadequate projection upon reality has also become evident. Further, the wastage of energy below the level of conscious life, owing to the presence of buried complexes and repressions, has become apparent. The positive side of the matter will be treated under the doctrine of salvation. It is of importance here, however, under the heading of sin, that one point should be dealt with at some length. If psychologically sin is regarded as moral failure, then it might be inferred that wherever there is failure there is moral culpability. That would mean that since all complexes and repressions tell against the attainment of moral perfection, therefore they are ills and imperfections for which we must be held individually responsible. It must be insisted, however, that psychological imperfections are not always personal sins. Psychological abnormality does not necessarily imply moral culpability. Complexes and repressions may be regarded as morally indifferent states, as morally diseased states or as sinful states.

Dr. Brill says: "We defined a complex as an idea or group of ideas accentuated and coloured over by profound emotional feelings which was gradually relegated to the unconscious for the very reason that it was of a distinctly

painful nature and so could not be kept in consciousness." * The dangerous thing, therefore, about the complex is its " repression " into the unconscious, where it is out of control. By complex is generally meant *repressed* complex, so that a complex and a repression mean much the same thing. The important point to notice is that the complex, repressed from consciousness, continues to function uncontrolled in the unconscious.

Now, it must be obvious that many complexes and repressions are not culpable. Repression is a safeguarding mechanism of nature. Just as, when physical pain becomes too acute, the mind loses consciousness altogether for a while; so likewise, when ideas become too painful, they are excluded from the sphere of the conscious mind. Obviously, then, not all complexes are culpably sinful. Whether deserving blame or not however, all complexes have an evil effect. They cause a wastage of energy below the level of the purposive, directed life. Negatively, therefore, they are all sinful in that by draining the vitality they prevent the accomplishment of good. They mean loss. Accordingly they will all need to come under the scope of salvation. Our need of salvation, however, is greater than our need of personal forgiveness for wilful transgressions and culpable imperfections. Without at all narrowing the amplitude of salvation, we may have to exclude much evil from the sphere of personal sin.

A difficulty will be felt at this point owing to uncertainty as to the meaning of sin. Help will be forthcoming however, if we recall the conclusions already reached on the nature of responsibility in Chapter III of Part I. Since (as we have seen) it is only the fully developed manhood that is wholly responsible, it must follow that responsibility decreases as sin increases. Wherefore, we find the greater the sin, the less the responsibility; and conversely, the less the sin, the greater the responsibility. It would therefore seem impossible to define sin as that for which we are personally responsible. It is sin that destroys personal responsibility, and where there is full personal responsibility there is no sin. Hence, there has been only one completely responsible person, the sinless Christ, Who alone could offer willing obedience. Although modern

* Brill, *Fundamental Conceptions of Psycho-analysis*, p. 13.

psychology establishes the need for salvation (as we shall see in the next chapter), it calls for considerable re-examination of our idea of sin.

Perhaps it would simplify the discussion if we ask now, whether modern psychology favours the reduction of all sin to moral disease. There is a decided tendency to-day so to regard failings. That much which used to be regarded as deliberate, intentional wickedness is not culpable and does not require punishment, but instead needs treatment at the hands of a mental physician, is very true. In making this point clear, modern psychology has greatly aided the cure and reclamation of many whom religion is seeking to deliver from sin. But the total elimination of the idea of sin is not justified on the evidence.

It must also be generally felt that the presence of sin implies responsibility. If there is only possible full responsibility where there is no sin, at the same time there is no possibility of personal sin where there is no responsibility whatever. In the case of moral disease, it is the compulsion of repressed complexes which causes the evil to be done; and the person, therefore, is not responsible for that particular action. Responsibility varies in degree according to the extent to which the life is ruled by compulsion from the unconscious. Were the whole conduct of life under control of the buried complexes, then there would be a complete absence of personal responsibility. Such a state, however, must be very rare, if not, as seems likely, impossible. What is usually found is that some complex is dominating one part of life's activities, and is influencing other parts in varying degrees. It is astonishing to what an extent a complex can influence the whole attitude of a person's mind. At the same time, it is only a few actions, and a certain type of actions, that will be wholly performed under the compulsion of the repression. Even in the case of morbid criminals, although the flagrant breaches of morality may be due to a complex, there are still many actions which must be called personal sins. And speaking generally, although some people stand in great need of special therapeutic treatment, nevertheless all, probably, need as well "the persistent presentation of the higher ideal." *

It must be insisted upon and reiterated, however, that to

* Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 48.

hold all as fully responsible for their moral transgressions, is psychologically false. Freedom increases with moral development, and, accordingly, the grosser the sin the smaller is the personal responsibility likely to be. Psychology is removing much of the foundation for moral blame. As Dr. Hadfield says: "Blame is the expedient of impotence." * In demonstrating this truth, psychology is preparing a place for the work of religious love. In an indirect way much of the blame for wrong-doing rests not upon the evil-doer, but upon other people, and upon society past and present. The exact apportionment of the responsibility, however, is here unimportant. The need is for the conviction that responsibility must not be attributed fully or exclusively to every individual wrong-doer. The experience of personal sin, let it be said, is very real and very true. But the amount of a man's life for which he is to be held fully responsible is not large. The conviction of sin most assuredly is no illusion; but it must be distinguished from the consciousness of imperfection, shortcoming and failure. This distinction had better be made a little clearer.

We set out by speaking of sin either as failure to attain moral perfection, or else as failure to stand in a proper relationship to God. So conceived, from both points of view, sin gains its meaning by reference to salvation. Sin is the measure of our need for salvation in order to attain, on the one hand to moral perfection, and on the other hand to the religious experience of God. Under the head of sin, so conceived, will be included every imperfection, every inner failing, every complex and every moral disease. There will be included, also, everything for which we are personally responsible. But for these evils mentioned there is not full personal responsibility. In trying to relate sin to personal responsibility, therefore, we find that although the sphere of sin is large the place for responsibility is small. It must be pointed out at once, however, that consciousness of the need for salvation does not depend only, or even mainly, on the awareness or the actuality of personal responsibility for sin. It is so often felt that when anything is said to minimize guilt and responsibility, the assertion is tantamount to a denial that there is any need for salvation. Let it be insisted, therefore, that a sense of guilt may have as

* Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 51

disastrous an effect as any complex. A burdened conscience means a weakened will. The work of religion is to remove the guilt and lift the burden. Few lives, if any, will be without the need for "forgiveness," as part of the effect of religion. The point is, however (as we have already said), that our need for salvation is far more extensive than our need for forgiveness. It is not intended, in saying this, to suggest that our need for forgiveness is small. The implication is rather that our need for salvation is far greater than we generally suppose. When the consciousness of special sins committed is least, the consciousness of sinfulness is greatest. That means that freedom from the degrading, demoralizing, disintegrating effect of moral transgressions has given a clearer understanding of the moral perfection of God. Wherefore, we are made the more aware of our imperfection. There is a sense of sin, meaning consciousness of guilt; and a sense of sin, meaning awareness of imperfection. Both imply need for salvation, although both do not imply personal responsibility and the need for personal forgiveness. Both responsibility and forgiveness may be, and often must be, corporate and social rather than individual.

Another point must be made clear. This sense of guilt and acceptance of personal responsibility for sin may be false; and in that case deliverance may only come through persuading the wrong-doer that this claim to responsibility and guilt is unfounded. There are cases of people who are under the compulsion of some complex, but who blame themselves for what they cannot help. The bitterness of their self-reproaches only increases their unhappiness and impotence. The need is then to convince such people that this claim to responsibility is unjustified; that it reflects personal pride; and that a fitting humility would teach them to confess volitional impotence and the absence of responsibility. When this has been done, the cure of the moral disease may proceed. Where such a course has to be taken, it is of the utmost importance to understand and to make clear to the person that the need for salvation is not in any way affected, but that this is a need of a different kind from that of the deliberate sinner. It should be made clear that the work of Christ in saving is all one, whether He says, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," or, "Arise, take up thy bed and walk." Christ also saves from sin as Moral Physician.

The mercy of God must now appear as psychologically a very real and valuable conception. By the belief in God's mercy, the wrong-doer is freed from the crushing sense of being held responsible for every sin. Merciless men may pronounce their blame, but the transgressor is not saved thereby. Merciful God removes the false idea of blameworthiness by accepting the weight of responsibility Himself: and in the offer of free pardon the sinner finds his one hope of salvation. God's mercy is made real in the acceptance of responsibility upon Himself, and in the forgiveness offered to the wrong-doer. The teaching of God's mercy and love, it may be noticed, is likely to be psychologically more effective than the announcement of His wrath and punishment.

It would appear then, that sin as personal responsibility for guilt is only a part of sin as the total need for salvation. Indeed, the actuality of sin often indicates the absence of responsibility. While unquestionably there is a place for personal sin as responsible action, the greatest need to-day is that we should recognize the limitations of responsibility. The purpose of religion is not to affix blame, but to offer deliverance. A morbid sense of sin may require the joint aid of psychology and religion before it can be removed and replaced by a healthy and proper attitude. Such a perverted consciousness of sin as we are now contemplating is not infrequently produced by a false idea of personal responsibility. When the nature of responsibility in religion is taught more in accordance with the findings of modern psychology, it may be hoped that the prevalence of a morbid sense of sin will be lessened, while at the same time a conviction of the need for salvation will be made more general. A further cause for an abnormal consciousness of sin is to be found in the failure to relate man's sin to God's mercy and forgiveness. The corrective for false teaching on the nature of sin is not to be found in neglect of the subject, but in true instruction. Certainly all attempts to produce artificially a conviction of sin as the necessary prelude to a sudden conversion must be most strongly deprecated on psychological grounds. Gradual religious education in the wide need of humanity for divine salvation conceived as a lifelong process is the best method in all cases, but especially in the case of children.

CHAPTER III

THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION AND THE THEORY OF INTEGRATION AND ADAPTATION

It must be understood that this essay makes no attempt to give a complete theological discussion of Christian doctrine. There is much to be said on each theme which is beyond the range of modern psychology. It is just the point of contact between Christian doctrine and psychological theory that is here focussed for examination. It follows, likewise, that psychology is not extensively scrutinized. Only where psychology affects doctrine is it criticized and estimated. It seemed necessary to say this at the beginning of the present chapter, since the insufficiency of the study of salvation and of many of the subsequent themes might appear as a deficiency in the treatment of the subject in hand, unless it were clearly understood that the subject is Christian doctrine only just in so far as it is covered by recent psychological discoveries. The purpose of the investigation is to show first, in what respects modification or amplification of Christian teaching is required; and then to show next that Christian experience, after passing the test of modern psychology, offers an empirical basis which is adequate to the support of Christian theism.

And now we pass from the conception of sin as, inclusively considered, the need for salvation, to the conception of salvation as the remedy for all imperfections, failings and transgressions. The point to be made here, in substantiation of the argument, is that salvation is much more than simply forgiveness for personal wrong-doing. It is also the indispensable qualification for ontological knowledge. On the more religious side, salvation is the condition of communion with God: on the more epistemological side, it is the condition of the knowledge of God. Since communion cannot be real without knowledge, it is not unimportant to religion to

examine the manner in which the knowledge of God is gained. Conversely, it will be true that knowledge of God as personal will be impossible without communion, so that there is no possibility of religion being replaced by ontology. The contention of this thesis is that religious experience, including moral consciousness, is the indispensable antecedent to valid thinking on the nature of reality. Deficiency of such experience is a disqualification. Moreover, it is the Christian religion which provides the surest guarantee of validity in the knowledge of reality; because Christianity, more than any other type of religion, deals with sin as the obstacle to the understanding of ultimate reality, and with salvation as the preparation for such knowledge. If we are concerned here mainly with salvation as the condition for the knowledge of reality conceived as God, that is only because the religious consequence of salvation in the establishment of the proper relationship between man and God is assumed as a necessity for the understanding of a God who is personal. The question of the personality of God is part of the doctrine of God and will be dealt with in the next chapter. At present we are concerned with salvation as the beginning of knowledge.

Salvation, so conceived, has two aspects: atonement and reconciliation. The teaching on atonement is partly covered by the theory of mental integration; and the teaching on reconciliation by the theory of mental adaptation. That for religion both atonement and reconciliation have a primary reference to God does not preclude them from having also a psychological meaning in reference to the inward state of the self and the attitude of the self to the environment. Whatever else atonement may imply, and by whatever means it may be brought about, its effect upon the mind or soul itself is unification. A mind cannot be at one with God while it is distracted and divided within itself. The state of atonement between man and God must mean harmony and single-mindedness within man. As atonement is gradually effected, so will integration be gradually accomplished. It may be urged, on the evidence of religious experience, that consciousness of atonement between man and God precedes, inspires and constrains the oneness, wholeness and health of the spirit within. The truth of this contention, however, does not disprove the hypothesis, that wherever

this inward balance, peace and stability is not being brought about there is not genuine atonement being worked out; and that wherever atonement is truly experienced, this building up of the self into a unity is always evident.

Although communion may precede integration, nevertheless the two advance together. An experience of communion may produce a degree of integration, but, until that integration is attained, any higher experience of communion is precluded. If communion is the condition of integration, integration is also the condition of communion. The two series move side by side and interact; although, as religious experience testifies, the initiative is always on the side of the divine. That God produces in man the condition of the knowledge of Himself by inspiring moral regeneration is part of the doctrine of salvation. It remains true, however, that there is a moral condition to the knowledge of God, even although it clearly appears that God alone, by His saving grace, can enable man to fulfil the condition.

Now atonement, in its partial aspect as integration, means deliverance from the dissociation of personality, which has been brought about by repressed complexes and conscious double-mindedness. Whether or not there be personal responsibility for imperfections and transgressions, the work of atonement is measured by their conquest. In reference to sin as guilt, salvation may be conceived under the form of forgiveness. In reference to all shortcomings, whether deliberate or involuntary, it may be thought of as atonement. So that atonement includes forgiveness. All inward unrest, all conflict, all division within the self, may be looked upon as the sin of imperfection, as the need of salvation or as the lack of atonement. Atonement means the gradual building up of the personality into a moral unity and spiritual continuity.

The effect of this relief from internal conflict and indecision is discovered to be an access of energy accompanied by a consciousness of peace. A complex or repression means inevitably the draining away of energy below the level of conscious direction and control. But in all cases of conflict, uncertainty and anxiety; in all states resulting from the acceptance of more than one standard; in all the consequences of a difference between a lower and a higher ideal when both are desired, there is a waste of vitality. As soon as

these divisions in the self, whether in the unconscious or the conscious mind, are overcome, new strength is available for concentration on the one chosen end or purpose of life. The divisions of the self from which we need to be saved in atonement occur on different levels of the mind. There are cleavages which have their existence in the unconscious, and these are due to the repressed complexes. Behaviour resulting from them is independent of the control of the will, and so is not sin for which there is personal responsibility. Such divisions may be healed most easily and most completely by salvation conceived under the form of psychotherapy. Christ may be needed by some persons first of all as the Moral Physician. Not all the divisions of mind, however, occur below the level of consciousness. There are the moral conflicts in which duty points one way and inclination another. Here, to follow inclination rather than duty is to submit to what modern psychology calls the "pleasure-principle," instead of obeying the "reality-principle"; and such a choice is sin; and sin, moreover, for which a degree of responsibility must be accepted, and for which forgiveness is needed.

It may be helpful to draw a parallel between the divisions in the unconscious due to repressed complexes, and divisions in the conscious mind owing to the pleasure-principle. This comparison is not forced, for there is a close connexion. Repression is the result of some too painful experience. Whatever challenges too violently the pleasure-principle is likely to be relegated to the unconscious. Thus it comes about that undue submission to this pleasure-principle is the fruitful cause of complexes. In many cases, however, the divergence between the two principles of choice is not sufficiently wide to occasion the formation of a psychoneurosis. But there is always this serious side to the contrast: while the life is divided between the two rules there is constant conflict. And this means waste of power. Even if in the end, after a period of moral conflict, it is the higher, the more real principle that is followed, the waste has occurred, and the strength needed to carry out the choice has already been sadly dissipated. But here we are touching upon the psychology of temptation, and the subject must be more fully treated later.

What is important to notice at this point is that atonement means the healing of dissension within the mind, whether

in the unconscious or on the level of conscious choice. The unity of personality brought about checks the wastage of energy which is involved in all mental conflict. Beyond this, such an atonement is the realization of personality. An organized self with an integrated behaviour is just the end reached by the salvation of atonement. The atoned soul is the true self. A mind divided against itself is neither one mind nor two. Only a morally unified self, obedient to the reality-principle, is a free, responsible and developed personality.

One other aspect of salvation requires attention. Psychologically viewed, atonement is the subjective process, and reconciliation the response to the objective world. A soul that has been atoned will react in a new way to environment. While there is an inward wavering, there will be no conformity in the outward behaviour. But once harmony has been produced within, conduct will be reliable, purposive and co-ordinated. Since reconciliation is, for religion, primarily a new attitude towards God, it follows that there is likewise a fresh adaptation to the whole of life and to the world. Man becomes reconciled to God, reconciled, that is, to reality as a whole; and therefore he becomes reconciled to the reality-principle as it affects his own life.

The new adaptation to the objective world, which in religion is termed reconciliation to God, is a far greater transformation than any effected by psychotherapy. The psycho-analyst (as we noticed when quoting from Mr. Trotter in Chapter I of this part) aims only at a more satisfactory adjustment between the mind and the world. Nothing is done, positively, to bring the mind nearer to the fullness of its own nature. The work is negative, and corrects maladjustments between the mind and the world. The mind is readjusted to the world. The great need, however, is to adjust the world to the inherent needs of the mind. By effecting an adjustment to the world as it is, there has only been produced a type of mind which is likely to allow the world to continue as it is. The forces which work for the persistence of the evil in the world may even be augmented by the adaptation of the mind to that existing world order. Religious salvation is greater than psychological adjustment; first, because it seeks the higher good of the soul itself, and is not satisfied merely with a working arrangement which produces the least

friction between the soul and the world; secondly, because it seeks an adaptation, not with the world that is, but with the Kingdom that ought to be. It establishes a true relationship, not with the present, unmodified facts, but with the facts which, as Mr. Benjamin Kidd expresses it, "have not yet arrived." The arrival of those facts is hastened by the fitting response of the mind towards them. Thus religion seeks to transform the world and to make it ultimately a place where fully developed souls may be free from torment. At present, however, the religious adaptation is directed to an ideal for the sake of which sacrifice must be accepted.

Atonement and reconciliation are complementary aspects of salvation. For atonement is not effected in an isolated soul that is untouched by the outside world. It is an atonement within a soul that is in constant and close relation with objective reality. Thus, integration of personality depends on adaptation to spiritual environment. And here a tremendous assumption is being made, viz. that it is the unified self that is best adjusted to the true and real world without. This implies that inward discord results from maladjustment and that inward harmony means perfect adaptation. And experience shows that the effect of environment upon an ill-regulated, undisciplined or neurotic personality is the production of conflicts, and very likely of repressed complexes. Experience also shows that a balanced, directed, steady mind is best able to cope with life. Thus there is verification of this tremendous assumption that the morally unified personality is the most perfectly adapted personality. Since, however, development is so greatly influenced by environment, this possibility of advance towards moral and religious perfection under the conditions which are set by reality is only understandable as something more than accident, if it be accepted that there is community of spirit between the mind of man and the reality which confronts him.

This assumption, of course, is not needed for the psychotherapy which regards the reality towards which adaptation must be effected as the world in its present condition. For religion, however, which identifies reality far more fully with the ideal and future than with the actual and present, this assumption becomes necessary. The objective world for the psycho-analyst is, after all, very much that state of

society which is the product of the human mind. But the great reality for religion is the universal order which embraces much that is altogether beyond the range of human influence. When reconciliation is sought between the mind of man and the great reality of the universe, then there must be made this great venture of faith, that the universe is suitable to foster the highest development of man by the attainment of a perfect relationship between the universe and man. This faith finds its verification in the Christian doctrines of God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. Those doctrines must be studied in turn. Here we have to notice that religion teaches that man's perfect adaptation to reality is to be found at the level of his highest spiritual attainment. Freudians tend to think that man is everywhere and always prone to slip back into the animal or childish existence; on which level, it would seem, according to them, he has his most natural and easy response to reality. If that be the truth of the matter, then all the so-called advance of man in moral and intellectual growth is repudiated by reality; hence these neuroses. That neuroses result from maladjustment between mind and reality is true, but the question now is whether the perfect adjustment is on the level whence we rose, or on the level to which we are rising? If the former alternative be accepted, then the change from adequate to inadequate adaptation is wholly inexplicable. Apart from that objection, however, it may be queried whether the adaptation on the animal or childish level is in any sense more adequate than ours at present. In point of fact, this whole conception of adaptation belongs not at all to the instinctive level, but only to the level of mind. Adaptation to environment is a mental ideal and a mental accomplishment. It involves the idea of what perfect adaptation would be. And perfect adaptation for mind can only be a relationship in which mind can discover its own satisfaction. For a child, adaptation is found in an adjustment to a phantasy world. But developed mind discovers that this world is false. Accordingly, adaptation to reality cannot be effected upon the childish level of consciousness. When applied to the animal kingdom, adaptation is deprived of its intellectual content and is made synonymous with survival. And for the animal, survival is sought under the special conditions of a limited environment, which means that there is adapta-

tion only to proximate and partial reality. Mind, however, breaks down these limitations and seeks an adaptation, not merely to surroundings, but to reality as a whole, and to reality freed from the errors of phantasy. Somehow or other mind has become the chief factor to be reckoned with; and the only adaptation possible for mind is one that is congenial to its own nature. The baulking of mind by itself would be at least as disastrous as the baulking of any of its special instincts. Mind, as such, is seeking an adaptation to reality as a whole; and only in such reconciliation, and in its own atonement, can it find satisfaction. And this satisfaction means that there must be a community of spirit between the mind within and the reality without. Either mind must deny itself, which is impossible; or it must strive for its perfect adaptation in salvation.

Once more, therefore, we are reaching the conclusion that the religiously perfected mind is the most competent to know reality. Reality must be knowable, and mind must be qualified to know reality. The more mind becomes true to itself, the greater is its qualification for understanding its object. The mind that is delivered from the compulsions to rationalizing which come from complexes, and that is saved from the division within itself which results from inclination towards the pleasure-principle instead of the reality-principle, will be the freest mind to undertake the task of discovering the nature of ultimate truth. However great the intellectual attainment may be, if a highly trained mind be under the dominance of complexes, or be influenced by submission to the pleasure-principle, then its trustworthiness as a discoverer and interpreter of truth will be lost owing to the lack of moral unity and religious salvation. But where the work of salvation is being carried out, then, providing the intellect be sufficiently trained and equipped, the reliability of the mind in its quest for the knowledge of reality will be greater according as the salvation is more complete. The mind that has the proper preparation to understand and to reveal the truth concerning reality is the mind that is atoned and reconciled. The condition of valid ontological knowledge is the moral and religious perfection which results from the salvation that God's grace effects.

Here it may be noticed that a point has been reached where the validity of Christian experience may for a moment

be examined. Calling to mind the principle according to which the test is applied, we have to remember that the crucial test is to be found in the experience of Christ, and its confirmation in the experience of those who most nearly approach to the moral and spiritual perfection of personality, fully attained only in Him. With this principle in mind it may be asked—was Christ the most perfectly adapted to environment? Granting as established the perfect integration of His character, did it follow from that that His adjustment to reality was also perfect? Or, to apply the principle in another way—can it be held that those whose character is most Christlike are better adapted to life and the world than those who disregard altogether the claims of Christian discipline?

The nature of the environment to which Christ and many of the saints and martyrs were rightly adjusted needs careful definition. No doubt the true attitude of a morally integrated personality to a human environment of ignorance and sin must be one of suffering and even of death. Yet it should be insisted that the only satisfactory adjustment of a perfect personality to an imperfect environment must be such an adjustment as shall make for the improvement of the environment. Moral perfection must make for the salvation of all that is contrary to its own inherent needs. The value of the religious adaptation to the world is to be found in its transforming and redemptive power over that world. Once more Mr. Trotter's distinction may be called to mind. The psychological cure which consists in adjusting the mind to the world is no substitute for the religious experience which first seeks the perfection of the soul and its adjustment to a moral and spiritual environment, and after sends it into the world to reform that world "according to the pattern shown upon the Mount." This was the method of Plato in sending his philosophers back into the cave. It is the only method which is valid. Nothing can be inferred from the experience of those who have been fashioned to the shape of the world's demands. But much may be learnt from those who have been re-created and redeemed, and are being fashioned according to the ideal manhood and in relation to the moral and spiritual realities. The adaptation which religion brings is one between the fully developed moral personality and an ideal spiritual environment. Only on that level, not on

the level of the world, can man find full satisfaction. When psychology merely seeks a working adjustment with some smaller and closer environment, it is only affording temporary relief. Nothing short of an adjustment to reality as a whole can satisfy the nature of man. And for such a relationship to be possible, reality must be conceived in terms of a Personal God.

We seek, then, the value and validity of Christian experience in that adaptation to a moral and spiritual environment which brings perfect peace and joy to the developing moral personality, and which makes that personality to be a transforming and redemptive power in relation to the human and physical environment. The adjustment of the sinlessly perfect Personality of Christ to reality conceived as God was so perfect that His relation with the world of human nature has always been redemptive. The satisfactoriness of the religious adaptation is seen in this, that it is directed upon reality as a whole, and that in reference to the imperfection of the proximate environment it is redemptive. By being adjusted to an environment which does meet the needs of human nature at its highest reach, power is acquired for the transformation of the partial environment into something which will be in harmony with the moral perfection of man.

CHAPTER IV

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND THE THEORY OF REALITY

It is a matter of general agreement among modern philosophers that the absolute cannot be an object of worship. Whatever place we may give to God in relation to reality, it is impossible to identify God with the absolute. The absolute is not God. But it contains God, together with all finite personalities and the objective universe. And since this absolute must be a system of unity, God must be related with all else that is likewise contained within the absolute. Yet, as we know, much that exists in our world does not clearly reflect the nature of the God of Christian doctrine. The theory of degrees, however, will be of some help in explaining this apparent discrepancy. If reality exists in various degrees of spirituality and divinity, then the divergence between a high degree and a low might well be so great as to make it appear that the divine nature could not be reflected in both. Nevertheless, on examination it must become evident that degrees are necessary to value, and the conquest of low degrees of value by higher degrees may be necessary to the actualization of those high degrees. In other words, the understanding of high and eternal values may be impossible apart from the contrast discovered between them and lower values manifested temporarily. If the purpose of God be the education of created personalities for the enjoyment of that system of eternal values which is good in the sight of God, then it may be necessary to come to the appreciation of divine values by knowledge of what is less perfect. Granting that the universe exists as a medium by means of which we may enter into communion with God and share His principle of spiritual evaluation—we may expect to find in the graded scale of divinity a ladder by which to ascend to a higher and higher level of spiritual-

mindedness. Perhaps, therefore, religious doctrine will yield a more satisfactory metaphysic of reality than can be found elsewhere. Certainly religion cannot refuse to enter the domain of metaphysics. For although God does not mean the absolute, nevertheless religion demands that God must stand for ultimate reality. Religion, therefore, requires a metaphysic. Any suggestion that the God of philosophy is different from the God of religion is repugnant to the religious consciousness. There is, however, a dual conception of a God of religion and a God of philosophy as somehow distinct. And this dual conception of God, not unpopular though most unsatisfactory, is surely due to procedure upon the principle of abstraction. On the one hand, the rational and æsthetic aspects of personality are employed to the neglect of the moral and religious; while, on the other hand, it is the rational and æsthetic which tend to be ignored, and the moral and religious sides are given undue prominence. Accepting the principle of personality as the key to the interpretation of reality, both these extreme errors are avoided. Personality is not satisfied with an absolute devoid of moral and emotional content. But at the same time it is disappointed with a God Who is perhaps Creator but Whose wisdom in creation is left unreconciled with His moral attributes. Here religious thought is no less to blame than philosophical speculation. If the religious mind seeks only the Holy Ghost the Comforter, and has but small interest in the Spirit of Truth, then it is small wonder if the God of philosophy and the God of worship should seem to fall apart. The evidence that two divergent conceptions of God have been reached is surely condemnation of the method employed, and a challenge to seek some other method which will yield us one conception of God, satisfying alike the full demands of every side of our whole personality. Do not the concluding books of Spinoza's *Ethica* bear witness to the contention that the God of philosophy must be a God Who can satisfy the cravings of the moral and religious consciousness?

Let us then inquire whether there is not possible a Christian metaphysic which will yield a theory of reality acceptable alike to philosophy and to religion. The first demand that we must make is that there shall be no cleavage between God and the world. The problem of Creation will be left over

for a separate chapter later. Here it is enough to notice that the reality of the universe must be directly referable to God. Any theory of God which left the world as somehow unattached to the reality of God could never satisfy the intellect, and at last could not satisfy the moral and spiritual nature. The God of Christian worship is the Creator of the Universe. "God becomes an abstraction," says Professor Pringle-Pattison (and it is against abstractions that we are protesting), "if separated from the universe of His manifestation, just as the finite subjects have no independent subsistence outside the universal Life which mediates itself to them in the world of objects. We may conceive God as an experience in which the universe is felt and apprehended as an ultimately harmonious whole; and we must, of course, distinguish between such an infinite experience and the experiences of ourselves and other finite persons. But we have no right to treat either out of relation to the other." * We have to accept, then, the universe and God, as in relation. And on the evidence of Professor Ward we may accept this relationship as the ultimate fact. "At last the theist is bound to admit that this conception of God-and-the-world is beyond us: we can assign it no beginning, and so we say it is eternal: we can find no ground for it, and so we say it is the absolute. . . . The only absolute which we can admit is the absolute which God and the world constitute." † Now let us see further how this conception of God can be developed so as to satisfy at once the demands of philosophy and the claims of religion. God so thought of is more satisfactory than the absolute, while at the same time being what as God He must be—the ultimate reality.

Let us assume that what is fundamental and ultimate is experience. Then the absolute will be God's experience of the universe. For experience (like its manifestation, knowledge) implies a subject and object in relationship. Thus God is the subject of that experience which is foundational. As subject He is determinative of the object, and is, so to speak, the creative mind of reality. The most essential element of reality is its centre in God as the subject of ultimate experience. God so conceived is, if one may use the expression, more essentially real than He could be if

* Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 314.
† Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 241, 242.

identified with the absolute as conceived by monism. God is, in a sense, integral to the absolute, in that He is the formative energy that sustains the absolute. Granted that as God it is His essential nature to be creative and to stand in relation of subject to what is objective, nevertheless it remains true that the object, though necessary, is still dependent upon the mind of God. God as subject has philosophically priority over what must stand as object. It is God Who, though not identical with the absolute, is, notwithstanding, the essential and ultimate element in reality.

God so conceived, as the subject of fundamental experience, must be not less than personal. The highest centre of experience of which we have any knowledge is personality. Accordingly, God as the eternal experient cannot be lower than personality. In Him what we know as personality may be, indeed must be, raised to higher grades than we can precisely conceive. But the essential features of personality must still stand as amongst the attributes of God. And the revelation of God in Christ is a declaration that the essential features of personality are perfect and permanent in God. Personality is not merely experient. It is also a principle for the evaluation of experience. The teaching of Christ is a manifestation of God's standard of values as applied to a portion of God's experience. It is an expression of God's point of view. The experience of God is the evaluated experience characteristic of personality. And it has also this further essential attribute of personal experience—it is a seeking after fellowship. Personality, as we know it, is inherently social. And this trait, too, is revealed in the Christian teaching on the nature of God. The personality of God is expressed in the community of spirit taught in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.

God, then, as the subject of experience in the absolute, is a God in whom personality is perpetual. Turning now to the object of that experience, Dr. Ward speaks of it as the universe. That, of course, cannot be taken to mean just exactly this physical universe of science. The object of ultimate experience must be eternal, and this universe in its present form cannot be eternal. Accordingly, the physical universe may be but a temporary and partial expression of the eternal object. Indeed, in its teaching upon the utter dependency of creation upon the grace and mercy of the

Creator, Christian teaching is rather committed to this view. But this question must be further discussed in a separate chapter. Here we notice that, although there must be an eternal object in relation to God the eternal subject, that object need not be identical with the universe as we know it at present. The present physical universe must be somehow part of that object, but may be only a temporary part. This aspect of ultimate reality is covered in the best possible way by the Christian metaphysic of the eternal generation of the Son. Christ was the object of God's experience before the foundation of the world. It was obviously, therefore, through Christ that the universe was made. In other words, the universe was a crystallization of the purpose of God in Christ: it was, at a different spiritual level, and for the realization of a specific end, an expression of the eternal relationship of God the Father to God the Son through God the Holy Ghost.

The purpose of God in creation is to be thought of as the making of finite spirits who, by the education afforded through that part of the object of God's mind which we call the physical universe, should learn gradually (and perhaps spirits less than infinite could learn in no other way) the appreciation of those values which are characteristic of divine experience. God, in His generosity, purposed to share with created spirits the joy which He eternally has in the unsearchable riches of Christ. We, as finite centres of experience, may learn to know God by the graded system of spirituality and divinity in this universe, and so may come to set our affections upon those things which are above. By contrast with what is lower, we are able to understand the meaning and value of what is higher. Passing through the various levels of value we are taught to love God with our whole personality, mind and soul and body and strength, and to recognize in Him the highest degree of spirituality and the very centre and principle of all true evaluation of experience. And we may look forward to the time when, at last, God shall be all in all. Then the object of experience will no longer appear as a universe set over against and external to God, but will be understood as the correlate to the mind of God.

The eternal object of the ultimate experience of God is, then, the eternal Son of God. The physical universe is, let

us say, a phase in the eternal experience of God. Through it is expressed, necessarily, something of the nature of the eternal object. Its purpose is the realization between God and finite spirits of a communion analogous to the eternal fellowship of God the Father with God the Son through God the Holy Ghost. Accordingly, the climax of the universe is reached when, within it, and under the conditions supplied by it, there is revealed the realization of that eternal fellowship between God as Father and Christ as the object of His thought and love. The Incarnation thus becomes, spiritually, the very centre of the universe and its culminating value. The extension of the Incarnation in the Church and Sacraments is a perpetuation of this principle of spiritual gradations. And this principle is the key to the interpretation of our experience in the universe. The Incarnation is the application to our universe of God's scale of evaluation for human experience.

The universe, though but a phase in the eternal experience of God, is, nevertheless, not to be conceived of as valueless to God. Far otherwise, for to lack value must mean to be devoid of all existence and of all being. The universe is an expression of the creative thought and love characteristic of the Personality of God. Through the universe of spiritual gradations and by means of its temporal sequence, there is realized an achievement of permanent values. And an accomplished good or value is different from an eternally existent good or value. The universe is, therefore, to be thought of as a field for the expression of values which are but transitory and subservient to higher values; but it is also to be thought of as a place where the higher values may be vindicated as superior by contrast with, and even by antagonism to, lower values. In this universe, spirituality and divinity, by being of necessity militant, may become in reality triumphant.

Care must be taken not to trespass too far upon topics which claim our attention at other stages of the argument. At this point it is enough to show that there is an acceptable philosophy according to which it is not only permissible to speak of God as our Heavenly Father, but in which the place occupied by God makes it necessary for us to think of Him as related in a communion of love, first with the Son, or eternal object of His personal experience, then with

finite spirits whom the Son brings into the relationship of children to the Divine.

Now we have reached the point at which we can relate the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God with the theory of reality. To speak of reality, without qualification, in terms of fatherhood, love and mercy, would have been to raise many difficulties. The simple identity of God and reality is seen to be impossible as soon as the term God is given any Christian content. We are not justified, however, in thinking that the solution to the problem lies in the distinction between God and reality. The explanation of the seeming inconsistency between the God of Christian doctrine and the reality of psychological theory lies in the acceptance of degrees in spirituality and divinity as necessary to the persistence of æsthetic and moral values. That theory accepted, there will no longer be the expectation of finding an equally true and complete revelation of the nature of God in every aspect and division of the universe. The degree of divinity and spirituality in a stone will be much lower than that in a plant; and that again lower than the degree in an animal; and so on up the scale. In man, one state or experience will be less spiritual than another. Values will vary throughout the scale. But at no point will there be any call to sacrifice a low value unless it is only a temporary good which has served the purpose of a higher value. No value, low or high, is sacrificed if it be a permanent good, since the whole would be poorer by the loss of even the lowest value it contains. Moreover, there will be no desire that all things should be of the one uniform highest value. For were all other values abandoned, that which remained would no longer be the highest, indeed would no longer be value at all.

Now the truth about man (as we have seen) is the revelation of the highest degree to which he can attain. And, similarly, the fullest truth about God is the truth concerning the highest degree of His being. What is most characteristic, most inherently and essentially true, is seen only in the highest manifestation. That the stone is not altogether devoid of the spirituality and divinity of God; that it does not lie at all outside of His mind or beyond His control, must not be taken as meaning that the qualities of the stone are the attributes of God in virtue of His Godhead. "The

heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork"; but there are also higher revelations than the manifestations of God in the realm of nature. Moral triumph and æsthetic creation are superior expressions of the nature of God. But the knowledge of God as God; the highest revelation of His attributes; the understanding of God at the highest degree of His being, is possible only for the mind that is qualified to attain knowledge on that exalted level. And we have already seen that knowledge of reality as God is discoverable only under conditions of moral and spiritual development. The most trustworthy knowledge is that discovered and revealed by Christ. He alone, because of His sinlessness, was free from the handicaps and obstacles to the true knowledge of God. Christ's teaching concerning the personality, fatherhood, love, mercy, forgiveness, holiness, atonement, reconciliation and all the other truths of the nature and work of God which He revealed —far from being inconsistent with the theory of reality here propounded—gives to reality its interpretation and value.

It follows from all this that when we are adjusted to reality as God, our adaptation is made to reality in its highest degree. Of all that is true of reality, what is most essentially and characteristically true of it is the teaching of Christ concerning the nature of God. No higher or better relationship is possible between the mind and reality than that which the Christian religion gives in the communion between the forgiven, atoned, reconciled soul and the Father of holiness and love. And this communion of the redeemed soul with God brings also the knowledge on the part of the integrated self of the reality to which it is perfectly adapted.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST AND THE THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE AND IDENTIFICATION

We pass now to consider, in the light of modern psychological discovery, the value of Christ as revealer of God and redeemer of man. Religious experience finds that these two aspects of the work of Christ are inseparable. By revealing God, Christ redeems man: and in redeeming man, He reveals God. The study of the work of Christ belongs to theology. The analysis of the experience of salvation belongs to the psychology of religion. Much that will be found under these heads is omitted here in order to limit the discussion to the aspect upon which some light is thrown by recent psychology, and also in order to make prominent the side which is relevant to the argument here undertaken. We will consider, therefore, how far the mechanism of transference and identification is operative in man's experience of Christ.

What is the meaning and significance of transference and identification? Dr. Hadfield sees that transference has a place in religious experience. He associates transference with what he, following Dr. Maurice Nicoll, calls re-birth. He says: "Between each phase of life there is a re-birth, at which the old dies and the new springs into life, and at each re-birth the soul is rejuvenated like the faded blossom that turns to tender fruit. Each instinct becomes transferred to an object worthier of the developing self." * Clearly the object which is most fitting to receive the transference of a soul that is seeking its highest development is an object which can raise mere transference to the level of religious response. Christianity treats of re-birth and gives it a deeper meaning than any supplied by psychology. It

* Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 99.

becomes not only the passing from one stage of growth to a higher stage, but also a passing to a new and higher mode of living and thinking; it becomes the acceptance of a loftier ideal. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, but that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Spiritual re-birth, then, is the effect of accepting Christ as the object of transference. Such transference of emotions upon Christ as the new ideal of manhood produces the sentiment of religious devotion and consecration. Transference occurs usually and normally at the times of transition, as when a youth passes into manhood. The youth, instead of having his development arrested by a father-fixation, is able to transfer his emotional response from the earthly to the heavenly Father. Adolescence is the age at which religious influence is most decisive in shaping the life of the individual. The conception of Christ is valuable in a similar but distinct way. As for the youth, God becomes by transference the ideal of fatherhood, so Christ becomes the ideal of selfhood. The developing personality accepts Christ as the embodiment of its own fully-realized perfection.

The success of the treatment by psycho-analysis of patients with complexes, neuroses, phobias or anxieties, depends upon the final transference of the emotion upon some aspect of reality. And what must be apparent, in this connexion, is the value of Christ as an object, an aspect of reality, available for the acceptance of this transferred emotion. The trouble in the neurotic patient is always due to some failure in normal progression from stage to stage of developing selfhood. Where, then, is a more fitting ideal to receive the transference of the baffled soul than the faultless, fully-realized personality of Christ?

Further, it may be insisted that since Christ, as the object of the transference at the end of treatment by psychotherapy, brings enduring health and peace to the soul, the same Christ accepted as the object of transference by the generality of men would be able to prevent the occurrence of the conflicts and breakdowns which make psychotherapy necessary. With God accepted by the youth as the ideal of perfect fatherhood, and Christ accepted as the ideal of perfect selfhood, life—though not free from difficulties and endeavours—should be free from the inner torments which make for weakness and collapse. Christ, by being accepted as the

ideal for transference, does effect the gradual atonement and reconciliation in man, and does produce an integrated and developed personality. The transference of the libido upon Christ means that the energy of the unconscious is released for the accomplishments of Christlikeness.

Very similar to this phenomenon of transference is another known as identification. Mr. Tansley writes: "In identification our own desires are projected upon occurrences in real life or in fiction, and our own personality temporarily identified with one of the actors in these occurrences." * But in the experience of identification there is always a possible danger. Desires which cannot be satisfied in actual life may find an outlet through identification, and so a complex may be avoided. But desires which, properly sublimated, re-associated and re-directed, would be effective for good in life, may, through identification, simply be rendered harmless, but at the same time ineffective. Identification is insufficient. Sublimation of instincts and emotions according to the ideal of Christlikeness, after a transference upon Christ has been made, is the surest and best way of salvation. Yet, until such full sublimation is brought about, Christ, as an object of identification, will not be without psychological value. It must be remembered, however, that identification is only a part of man's religious experience of Christ.

The experience of identification with Christ in His death for sin is found to be very common amongst Christians in all ages. By such identification with the Sinless Sufferer the sense of guilt is removed in two-fold manner. It has been expiated in the suffering which by identification is the suffering for the sins of the sinner himself: also, the sinner, his sin thus expiated through suffering, is next identified with the sinless Christ. This experience, in ridding the soul of the intolerable conviction of guilt and responsibility, sets it free with unburdened strength to face life anew. The guilt and the responsibility are fixed upon the Cross where Christ died as an expiatory offering for sin. The sinner is cleansed and released. This identification of the sinner with the sinless Christ Who was crucified to save men from sin is of the utmost value as a great fact in the moral redemption of man. What was said above, however, is not modified

* Tansley, *The New Psychology*, p. 134.

by this consideration. Identification is only a part of man's experience of Christ, and must be succeeded by transference. There is a type of piety which is so fully convinced (and truly convinced, as we see) of salvation as deliverance from the guilt and blame of sin that it fails to pass on to what is the end of salvation, viz. sanctification as increase in goodness and well-doing. The deliverance from sin, experienced by identification, is only the initial act in the great process of redemption. Full salvation means the gradual attainment of Christlikeness. Salvation is effected continuously through transference.

Sometimes, however, development through transference is not desired, but, instead, the satisfaction reached through identification is made an end in itself. In that case, what ought to be the first step will be made the last. There will then be no serious attempt made to overcome sin, because the sin, by being retained and referred to the suffering Christ, can be made to bring personal gratification. Indeed, a morbid state may be reached in which the mind harbours an unconscious desire for the continuance of sin as the condition of sexual gratification through the suffering for sin. "Shall we sin, that grace may abound?" This is the reason why persistence in religious feeling on a revivalistic level brings so little, if any, moral development. The only satisfaction sought in such cases comes by identification with the suffering of Christ for sin; and moral regeneration from sin which would come by transference is not desired. It might almost be said that such moral development through transference, threatening as it does to supersede the identification, is unconsciously avoided or rejected. The evil is that identification, instead of being a part of religious experience, has sometimes been made the whole. The great problem for the Christian religion, therefore, is the transition from the identification found in the evangelical revivalism to the transference which may be experienced in spiritual and true worship.

One radical defect of this identification may be referred to at once. Identification is *individual* substitution. This accounts for the excessive individualism of the exclusively revivalistic type of religion. It is the sin of the individual that inflicts the suffering on Christ; it is the sin of the individual for which Christ suffers. But this individualism

is the opposite of sublimation. Hence (once more) there is a reason for the indifference or unconscious hostility to that moral redemption which means the sublimation of the instincts. To sublimate an instinct is to give it a social reference. In this transformation, however, there is no danger of the individual application being lost. With the fullest sublimation there is always a reserve left over for the original functions of the instincts. In addition to this special application there is a social direction of the instinct gained. Love is the great social distribution of an emotion which, in its undirected manifestation, is limited and individual. In distinction from what may be called the revivalistic type of religion, which tends to individualism, the catholic type, to use that designation in a general sense, works towards universalism. Sublimation is not so well served by individualism as it is by universalism, because sublimation to be easily effected needs, in addition to identification with Christ as personal Saviour, also transference upon Christ as the ideal Manhood, the Head of the Race, the Redeemer of Humanity. So Christ is conceived, in the catholic view, as suffering not merely for the sins of individuals, but also for the sins of mankind. Simple identification with the sufferings of Christ for sin is transmuted into "filling up what is behind in the afflictions of Christ *for His body's sake, which is the Church.*" By sympathy a man suffers with Christ, not merely for his personal sins, but for the sins of all his fellows. Thus the contemplation of the sufferings of Christ, for a catholic type of religion, lends new inspiration to the service which seeks the moral regeneration of human nature.

We may conclude, then, that in part at least the moral and redemptive efficacy of the Cross of Christ is due to an identification which culminates in perfect transference. In thus redeeming man Christ also reveals God. The redemption of man through Christ is believed to be the purpose of God in Christ. Thus, Christian experience of redemption is partial confirmation of Christ's revelation of a merciful and loving Father. But the final guarantee of the validity of Christ's teaching on the nature of God must be found in the sinlessness and full moral and spiritual perfection of Christ Himself. On the moral and spiritual conditioning of knowledge of reality conceived as God (that is, at its highest and most characteristic degree) enough has been

said already. Here it will be sufficient to notice that since Christ has fulfilled those conditions, His teaching is worthy of full credence. Modern psychology, while freeing that teaching from many false interpretations, leaves the essential affirmations of the revelation clarified and at many points vindicated.

It may be worth while to point out that in applying the psychological mechanisms of identification and transference to the Cross of Christ, a suggestion has been made that the manner in which the Cross influences human nature can be partly understood and explained by an examination of sympathy. Dr. Temple says: "The possibility of sympathy has never (so far as I know) received sufficient attention either from psychologists or from philosophers. If it is a merely sentimental reaction on the part of a completely separate *self*, it is of little consequence; but if it is (as I believe) a real union of personalities through an experience in which both share, it is always a true atonement." *

By the terms identification and transference, modern psychology is drawing a distinction between two kinds of sympathy. The difference is not easily discovered, but may perhaps be made apparent by the illustration of a few distinctions. Identification is an individual sympathy, having little or no reference beyond the object sympathized with and the subject sympathizing. In transference, the sympathizer is cognizant of membership of a society and of relationship to an environment. Identification finds its satisfaction in feeling and in such thoughts and actions as express and sustain the feeling, but are more suitable to privacy than society. Transference seeks a constant and organized expression of sympathy in relation to society. Identification survives upon the level of spasmodic emotion. Transference becomes a permanent sentiment. Thus, identification may have a dislocating effect upon life and behaviour. Transference leads to the dominance over all thought and action by the object of sympathy. When the Cross of Christ is made the object of transference-sympathy, then it influences every relationship into which the sympathizer enters, and becomes the centre and goal of all thought and volition. In that way it effects the integration and achieves the adaptation which were seen to be features of salvation.

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 218.

Modern psychology throws some light upon the problem of validity at this point, and one aspect of the subject may engage a moment's attention in this place. In other chapters the nature of Christ and the validity of His experience come up for discussion. Here the argument leads us to consider the subjective conditions of our own Christian experience, wherein we find the confirmation of the teaching and experience of Christ. And in this connexion the valuable contribution of modern psychology is to be found in its insistence upon the need for a proper inner state as the pre-requisite of right thinking. Unless the moral and emotional life is disciplined for the task, the intellect will be hampered in its pursuit of truth. A Christian critique of pure reason insists that reason is only pure when the heart is pure. The condition of understanding the teaching of Christ is that we should enter into the experience of Christ. Only a Christian can test the validity of Christian doctrine. Sympathy is the only sure guide to understanding.

Sympathy with Christ, entering into the experience of Christ, having the mind of Christ, passing through the stage of identification with Christ to the higher stage of transference upon Christ—whatever expression be used to describe the condition, it is the lack of this Christian experience which precludes the mind from testing Christian truth. Only by sympathy with Christ can the nature of Christ be understood. The most urgent need amongst those who would interpret the Cross is not intellectual acumen, but spiritual devotion. If, in other places, sympathy is necessary to the understanding of personality, how much more must sympathy be required for the understanding of ultimate reality as revealed through personality! To make the Cross a subject of mere argumentation is to deal with something very different from the Cross of Christ in human experience. Small wonder, then, if the conclusions from such intellectual exercises are at variance with the verdicts of Christian teaching. The value and meaning of the Cross as a power to purify and unify the moral and emotional life must not be ignored if the inquiry is to lead to valid conclusions. This power it is which qualifies the mind to understand the Cross, and to understand therewith the nature of reality as revealed in the teaching and experience of Christ. The meaning of the Cross can only be given in terms of per-

sonality, and for its understanding, sympathy is essential. It is a considerable help in solving the problem of validity to understand that only in Christian experience can the validity of Christian doctrine be tested. All criticism of Christian teaching which results from a failure to sympathize with Christ must be regarded as partially at least irrelevant. For without sympathy the fact examined is different from the fact in Christian experience. The Christian teaching is that the knowledge of God is conditional upon a certain state of human personality and upon a certain relationship between human personality and reality. It is altogether beside the point for some critic who refuses to accept the conditions to declare that he arrives at a different conclusion. That is only what the Christian would expect. Sympathy with the Sinless Perfection of Christ must be the moral and emotional discipline of human personality before it can respond in a fitting relationship to the revelation of reality in the form of divine personality. Without such sympathy there can be no full and perfect knowledge of reality as God. Sympathy that is mere identification with Christ is not enough. The sympathy needed is a constant transference upon Christ as the redeemer of man and the revealer of God.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE THEORY OF THE SUPRALIMINAL

THE doctrine of the Holy Spirit offers few difficulties when once the companion doctrines of God and Christ have been accepted. The danger is that the point of contact between psychology and religion should be sought solely in the conception of the Spirit. When that is done, Christian teaching is attenuated to vague abstractions about spirituality. There being then no clear or precise definition of the Spirit, it is easy enough to make the Spirit stand for just whatever seems convenient from a psychological standpoint. The Holy Spirit in that case becomes nothing more than a religious term for a psychological phenomenon. This danger being guarded against, however, the conception of the Holy Spirit will be of the utmost value for the interpretation both of religious experience and also of consciousness in general as studied by psychology. The present need would seem to be for a more thorough study of the implications of the Christian teaching on the Spirit, and the assimilation of these with the findings of psychology. It must be remembered, however, that if the conception of the Holy Spirit is to retain its essential Christian content, it must be regarded throughout as the Third Person in the Trinity. Its nature and activity is to be inferred from previous knowledge of God the Father and God the Son. We are not concerned with mere spirituality. Every phase and aspect of reality is infused with spirituality. But in treating of the Holy Spirit we are primarily studying reality at its highest level, and we have to consider the activity which is characteristic of that highest degree of being. There is spirituality and divinity throughout the whole realm of being. But by God—that is God transcendent, God the Father—we mean, reality at its highest reach. And by the

Holy Spirit we mean first of all the operation of the transcendent Spirit at its highest, fullest degree. Indispensable to, and inseparable from, the notion of transcendent Spirit, is the complementary conception of the immanent Spirit. In communion with the spirit of nature there is real and true communion with the Spirit of God; but this is but an imperfect and partially true manifestation of the being and attributes of God Himself. Worship in spirit and in truth must mean communion with reality in its highest, truest, most spiritual and most divine aspect. The conception of the reality of God here set forth allows the truth of communion with God through nature, but at the same time makes it very evident that only in Christ do we find the truest and fullest manifestation of God. All that may be said of spiritual experience on a lower level than that which is known through Christ has its place in this theory, but the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the truth concerning spirituality at the high level of divine revelation.

With all this allowed, however, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit referred to the teaching on the Third Person of the Trinity, the inference cannot be avoided, and must not be denied, that there is no impassable gulf between the Holy Spirit and the spirituality of the whole world. The difference between the spirituality of the highest degree of being and the spirituality of a lower degree is a difference in degree only. But, once more, differences in degree are of the utmost importance and are real differences. Some differences of degree may be only temporarily necessary (as we have seen), but some are ultimate. The exact truth at one degree is not the full truth at another. Nevertheless, there is a principle of truth which holds good throughout. The teaching on the Spirit at the level of Deity must not be taken as applicable to the spirituality of nature. At the same time, there is a community of spirit between all phases, aspects and levels of reality. The doctrine of the Spirit does, therefore, link up the whole realm of being with God as its centre. But what is true of the Spirit of God will only be true in degree of the spirit of man or of the spirit of nature. This manner of relating all spirituality to God is the reverse of that noticed at the outset of the chapter. Then it was said that spirituality might be taken at a level lower than the highest, and what was discovered on that plane might be

referred without sufficient qualification to God. Now we insist upon starting with spirituality at the level of God and descending through the scale, seeking at lower stations a partial manifestation of what is fully true only at the highest stage. All spirituality is of God, but the norm is the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit, considered as the aspect of activity and relatedness in the Deity, may be seen in the attitude of God the Father to God the Son, and in the attitude of God the Father, through God the Son, to man the potential child of God. Our task, however, is limited to the study of God in relation to man. Two sides of the Spirit's activity and relatedness we have seen in the Fatherhood of God and the Saviourhood of Christ. But the emphasis has been on the human side of the experience: man's sonship and man's atonement. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the objective complement of that subjective attitude. A relationship cannot be one-sided or have only one term. Man's possible relation with God implies God's realizable attitude towards man. And according to the revelation in Christ, God is essentially Father in His attitude; and therefore God is essentially Saviour to those who fall short of the place of sonship. God, to be Himself as Father, must atone and redeem all who could be raised to the position of sons of the divine. As Father, God suffers through lack of the possible sonship of man. This suffering of God's love is inherent in His Saviourhood. Man must be raised by moral regeneration, so that he can enjoy fellowship and communion with a Holy God. God suffers for man's sin until, by atonement and reconciliation, man is fitted for the perfect relationship of child to Father. Viewed from the side of God, the suffering, which effects man's redemption, is a necessity to the nature of God in relation to sinful man. The truth concerning the Holy Spirit, or God related to man, is revealed in a Christ Who, as God, suffers for the sins of men.

This very brief *résumé* of theology was necessary, since we have to study from the side of God the relation of God to man. This study is indispensable even to our limited field of investigation, because we have to inquire in what way and through what psychological mechanism God acts upon man. It is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit which, when closely related to the doctrines of God and Christ, raises the

problem of objectivity. Is God's Fatherhood merely the transference upon reality of a youth's attitude towards the human father? Is Christ's Saviourhood merely the identification and transference of human experiences and aspirations upon an ideal figure? The answer to these questions is to be found in the teaching on God's essential attitude and response to man through the activity of the Holy Spirit. Behind this answer lies the metaphysic of the objectivity and validity of our knowledge of reality. But that prior investigation has already been carried out, and the conclusion reached justifies us in proceeding to study the operation of the Holy Spirit upon man.

God's part in the work of man's salvation is covered by the doctrine of grace. For our purposes this doctrine may be taken as included in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. God's attitude towards man's sin and need for salvation is termed grace. God's grace meets man's sin. Grace so conceived covers both mercy and pardon. More than that, God's grace inspires us to well-doing, and builds us up into Christ-likeness, thereby qualifying us for knowledge of reality.

What we have to notice specially for our purpose is that, according to Christian revelation and teaching, it is not man who effects a change in the relationship of God towards human nature. Grace, that is to say, is not a consequence or result of man's activity. The reverse is the truth. It is God's grace that alters the relationship of man to the divine. Grace is a cause, a spiritual energy operative upon man. In other words, objectivity is fundamental to the Christian doctrine of salvation. The initiative comes from God. It is God Who works upon man. It is God Who draws up towards His own level all spirituality which needs only to be temporarily expressed through lower degrees. God not only sustains all, but attracts all to the highest level to which it can attain, to the stage at which it reaches its own perfection. God active and suffering for man's redemption is the teaching of the Holy Spirit.

Our special study must be the mode of God's operation upon the spirit of man. Remembering the wide need which man has for salvation, we must not limit the work of the Holy Spirit to deliverance of man from personal sins. Christ saves from sin, disease and every imperfection. This wide scope of the Spirit's activity is to be conceived as the purpose

of God through the Holy Ghost. The end of the Spirit's work in human nature is the building up of a full spiritual manhood which shall be competent for the knowledge of God and for communion with the God revealed and understood. The Spirit's task is the removal of every impediment in the way of such knowledge and communion. God, through His Holy Spirit, is preparing man for that knowledge of Himself which is possible only to those who are morally and spiritually reconciled and atoned. We shall not be justified, therefore, in denying the presence of the Holy Spirit in the cure of man's physical weakness.

The operation of the Holy Spirit, as a curative, redemptive and inspiring agency, must be through some part of our total personality. Its effects upon conscious life are clearly seen in increased health, in strengthened will, in temptation resisted, evil habit conquered, and in good dispositions and sentiments acquired. It is not directly upon consciousness, however, that the Spirit works. At the same time, it is not through the unconscious, as conceived by Freudians, that we should expect the Holy Spirit to operate. Jung's view of the unconscious, equally with Freud's, disqualifies it from being the channel through which the Holy Spirit could influence the conscious life. Help coming from outside of consciousness, as undoubtedly help does come (through suggestion, for instance), is more likely to act upon the mind through a tract that is higher than consciousness rather than through the region which Freud and Jung designate the unconscious. There is much more that is not within the field of the conscious mind but which, nevertheless, influences consciousness, than is contained in that part of extra-consciousness which Freud and Jung and their disciples term the unconscious. We must remember what has been pointed out already, viz. that the unconscious is not to be identified with repression, and that the Freudian definition of the unconscious is not exhaustive of the whole of mind that lies outside the field of normal consciousness. The undisciplined unconscious, as described by Freud and Jung, with its complexes and repressions and with its unharnessed strength, needs to be redeemed, in order that its energy may be available for conscious purposes, and not be lost below the level of the conscious life. The complexes and repressions in the mind must be dealt with before it can be qualified for its high

task of knowing God. Yet we find that the unconscious is controlled and co-ordinated as a result of directed thinking and organized willing on the part of the conscious mind. A strengthened will and a clarified intellect will mean a more disciplined unconscious. An organized, integrated personality with a systematized, unified purpose of life will mean a fully controlled and organized unconscious. The necessary salvation of the unconscious, which must be a part of the full redemptive activity of the Holy Spirit, would seem to be effected indirectly through the means of the conscious life. Such a conclusion disposes of any suggestion that religion is chiefly a matter of the unconscious. And we have already seen other reasons for rejecting this view. But such a conclusion means also that we cannot neglect the education of our intellects and wills, since (complexes due to moral and spiritual imperfections having been resolved) the unconscious is dominated to a considerable extent by directed thinking and organized willing. We have, accordingly, no justification for relegating our moral regeneration to the unconscious and imagining that our salvation will be automatically worked out there. Modern psychology seems to show that the active co-operation of intellect and will is indispensable to the atonement of the self and the realization of the fully developed personality. But in this we co-operate also with a Higher Power.

So far then, we conclude, that the Holy Spirit works towards the atonement of the unconscious through the salvation of the conscious; and accordingly, our appropriation of the divine grace must be a conscious and deliberate act, reinforced by an energy from above the self. And it is in keeping with the theory of degrees that the operation of the Spirit upon the conscious mind should be through the descending grades of being. That is to say, it is always the higher that attracts the lower degree. The activity is from the highest degree and is magnetic, or teleological. A high degree of spirituality would not affect a lower degree by propelling it as a result of activity directed through a lower degree still. It would be activity exerted through intermediate degrees from higher to lower. The attraction would always be upward in the scale towards more perfect harmony, development and personality. Thus, just as the unconscious is found to be influenced by the conscious mind, so we should expect

the conscious mind to be controlled from a higher stage still. The divine touches man at the point where he himself is most divine. The highest degree to which he is at all able to attain is the state through which the Spirit of God influences and energizes him. This is not, of course, a spatial delineation of consciousness. It is a matter of higher and lower degree or value. The conscious mind is a higher degree than the unconscious; and above the conscious mind, though of course closely related to it, is a yet higher degree of spirituality.

The focus of personality is to be found not in the subconscious, but in the conscious mind. It is to be found in the conscious and not in what may be described as the supraconscious mind. Personality, however, is graded consciousness; including subconscious, conscious and supraconscious mind. A better term perhaps than supraconscious is supraliminal. In that case, if subliminal be used for everything that is below the level of consciousness, not merely the Freudian unconscious and foreconscious, but every process and activity which is beneath the threshold of consciousness, we could say that personality is a conscious mind, with a subliminal and a supraliminal margin. With the development of consciousness, the range of the subliminal is curtailed, though the subliminal is not thereby eliminated; for when effectively operative, it is a great economy to the conscious mind. Also, with the development of the conscious mind, the sphere of the supraliminal may be limited, and much more may come within the purview of conscious apprehension and direction; but the supraliminal is not thereby abolished, because it is the channel of divine power. Dr. Garvie writes: "To the writer it seems a distinction should be made between *subliminal* and *supraliminal* consciousness, as consciousness is approached from the side of *sense* or the side of *spirit*." * It may be noticed at once that if the effect of the Holy Spirit is first upon the supraliminal, and after, through the conscious mind, upon the unconscious; then the energizing power of the Spirit is something over and above the released strength due to the resolving of complexes in the unconscious. A new source of strength from the unconscious will certainly be available, but before such strength can be released there must be an influx of power from on

* Garvie, *The Christian Certainty amid the Modern Perplexity*, p. 447.

high. The very fact that so much vitality is running to waste owing to repressions and complexes and neurotic conditions generally involves a loss of vitality for the conscious mind. The will and the intellect are both, it may be, drained of energy under the influence of complexes. The will certainly (if not also the intellect) will be reduced almost to impotence, so that there will not be in consciousness the strength to control the unconscious and wrest from it the wasted life force. This is the pathetic dilemma of all neurasthenic patients. They have not the strength to exert the effort necessary to check the waste of power within themselves. What they need most of all is a supplement of power from outside themselves which will give them the will power and intellectual endurance sufficient to order and direct their own unconscious selves. This new increase of volitional strength comes to the neurotic, sometimes by the help of the physician, sometimes by the aid of auto-suggestion, and sometimes directly by receptivity to the Holy Spirit. In each of these cases, we may believe that the help comes through the supraliminal mind of the patient himself. During the process of psycho-analysis, the aid of the supraliminal is gradually solicited to redress the balance between the conscious and the unconscious mind, and to restore the dominance and ascendancy of the conscious over the unconscious. In auto-suggestion, the same higher power of the self is brought to bear upon the conflict or disease of the lower consciousness. In both these ways the influence of the Holy Spirit must be allowed. The restoration of health and vitality may not be recognized by the patient as the work of the Holy Spirit; and yet such, nevertheless, it may very well be. The importance of the discovery that through the supraliminal the Holy Spirit influences and energizes the self, lies in the possibility of deliberately utilizing that help in all cases of need. Whether the need be physical, moral or spiritual, the grace of God is available, if only the mind through the supraliminal can be made receptive to the in-pouring of God's Spirit.

On this subject of the Spirit's activity, or God's grace, the most reliable evidence we have is that given by Christ Himself. According to the argument here advanced, it was Christ Who was best qualified to know the truth of things divine. The validity of His experience is taken as

the criterion for testing all other experience of God. Religious experience in others who are qualified in a measure, though less fully than Christ, goes to confirm the evidence of Christ; but it is His Word that has the greatest degree of truth. Accordingly, the verdict of Christ becomes the guide to the interpretation of all religious experience. Thus, if the religious experience of a soul, at a lower stage than that of Christ's perfection, may seem doubtful of explanation and significance, then the true meaning is to be found by reference, not to what is lower in *general* human experience, but to what is highest of all in *religious* experience. This principle of interpretation and evaluation by reference to Christ is in itself of the utmost importance to the establishment of the validity of Christian experience. The principle follows as a corollary from the main proposition of Christ's qualification for knowledge of God. Meaning and value are to be ascertained, not by comparison with lower degrees only, but by estimation in the light of the highest degree attainable. The fullest and most convincing evidence of the truth of man's personal experience of God is to be found in the perfect experience which Christ had, and to which man's experience bears resemblance. Apart from Christ, all human experience of God must seem so fragmentary and weak that upon it there could not be based any philosophy which would venture to interpret reality. When, however, human experience, as a fragment, is related to the whole of which it is a part; not only does it gain fuller meaning itself, but within the whole it can be used as contributory to the great foundation of perfect religious experience, upon the basis of which an explanation of life may be constructed. Religious experience without the experience of Christ is at best a tentative venture. But the experience of Christ is a sure discovery and a valid revelation. This conclusion must be allowed, since Christ has fulfilled the conditions which would make such knowledge possible and reliable.

Applying this principle to the matter in hand, it must be clear that the culminating stage in the proof of religious experience lies in the teaching and revelation of Christ. Confirmation is necessary in human experience, and, as we are discovering, is forthcoming on examination; but the ultimate guarantee of truth is the interpretation of religious experience in the light of Christ's experience. What has been said

on the nature of man, sin and salvation depends upon the evidence of Christ supplementing the facts of human experience. Similarly, the meaning given to God, Christ and the Holy Spirit gains its fullest support from Christ Himself. Ultimately, our assurance of the objective truth of God's Fatherhood and Saviourhood comes from the experience of Christ Himself, Who alone was perfectly qualified to know. So also, our interpretation of the Holy Spirit's influence and power must be gained from the consciousness which Christ had of God's grace redeeming, sustaining and perfecting man. In dealing with all these doctrines, the true explanation is to be found in *perfect* religious experience. This same principle must be applied to the operation of the Holy Spirit. It is not easy to understand just how the Holy Spirit influences and energizes the human soul. But that such an effect is needed cannot be denied. And the source of power which strengthens the impotent will, when the mind is unable to help itself, remains unknown to psychology. Nevertheless, this power may very well be due to the Holy Spirit. The suggestion that the Holy Spirit operates through the supraliminal margin meets the difficulty of relating the Holy Spirit directly with either the non-moral unconscious, or with the imperfectly moral conscious mind. The suggestion is also in keeping with the general theory of gradations. Yet such a view of the channel of the Spirit's influx cannot, of course, be said to be conclusive. It can be held, however, with conviction, that the operation of the Holy Spirit upon man is desirable and not impossible. With that position established, we may safely fall back upon the evidence of Christ, confirmed in Christian experience, that the Holy Spirit, whatever the means it employs, actually does help man in his development towards the perfection of his personality. In conclusion we may say, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is working to help man in the attainment of that perfection which makes possible true knowledge of the nature and attributes of God. That there must be community of spirit between the subject knowing and the object known has already been demonstrated in Part I: and now the argument has reached the point at which it becomes evident that this Spirit must be redemptive in its agency. The mind must be prepared to know its object; and when the object is reality as a whole, the preparation must be a moral

and spiritual one. Reality as a whole is only knowable when its highest degree is known. Since reality at its highest degree is the holy and loving Father God, the religious preparation necessary for fellowship and communion with God is also the indispensable condition for knowledge of reality. The community of spirit between the mind of man and God its object, is the communion of the Holy Spirit. Experience of the redemptive work of the Holy Spirit becomes the condition of valid knowledge of reality. Once more the theory of religious knowledge receives verification, and the claim of validity made for Christian experience finds vindication.

God's grace, operating through the supraliminal, and conditioned by the receptivity and co-operation of man's conscious mind, works for the deliverance of man from all imperfection and for the upbuilding of the self into a perfect manhood. Beginning at the lowest level, complexes are gradually resolved and the unconscious is organized and brought under control. At a higher stage, the conscious mind learns the way of directed thinking, and the will learns the secret of persistent, ordered volition, whereby the whole of conduct is integrated, and personality is co-ordinated into a rich, harmonious unity. This work of spiritual deliverance is supplemented throughout by the work of spiritual enrichment. In measure as man is delivered from sin, he is qualified for communion with God and for knowledge of God. As he is set free from the compulsions to rationalizing, he is also, by his fuller experience of truth and reality, equipped to make more spiritual and true projections upon reality. So that in the end, by the grace of God, man is qualified to discover and understand the nature and attributes of God, and thus to gain knowledge of the character of reality at its highest and truest degree.

From the standpoint of a Christian metaphysic the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is expressive of the initial assumption that there is no disparity between the needs of developing human personality and the nature of ultimate reality. There is one Spirit operative throughout the whole of being, and that Spirit is seeking to establish a personal relationship in holiness and love. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of right-relatedness in the world, is the Spirit of active personality. It follows, therefore, that the right relation between the mind

and reality is not determined by intellect alone. It must be a personal response. The holiness and love of God necessitate in man a moral and emotional development as conditional to that right-relatedness wherein alone the human personality can gain knowledge of the divine personality. The Holy Spirit of God is working to produce in man the conditions of right relationship between man and reality as a whole. Our knowledge will be valid when it is gained through the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit alone can lead us into all truth. In the formula of knowledge A X B—when B stands for reality as God, then X stands for that relationship in the Holy Spirit which is the only relationship in which a Holy and Loving God can be known; while A stands for the full human personality which, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, has developed to such a degree of moral and emotional unity that it is able, through the relationship of the Holy Spirit, to have communion with and knowledge of God. It is the Person of Christ which alone fulfils the conditions in A necessary for the Christian epistemology thus represented as A X B. The validity of human knowledge depends upon the ability of the personality A to stand in the relation of X towards B: it depends, in other words, upon the measure in which B through X has been allowed to influence A. According to Christian metaphysics, B is active through X in qualifying A for its place in the process of knowledge A X B. In so far as man allows the Holy Spirit to work upon him, he will gain true knowledge of God.

PART III

CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE

CHAPTER I

WORSHIP

We turn our attention now from Christian doctrine to Christian experience. The distinction, of course, is not clear cut, for doctrine is based on experience. The difference might be indicated by saying that the transition is being made at this point from the intellectual to the emotional aspect of religion. In a measure, doctrine is an intellectual construction, while that which it treats of is very much an emotional condition. Although there can be no sharp cleavage, the distinction, nevertheless, may serve, since the importance lies now with what is felt more than with what is taught. Modern psychology, even when it questions religious teaching, recognizes the ineradicable character of religion itself. Religious emotions and religious exercises are allowed to be both normal and valuable. Whether, however, it is possible to retain religious feeling and practice and at the same time to reject the teaching associated therewith, is extremely questionable. The theory here advanced is that the very persistence and necessity of religion must be taken, on any acceptable metaphysic, as proof that reality is touched by the human spirit whenever such an attitude as the characteristically religious one is adopted. That the truth apprehended in religion is partial and progressive is altogether what we should expect, since there are conditions which must be fulfilled before knowledge can be obtained. The fullest truth is discovered and revealed where the conditions are most adequately met. This means that the greatest authority on religious truth is Jesus Christ. Even the lowest form of religious response, however, is a movement in the direction of ultimate truth. For, however great the error present, religion cannot be entirely devoid of the apprehension of the truth concerning reality. The contention here put forward is that the inherent character of religion in human nature

is a guarantee that reality responds in some measure to the demands of the religious spirit. Just as we believe that the universe responds to the needs of the mind for intellectual construction, so we believe that it admits the need of the soul for communion and understanding. Such deductions follow from the metaphysic which affirms that the spirit of man is an integral part of the reality which is to be known. If psychology makes suggestions which imply the hiatus between the mind and the universe, then it is thereby prompting a course which is nothing short of intellectual suicide. The aim and ambition of psychology to restore and establish a satisfactory attitude of the mind towards reality is very likely to fail unless the religious claim to know reality as God be not only allowed, but ardently advocated.

Let us, then, study some aspects of religious experience in the light of modern psychological practices; and first amongst these, let us consider worship.

It must be repeated at the outset that in this section, as in the former, our concern is only with a part of the whole subject. The study of the full meaning and value of worship lies beyond the scope of this essay. Our attention is confined to those features of worship which can be related to modern psychology. The theme is a much smaller one than the psychology of worship; it is just the bearing of recent psychology on the experience of worship.

Worship must be *social* or *corporate* in nature. And corporate worship is a religious necessity. Religion is not merely a private experience, although, of course, it may be intensely personal. Even when most personal, however, it is also an experience of the herd. And it is a point of some importance that the herd instinct should find expression and be brought to sublimation through the experience of the worship of the Church. The Church sets up as its goal the realization of a herd ideal, the Kingdom of Heaven; but its appeal to the herd instinct has often been too much neglected. The narrow, evangelical and pietistic type of Christianity, by emphasizing too exclusively the important truth of the experience of *individual* salvation, has tended to overlook the social factors and to ignore the appeal of religion to the gregarious nature of man. The consequence of this exaggeration of individualism is, that in the assembly of the congregation worship is apt to become merely an

extension of the experience of the ego to a limited number of closely related units, and the social element is thereby in danger of being almost excluded. For the distinction between the individual experience and the social experience (be it noticed) is not essentially one of numbers. It is possible for the ego to find enhancement and enlargement of its own individualism by the confirmation which comes from the knowledge that others around are sharing a similar individual emotion. In such an assembly the true note of the Church would be absent, and worship would have failed in its great purpose owing to its inability to become a truly social act. The herd instinct would be very little influenced for good in such an imperfect experience of the worship of the Church.

At the other extreme, and equally a characteristic of an exaggerated and distorted evangelicalism, are to be found the phenomena of revivalism. Here, certainly, the herd instinct is touched; but not for good to itself. The contagion of emotional demonstration in these meetings results from a reversion to a primitive level of consciousness. The herd instinct is given, for the time being, an outlet for unrestrained expression, but remains uninfluenced thereby. The revival is not the way in which to attempt the sublimation of the herd instinct.

While noticing, therefore, that collective experience of revivalism is valueless as a means for refining the herd instinct, we must also notice that individualism in worship equally fails in this respect. Sectionalism, in the form of sectarianism and denominationalism, shares, in part at least, that failure to achieve the true worship which is the religious act of a whole community. And that this social quality is inherent to worship becomes evident beyond dispute when the evolution of worship is studied. Moreover, it is this corporate note which gives to worship its significance, not only in earlier phases, but also in its latest and highest development. The great need is that worship always and everywhere should be engaged in as a corporate act. It is the community as a whole which, on its religious side, expresses itself through the worship of the Church. In order to be representative of the Kingdom of Heaven, the establishment of which on earth is the goal of the Christian religion, the community worshipping must be, not a small

company, but a great society. It must be great, that is, ideally, if not numerically. Potentially, if not actually, it must be the fellowship of all mankind, the Church of a redeemed humanity. Although, in point of numbers, there be but two or three gathered together in Christ's Name, the presence of the High Priest of the race in the midst of them makes actual there the Holy Catholic Church and the Communion of Saints. It is the vision of greatness that is needful to the Church in order that it may be true to its function and place in reference to the religion of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is by realizing that worship is the act of the Great Church, and not merely the performance of a small congregation, that the true meaning of worship is understood; and it is thus, also, that it is brought to bear upon the herd instinct in man. Worship is the religious response of the herd. Through worship a refining influence is exerted upon the gregarious instinct, and so upon all the feelings and emotions which are closely associated with that instinct. Too often this instinct is left uncultured and allowed to find its only expressions in useless and undesirable outlets. The possibility of sublimating this instinct through the worship of the Great Church, and thereby linking it up with the heavenly herd of the Kingdom, although it has been so much neglected in some quarters, is of great importance to religion. Worship is a side of religion which ought to be used for the culture and refinement of the whole of man's instinctive and emotional nature. It is now understood that emotions are, on the one hand, closely related to instincts and impulses; and are, on the other hand, organized into sentiments. Thus, by the formation of sentiments, the whole of man's feeling or affective side may be influenced. The sentiments which find a place in religion are closely associated with the herd instinct as their radical constituent. The sentiment which is most prominent in worship is reverence. Reverence, like every sentiment, is complex. It is due to the blending of the emotion of fear with the emotions of wonder and awe. The emotions at the root of reverence may be provoked on certain occasions, and cultivated by direction upon a suitable type of objects. About these objects the emotions become organized into a permanent feeling-disposition, or a *sentiment*. As part of its instinctive root, reverence has fear; not only fear as an

emotion, but fear as an instinct with reflexes. Amongst gregarious animals, fear is highly contagious. This adds to its survival value both for the species and for the individual. Now, the herd instinct is closely related to the instinct of fear. The modern phenomenon of panic is evidence of this association. It is through the herd instinct that fear, as a social factor, gets its peculiar force. Wherefore, through reverence, the herd instinct is being touched, because reverence has as its root the instinct of fear. Even more important than this consideration, however, is the inference, that in reverence we have a sublimation for fear. And of all the instincts, fear is perhaps the most difficult to sublimate. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, apart from reverence, fear has any adequate sublimation in modern life. And of all the instincts, fear, if it be left uncultured and unrefined, is, at present, the most dangerous to civilization. Warfare is, in no small part, due to-day to an unsublimated fear which is reinforced by an undisciplined herd instinct. The value of reverent worship as a sublimation of the instinct of fear and of the instinct of the herd can hardly be overestimated. This consideration leads us to the conclusion that worship which lacks the note of reverence fails in its purpose as greatly as worship that is devoid of the corporate note.

Mr. Shand specifies four emotions which are the most prominent as constituents in the sentiments, and which are easily discernible in the common sentiments of love and hate. Fear and anger, joy and sorrow can all be organized about an end or object; and, as Mr. Shand insists, it is the nature of the object which determines the nature and direction of the emotions when they are lifted into the unity and stability of a sentiment. The most important consideration for us is this possibility of changing the direction and character of an emotion by attracting it to a certain type of object. On this point Mr. Shand may be quoted: "The form which the problem assumes for us is this, how such emotions as fear and anger—commonly regarded as egoistic, or at least as bearing on the preservation of the individual—or such uncertain emotions as joy and sorrow—how these can manifest at times a disinterestedness apparently foreign to their nature. And the solution to this problem appears to be that it is through the cause that excites it, and the particular object or end to which it is directed, that an

instinct, an emotion, a sentiment becomes interested or disinterested." *

This is confirmation of the value of worship as a sublimation for fear, and as an influence making for the refinement and cultivation of the instinctive and emotional side of man's nature. The objects and ends which are placed before the mind in worship are social and disinterested; and, moreover, they are objects and ends which relate not to any small group, but which are identical with the redemption and eternal welfare of the human race. The sentiment of reverence will give social direction and disinterested quality to the emotion of fear. While doing nothing to sever the close bond between the instinct of fear and the herd instinct, reverence, by extending the herd to include the race, will free fear from the mode of expression through group hatred and group war. Thus fear, instead of forming part of the sentiment of *hate* to foreigners, will form a part of the sentiment of *love* to humanity.

Other sentiments closely akin to reverence and love also find expression in a full and true worship. The sentiment of gratitude, for instance, finds support in the thanksgiving. The sentiment of humility is involved in the confession. The sentiment of dependence is manifest in the intercession. But it must be noticed that in public worship, as distinct from private devotion, all these sentiments have a predominantly, though not exclusively, social reference. The thanksgiving is not merely for personal benefits; indeed, is not an emotion aroused by any special boon vouchsafed; but is the constant feeling attitude towards God for His goodness towards man. Similarly, the confession is not merely personal; its significance lies in the fact that it is also a corporate confession, a recognition of social guilt and social responsibility. It is a confession of the sins of the community in which the individual, be he never so pious, is vicariously involved. So, too, the sense of dependence is a consciousness of the dependence of human nature upon divine generosity and love. All these social implications of every part of worship, however, will not be missed by feeling, provided that reverence, with its touch upon the herd instinct, be made fundamental to the whole of the worship of the Church.

* Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 45.

Sublimation means the socializing of instincts and emotions. Corporate worship, therefore, might have, and ought to have, the effect of refining and sublimating the feeling side of man's nature. Such sublimation being effected (as we have seen it might be), religion would then bring to the service of humanity an emotional dynamic already directed upon social ends. The advantage of religious sublimation over all other means of socializing the instincts and emotions is to be found in the more perfect accomplishment of a wide and full application to human need. Patriotism, for instance, links up the herd instinct with the nation; but religion links it up with humanity. Social service is, of course, valuable in all the smaller spheres; but over and above all the partial work, there must be the great reference of emotion to the ultimate pole of social morality—the well-being of mankind. The function of religion, through worship, is to supply the purified and strengthened emotion which can be directed along those channels where it may flow to the fulfilment of the religious ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven. Worship, however (let it be said at once), must be engaged in objectively and for its own sake, or it will cease to have this value for social service. Religion which is identified with morality is as false and imperfect as religion which is divorced therefrom. The nature of the sentiments, when their object is God, ought to preclude the possibility of participating in worship as a means to an ulterior goal. Only true and spiritual worship can have a valuable effect upon the feeling nature of man. Worship as an emotional exercise preparatory to social work is false worship and futile worship. The emotional energy necessary to realize the ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven comes through the worship not of that ideal, but of the Christ Who died for that ideal.

The value of worship having been once recognized, it will then become evident that whatever contributes to make worship reverent and corporate is a genuine and desirable aid to true worship. And first it must be noticed, in this connexion, that what is old is helpful in constraining reverence and inducing the consciousness of social continuity. This will apply in part to prayers, hymns, music and version of the Scriptures; but also in part to ritual, ceremony and vestments. The social solidity of the Church depends alike

upon the firm foundation of its feet in the past and the wide embrace of its arms in the present. Neither the needs of the present nor the heritage of the past can be ignored if worship is to be spiritual and true. While, therefore, the present is kept in view in worship, at the same time the past must never be out of sight. Ritual, provided it does not render worship ineffective in the face of modern need, may have great influence in producing the atmosphere of reverence. And a just and right ceremony should be a great help to a true and spiritual worship.

Apart from the social significance and awe-inspiring value of what is at once good and old, there is another point to be noticed closely connected with the above—the use of symbols. Modern psychology has done much to demonstrate the naturalness and helpfulness of symbolism as a language for the unconscious. Not only the unconscious mind, but the conscious mind also, utilizes symbolism as the rudiments of its language. Simile, metaphor, allegory and parable are all implications of the principle of symbolism. The unit of speech, the single word, is often derived from a symbol. Accordingly, the attempt to eliminate symbolism from worship is not only unnatural but impossible. The symbolism may be reduced to a minimum or increased to a maximum. What, however, is more important than the amount of symbolism is the quality. There may be in worship either good symbolism or bad. The perfect worship would have the right amount of the best symbolism.

On the other hand, however, the attraction of mere symbolism for its own sake may have little or no religious value. A service of elaborate ceremonial may be as devoid of the spirit of worship as the barest and emptiest form of service. Indeed, the barren and bleak worship would probably have the greater reality of the two, or it could not survive, since it has nothing but its element of genuine religious emotion to make it attractive. The fault is (as we have seen) not that religion is absent in the latter case, but that the social consciousness essential to true worship is lacking. Intense personal religion is as likely to be found in the unliturgical type of service as in the elaborately ceremonial. The whole question is, however, what type of ceremonial and symbolism, and how much, will aid the

realization of the *social* content in worship, without overloading the soul and destroying sincerity and spirituality.

First, it may be said without hesitation, whatever symbolism is used must be recognized as symbolism. It is there, not in its own right or for its own sake, and emphatically not owing to its possession of any magical efficacy. It is used as representation and suggestion of the moral and social reality in worship. In order that the symbol may be regarded as no more than symbol, something of its meaning and significance had better be understood. It may not be easy to define precisely what a symbol stands for; its value is partly that it represents something that cannot be exactly and fully expressed in any other way. Nothing but harm, however, is done when the ritual and ceremonial are supposed to be anything more than forms appropriate for the need. There is a fitting symbolism and also a repugnant symbolism. Excessive elaboration of ceremonial is repugnant to the simple sincerity of religion, just as absence of all traditional and universal forms is repugnant to the wide fellowship of religion. The one savours of empty formalism, the other of aggressive individualism.

It may be concluded, then, that the use of simple symbols and dignified ceremonial is not only justified, but helpful, in realizing spiritual worship. The symbol is effective on account of its suggestiveness. So that we are led next to consider the aid of suggestion generally in worship. Whatever acts through suggestion as a stimulus to reverence, may be considered as helpful to worship. Architecture, with effects of lighting; music and silence; incense; symbols and ritual; ceremony and vestments, are all means which work through suggestion to the end of reverent worship. It is true that the *sentiment* of reverence may exist without any excitation of the emotions. Nevertheless, unless the emotions of awe and wonder are sometimes experienced, the sentiment of reverence must grow weak. Moreover, there is value in the emotional outlet. Worship which is untouched by emotion is unsatisfactory to human nature. The helpfulness of worship in human life should be, in part, the opportunity it offers for a wide emotional outpouring, under restraint and control, and dominated by the ideal of social service. In this way emotion is taught to seek sublimation on its first emergence into consciousness.

The libido, or emotional stream of life, is the vital force which serves all the emotions. It is not to be identified with sex emotion, as Freudians have taught. Sex is one of its outlets; and in youth, unless other channels for its flowings are provided, it may, likely enough, run along the river bed of sex. Another outlet for the libido, and one which makes all the more easy its sublimation in various directions, is the emotional outpouring in worship. Unrestrained emotionalism effects nothing good, and may result in much harm. It is merely an expenditure of the libido in unsublimated ways and is likely to make all the more difficult the useful and necessary sublimation of the emotions. In worship the emotions ought to be awakened, and ought to be taught to flow under prescribed restraint in the direction of the great social ideal of a redeemed humanity.

The value of imagination and emotion is generally recognized. Worship may be a means of winning the libido for the service of the Kingdom through its appeal, by symbol and ceremonial, to the imagination and emotion of youth. It has been proved that suggestion is most potent when received under the conditions of quiescence. Such a state should be produced during the offering of prayer. The appeal of the sermon, too, should be all the stronger if it comes upon minds that have already been prepared for quiet receptivity. Neglect of external means for producing internal conditions favourable to lasting impressions may be one of the causes for the ineffectiveness and unattractiveness of some worship. The psychologist may have to go even further than this and utter a warning that the external conditions of worship are sometimes such as to make any spiritual benefit all but impossible.

All that has been said about worship in general applies with special force to the Sacraments. These, by their nature, are psychologically fitted to become, and so ought to become, the most effective services of the Church. What is true of the influence and value of all worship is peculiarly true of the service of the Eucharist.

The evidence of Professor Pratt upon the psychological effect of the Eucharist is worth quoting here: "The Mass is the very centre of Catholic worship and the heart of Catholic belief; and leading up as it does to the miracle upon the altar and the tremendously dramatic climax of the elevation

of the Host, it has no rival in the whole round of religious ceremonial for impressiveness and for the production of deep but controlled religious emotion. To the unsympathetic and ignorant beholder it seems bizarre, but whoever enters sympathetically, intelligently, imaginatively, into the feelings of the worshippers kneeling around him, and for the moment takes their objective point of view of the peculiar and miraculous presence of the Divine, can hardly fail to find in it a new and unique and deeply religious experience." *

In all this it may appear that the emphasis has been placed upon the social factor in worship to the neglect or even denial of the personal element. The emphasis, however, has been placed where it seemed to be most needed. The value of private devotion is another question. Worship means an act of the community; wherefore, in worship it is the social feature which is prominent. Worship, however, to be real must have its personal side. The necessity for this has been made clear in the stress laid upon the need for emotion in worship. Furthermore, it must be evident that the corrective to formalism lies in the fervour of personal religion.

The worship offered by the Church must be the best that man can give, and must be of a type considered to be suitable for acceptance by the God revealed in Christ. So offered, worship is the fitting attitude of the mind towards the highest degree of spirituality; and when the conditions of true worship are realized, the mind is inwardly prepared to become more like the object it worships. No ideal can have such constraint as one that is worshipped. Worship, accordingly, is one of the ways in which the mind gains its qualification for a knowledge of reality. In the communion of the mind of man with the mind of Christ, an understanding of the nature of God is possible for man, even as it was for Christ. According to the measure of Christlikeness attained through worship, so is the reliability of the knowledge of God.

In noticing now what is the bearing of the experience of worship upon the argument of this thesis, it is necessary to recognize the value of objective worship. Professor Pratt, in Chapter XIV of *The Religious Consciousness*, draws a distinction between objective and subjective worship and

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 298.

finds each type expressed in its extreme form in Catholic and Protestant worship respectively. "To the Protestant," he says, "the Mass seems phantastic; to the Catholic the evangelical worship appears Godless. Each can understand the other only by appreciating the difference in aim: the leading purpose of the Mass is the worship of God, that of the Protestant service is the subjective impression upon the minds and hearts of the worshippers." * Of course the apportionment of the two types of worship to Protestant and Catholic cannot be made in a clear-cut fashion. For in the sermon the Catholic aims at a subjective effect upon the hearers; and in the prayer the Protestant intends to be objective and work some effect upon the Divine. Even if intercessory prayer be abandoned altogether, still the purpose of prayer, as distinct from meditation, is to establish a relationship between the human subject and the Divine object. The more subjective the worship becomes, however, the weaker is its religious influence upon the worshippers. Of course, the religious influence of the most subjective mode of worship conceivable could not be reduced to nil, for the simple reason that any conception of God which did not make worship altogether irrelevant would have a measure of objectivity. This being so, the subjective religious effect of Protestant worship may be very considerable owing to the objectivity attaching to the idea of God in the minds of the worshippers. Where that is so, although the form of service is not framed for the purpose of objective worship, nevertheless the worship does acquire an objective note. On the other hand, Catholic worshippers whose belief in a transcendent God had vanished and who attached no meaning to the supernatural and rejected the miraculous would have the objective element in their worship very much reduced. With all this allowed, however, evidence goes to prove that when, for whatever reason, the worship offered has acquired the objective attitude, then its subjective effect is heightened. That is to say that worship, like art and virtue, must be sought for its own sake and as an end in itself, or its unique value is dissipated.

This means that when in worship a relationship is believed to be established between the mind of man and objective reality, then consequences follow which, in default of that

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 290.

belief, are not to be found. Worship which is objective has greater subjective effect than worship which is not objective. This fact of experience calls for explanation. The theory of auto-suggestion is inadmissible as an explanation, for the simple reason that, far from explaining the fact, it could only destroy it. Auto-suggestion is not a sort of psychic potency which can produce results in the mind. It is merely a name for a mental process and indicates nothing but the presence of imagination and emotion. Now, imagination must have a mental image and emotion must be directed upon an object. The question to ask is whether the image is true and whether the object is real. Recognizing that auto-suggestion is a psychic-mechanism, let us allow it as large a place as any care to claim for it in the experience of worship. Still, it must be allowed that everything depends upon the idea that is suggested by the self to itself. This is true, although, of course, a large place must be allowed also for hetero-suggestion. No hetero-suggestion, however, would be effective which did not become auto-suggestion at last. Suggestion, then, to use the word generally, necessitates an idea suggested. And, as said above, the type of idea which is most effective is one that fixes the imagination and stirs the emotion. But now, an idea which was believed to be false could do neither of these things constantly. And what is meant when an attempt is made to discredit an experience by explaining it as due to suggestion is simply that the idea proposed and responded to was false. But true suggestion is no less possible, and one hopes no less common, than false. Everything depends on the idea presented and perceived.

In Christian worship the idea presented as objective is that of a Personal God Who is an aspect of reality and Who enters into a relationship with the human soul. When this is believed and God the Father is objectively worshipped through Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit, then subjective religious effects are produced. The more objective the worship, or in other words, the firmer the belief in a Personal God as Objective and Responsive, the more marked is the influence upon the worshipper. But this influence, it may be objected, results from the mere *belief* in objectivity, and is no evidence of objective truth: for, so long as the idea be firmly *believed,* its objective truthfulness does not make any

difference. But the acceptance of a belief that no difference were made by the truth or falsity of the idea would most certainly mean the weakening of the effectiveness of the idea over the mind. The dilemma, therefore, seems to be this: any doubt entertained respecting the objective truthfulness of the idea suggested affects the influence of the idea; but assurance that the idea is not a falsity cannot be gained.

The difficulty here is similar to that which confronted us in discussing the content of projection. There is no possibility of comparing an idea of reality with reality in order to estimate its truthfulness. From this consideration one inference seems inevitable, viz. that any metaphysic which demands such a test of validity must be false, since the test is impossible. The only criterion which can be applied with any satisfaction, from the standpoint of the inquirer into the nature of reality, is the pragmatic standard, widely conceived. That idea of reality which yields the most complete adaptation of the fullness of developing personality to that large environment of physical, intellectual and spiritual conditions which outreach to reality as a whole, must be accepted as the truer idea of the reality in which developing personality must exist as an integral part. Reality as a whole cannot repudiate the claims upon it of so essential a part of itself as personality. A measure of the truthfulness of an idea of reality may therefore be discovered in its satisfactoriness to an integrated personality.

A Christian metaphysic, however, carries us further than this, and affords a supplementary and more conclusive criterion. According to Christian teaching, reality is not neutral towards our quest for knowledge of its nature and constitution. Reality actually responds to our seeking. The nature of reality is such that it prompts personality to desire a relationship between the soul and the ultimately real. And this relationship is desired alike on the side of reality beyond the soul, and on the side of reality within the soul. A relationship for personality can only be fully satisfactory when it becomes communion with personality. And for developing moral personality, the highest communion possible is that increasingly effected between the soul and Perfect Personality. Reality is conceived, therefore, under the aspect of God, Who is Perfect Personality. God, so conceived, is a God Who is active in promoting communion

between Himself and created souls. He is a God Who responds to man's desire for knowledge of Himself. Indeed, He is a God Who first seeks communion with man, so that man's seeking is a response inspired by the Holy Spirit. The question then becomes, not whether reality will respond to our claims upon it, but rather, whether we are willing to respond to the demands of reality upon us. And one demand is that we should attain to the stage of divine knowledge and communion through the discipline of moral education. The initiative, both in revelation and redemption, is with God. Wherefore, the Incarnation is the inevitable deduction from a Christian metaphysic. God in Christ is revealing the nature of reality; and the nature of reality is shown to be such that it must thus reveal itself.

Thus we are brought back to Christ as the final test of validity in all our thinking upon the nature of ultimate being. Those ideas are most true which are most conformable to the revelation of God in Christ. Further confirmation is to be found in the experience of those who have held such ideas. But the final authority is in the teaching and experience of the Sinless and Perfect Son of God.

This Christian metaphysic of the nature of reality yields us, as no other metaphysic does, an object of worship. Worship is as indispensable to the Christian conception of God as logical consistency is to the idea of the absolute. Worship bears witness to the character of God as inherently worshipful. He is to be reached through those responsive states which are achieved at their highest in the attitude of worship. And all worship must be objective, since its aim must be to effect a relationship with a God Who, far from being static and neutral, is active in self-revelation and moral redemption. If the God of reality be Incarnate in the Son of God, then the only fitting recognition and response is to be found in worship.

Worship, then, reflects that conception of the universe which is implied in a Christian metaphysic. On this point we may quote Dr. Temple, and with the quotation close the chapter: "The universe itself is an organ of God's self-expression. Thus we have the following background of the sacramental worship of the Church: the universe is the fundamental sacrament; and taken in its entirety (when of course it includes the Incarnation and the Atonement)

is the perfect sacrament extensively; but it only becomes this, so far as our world and human history are concerned, because within it and determining its course is the Incarnation, which is the perfect sacrament intensively—the perfect expression in a moment of what is also perfectly expressed in everlasting time, the Will of God; resulting from the Incarnation we find the Spirit-bearing Body, which is not actually a perfect sacrament, because its members are not utterly surrendered to the Spirit within it, but none the less lives by the Life which came fully into the world in Christ; as part of the life of this Body we find certain specific sacraments or sacramental acts." *

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 234.

CHAPTER II

PRAYER

HAVING considered in the last chapter the subject of divine service, we must now turn to the study of the closely related subject of private devotion. We have seen already that both public worship and private prayer are necessary if religion is to be real. Formalism and individualism both mean death to Christianity. What must not be overlooked, however, is that both these enemies may invade prayer no less than worship. What gives reality to worship is the combination of the social and the personal. The experience which is truly personal finds its complement in what is truly social. It is not personalism but individualism that is anti-social. As in worship the stress is upon the social, without exclusion of the personal; so in prayer the stress is upon the personal, without exclusion of the social. Prayer that is selfish is as unreal as worship that is formal. Individualism, in the shape of aggressive egoism, may, and perhaps often does, destroy the spirit of private devotion. Christianity, as a religion of love and communion, is incompatible with self-centring interests. It lays down as the condition of its fulfilment, that the mind must lose its self-centred, egoistic, individualistic self, and find its Christ-centred, altruistic, personal self. Modern psychology divides abnormal minds into extraverted and introverted types. The one type is preoccupied with the external world, the other is obsessed with the thought of self. The two types in their modified manifestations would tend, the one to formalism, the other to individualism; or, alternatively, the one to emotionalism, the other to intellectualism: but either way, with extreme lack of balance. Probably both extraverted and introverted types are manifestations of individualism or undeveloped personality. The perfect response, of course, is that of developed personality. This means a socialized self, an adjusted emotional and intel-

lectual life, and a co-ordinated inward and outward interest. Such a personality, free from all the imperfections discovered by modern psychology, it is the aim of Christianity to build up. And the proper blending of divine worship and private devotion is calculated to foster the growth of true spirituality and full personality.

The evil of formalism need hardly be touched upon here, but one type of individualism calls for attention. Extreme mysticism, with its accompanying emotionalism or ecstasy, is a form of perverted religion due to undeveloped personality. This does not mean that mysticism has no place in the Christian religion. To say that would be as false as to say that because excessive emotionalism becomes a denial of the Christian ideal, therefore emotion has no place in religion. Symbolism and sacramentalism give scope for a mystic experience; but both emotion and mysticism must be restrained and kept closely in touch with the moral and social realities of religion. The fault of much unsymbolic and unsacramental worship is that it fails to give scope for any mystical experience under social conditions. Either, therefore, mysticism is starved, or, if insistent, is forced to find expression through individualism.

Mysticism is prone to claim that through ecstasy it has direct intercourse with God. Since, however, it is impossible for the mystic to communicate to others the knowledge he has thus gained of God, his experience has no social value. He can tell how the mystic trance is to be gained, and so help others to come to the discovery themselves; but the knowledge of God remains an individual possession. There is, of course, truth in the contention that you cannot know fully what you have not yourself experienced. A mystic experience of God may be to many the surest evidence of the truth and reality of God. The point at issue, however, is the contention of extreme mysticism, that only in individual intercourse can God be known. The Christian religion declares that the presence of God may be experienced both in public worship and in private devotion. This means that the Christian experience is not an *individualistic* but a *personal* experience. And within the personal experience there is a place for the mystic awareness of God's presence. In the mystic trance, however, there is no place for corporate fellowship with God. Personality is a more fully developed

and inclusive conception than individuality; and in personal religion, both through worship and prayer, the mystic note of the Sacramental Presence should be found.

It may be noticed, in passing, that for modern psychology, trance or auto-hypnosis means a regression of the mind to the level of the unconscious. The conscious and the supraliminal are both shut out for the time being. Ecstasy is not a state reached owing to a high integration of the mind. It may be facilitated by the undisciplined state of the unconscious. But knowledge of a God Who is Perfect Personality is to be attained only through the perfection of personality and not by regression to what is below the level of consciousness. Quiescence, which is desirable for all devotion, brings into accord the unconscious and the conscious mind, but does not surrender the mind to the control of the unconscious; much less does it efface the conscious mind. When, however, mysticism is blended in a full personal awareness, instead of reverting to trance, it may be supposed to effect a blending of the conscious with the supraliminal, and so aid communion through the Holy Spirit.

A further point of importance is this. The avenue of knowledge chosen by mysticism when it becomes ecstasy or trance determines the type of knowledge gained. The single aspect of reality faced precludes knowledge of anything but one particular side of truth. True of a part of reality, the mystic experience becomes false when referred to the whole. The aspect of the whole as divine is appreciable to the vague feeling-tone of mysticism. But more than a merely emotional or trance state is needed in order to conceive reality as graded divinity with, at its highest degree, the Personality of God. As Dr. Galloway points out: "The danger of mysticism is that it weakens the rational and practical side of religion, and inclines to substitute pantheistic absorption for spiritual communion." * It must be clear, therefore, that in private devotion the individualism which leads to mystic trance must be avoided.

Private prayer must, then, be personal religion and not individualism turned pious to serve its own ends. Prayer in the Name of Christ cannot be prayer circumscribed by self. The self has its needs, which are met in prayer; but the religious needs of the self are: First, for deliverance from

* Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 161.

the imperfections of personality, with forgiveness for personal sins; and secondly, for growth in grace towards Christ-likeness. Such are the prayers for self which are unselfish. Prayer, if it be Christian, must gain its quality from Christ, through Whom it is offered. Such prayer is a seeking of the Father revealed by Christ, and is a surrender of the self to the God Whose Kingdom is sincerely desired. Only prayer that is through Christ can give valid experience of the nature of God. Prayer directed upon some private God, or upon a national God, is nothing better than a false projection upon reality. Fetishism is regarded as a retrogression from a higher type of religion just because its god is private and is used for selfish gain. Nationalism in religion is seen to be also a regression (and therefore false) as soon as it is transcended in universalism. Similarly, private devotion must never be made an opportunity for individual regression to a more primitive and less spiritual religion. Unless the Christ of the Church and the God of the Kingdom be kept constantly before the mind in private devotion, the mind will make prayer an occasion for self-assertion.

The subject of confession and forgiveness, so closely related to prayer, demands a separate chapter. Here, however, the need for confession at the beginning of prayer is evident, since a safeguard is necessary lest prayer be used simply as the encouragement of the self in its selfishness, sins, grievances, discontents and rebellions. The only safe prayer, psychologically, is that which has Christ and not self as its centre. If any symbolism, such as cross or crucifix or picture or private altar, helps the mind to turn from itself to Christ and fix its attention there, then such help must be considered as desirable. Psychologically, the dangerous prayer is that which is nothing better than a brooding upon self, a pre-occupation with individual resentments, and a morbid anxiety for self-preservation in this world and the next. It is not the prayer offered with a crucifix in sight that is false, but the prayer that has only the self in sight. Prayer, like Bible-reading, has been regarded as a valuable spiritual exercise quite irrespective of the method or manner of its use. Actually, both may be employed to foster assertive, irreligious individualism; and psychology has to utter the word of warning. Closed-in

prayer is merely a manifestation of a closed-in mind. The value of true prayer is its widening effect upon mind, its deliverance from the narrowness of self-limitation, and its expansion into comprehensive spirituality.

A distinction must be drawn between prayer and auto-suggestion. We have seen already that there is a type of self-centred prayer which is valueless as a means for acquiring true experience of God. Similarly, prayer that is simply auto-suggestion could not be taken as giving reliable knowledge of objective reality. The self in such an experience might very well be projecting its own ideas and referring them to reality where they did not fit. The practice of auto-suggestion is valuable, and is to be encouraged as an aid to the acquisition and maintenance of health, and also as a help to the development of morally useful and desirable habits. As a mechanism also by which the higher thoughts of the mind may influence the lower dispositions it is to be utilized. The proved efficacy of auto-suggestion, however, does not land us, as might be supposed, in subjectivity. For the idea, suggested by the self, must have been appropriated from the outside world. Auto-suggestion, therefore, implies nothing more than this, that an ideal to be effective in life must be approved and adopted by the self. Thus accepted its influence is assured. In this way, however, it must be recognized that both true and false ideas may be self-suggested. And although the idea may come from objective reality, the mind in interpreting the experience may refer the idea back to reality at a different point from the place where it originally belonged. Auto-suggestion, therefore, although it does not necessarily preclude valid experience, is at the same time a mere psychological mechanism, and carries with it no guarantee of truth. The whole question is, whether the idea suggested is true in the setting in which it is taken. This, of course (as we saw in the last chapter), must be decided on other grounds. So far as prayer is concerned, the truth of the idea suggested to the mind must be judged by reference to the teaching and experience of Christ. The type of prayer noticed already as false and individualistic would be an erroneous and harmful type of auto-suggestion. Those morbid traits of the mind which ought to be corrected would thereby be strengthened.

Yet there are true prayers which become effective owing to the mechanism of auto-suggestion. And it is important to understand that religion can utilize suggestion to accomplish its own ends. Its value in public worship has been noticed, and now its operation in private devotion must be examined. Prayer may be taken as comprising meditation, adoration, confession, thanksgiving and intercession. The influence of meditation and adoration upon the mind may be considered as due largely to the process of auto-suggestion. Yet the value of these devotions lies in the truth and goodness of the object that is before the mind for quiet, receptive contemplation. If the character, teaching and work of Christ be the objects of the mind's aspiration, then, because on other grounds they can be shown to be true, their effect through appropriation and suggestion cannot but be beneficial. In such an experience, instead of the morbid, anti-social, rebellious traits finding reinforcement, those qualities on the contrary which make for the upbuilding of Christlike personality will be given the support of accepted suggestion. And in the end the confirmation of the experience will be found in the quieting, integrating and atoning effect of such contemplation upon the aspiring mind.

In all this, however, it may be objected that God is quiescent and the mind alone active. Although such a conclusion is not to be regarded as justified, nevertheless, on the knowledge of the process of auto-suggestion alone, it does not appear to be necessary for the object actively to affect the subject, but only for the subject actively to adopt the ideal. Nevertheless (as it has been said already in this thesis), the effect which the ideal has upon the self may be taken as some evidence of its truth. Religious minds, however, would not be satisfied with any account of prayer which did not describe it as intercourse and communion between the soul and God. This distinction, therefore, must be drawn between the experience of prayer and the practice of auto-suggestion. In the former there is consciousness of the active participation of the object: in the latter there is awareness only of the activity of the subject. Meditation and adoration, accordingly, while they embrace the process of auto-suggestion, also exceed it; for in these experiences,

as forms of prayer, the religious soul would claim that the distinguishing feature was communion.

The value of the experience of prayer as giving valid knowledge of God is to be found in two characteristics, closely related. First, it implies that the nature of God is such that communion, through prayer, can be effected between the soul and God. God, to be prayed to, must be believed in as a God Who answers prayer. The conception which men form of God may change as human personality develops, and consequently the manner in which He is expected to answer prayer may also change. Prayer may become more an experience of fellowship and less an act of bargaining. It may be practised more as an end in itself and less as a means to more practical ends. Yet prayer always expects a response from God. Indeed, the belief may be held that in prayer it is God Who calls and the soul that responds. But however the idea of prayer may be developed, belief in a God Who enters into some manner of communion remains constant. This leads to the second characteristic of prayer; its objective nature. Professor Pratt gives instances of people who, having lost all faith in the objective reality in prayer, nevertheless continued the habit of prayer because of its subjective value. And it is always possible that, in a world where the majority who pray do so because of belief in prayer as an objective experience, a few highly disciplined individuals should be able to continue the practice of prayer without such belief. But as Professor Pratt insists, the disappearance of such belief would mean the cessation of prayer. He says: "Psychology may and should point out that the subjective effects of prayer are almost invariably due, directly or indirectly, to some real faith in the objective relation. . . . That meditation may have excellent subjective effects is not to be denied, but no one with any knowledge of the psychology of religion will claim for it an influence equal to that which results from the earnest prayer of the man of faith. The subjective effects of prayer, in fact, seem to be roughly proportional to the strength of the faith of him who prays. . . . Since the subjective value of prayer is chiefly due to the belief that prayer has values which are *not* subjective, it will with most persons evaporate altogether once they learn that it is *all* subjective." *

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 335, 336.

The question to be asked in this connexion is, surely, this —what must be the nature of reality, within the soul and in the world outside, if deception, illusion and falsehood are more helpful to the soul in gaining its adjustment to reality than truth can ever be? Within a circumscribed environment, a belief in phantasy may, of course, be a temporary aid. But here we are considering the acquisition of a permanent adjustment to reality as a whole. The difficulty may be illustrated by reference to the three fundamental tenets of religious faith, as enumerated by Kant—belief in God, Freedom and Immortality. Without question, the acceptance of these beliefs makes for a more satisfactory and steady adjustment between the soul within and the starry universe without. An alternative adjustment has been offered in Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay on "A Plain Man's Worship." Even if it were allowed that such an attitude of mind as is there depicted had naked truth to recommend it, nevertheless it would be matter of regret that the more satisfactory adaptation offered by religious faith were not available. So likewise with prayer. If its objectivity be false, then we can only deplore that the discovery of truth sets us at a disadvantage in establishing the relationship between the soul and reality which is the fundamental need of mind as such. As in worship, so now again in prayer, the conviction of objectivity makes such a tremendous difference to the whole personality, both in regard to its own moral development and also in its essential relationship with ultimate things, that it forces us to the choice of alternative theories of the nature of reality. On the one hand we may say that the nature of reality is static, or non-personal, or non-moral, or unresponsive to the inherent needs of mind and soul—and so on—propounding a theory which gives the lie direct to all definite religious teaching and faith: on the other hand, we may say that the nature of reality is such that it encourages and meets the highest and truest needs of developing personality—and that the fullest truth about the nature of ultimate being which can be reached must be expressed in terms of personality. The first theory, even when it deals sympathetically with religion, leaves us at best a cosmic emotion devoid of definite Christian content. The other is the Christian metaphysic, and expresses what is the nature of reality implicit in the revelation

of Christ. Both Dr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet * write with insight and feeling on the subject of religious experience, but both conclude, in effect, that the God of religion is not the God of philosophy. And certainly their theories have no place for a self-revealing Incarnate God. It is a metaphysic which has to deny, however courteously and respectfully, the definite teaching of Christianity.

In opposition to both the method and conclusion of modern monism, the position here adopted is, first, to take Christ as giving (for reasons to be stated and examined more fully in Part IV, Chap. I) an authoritative revelation of God; secondly, to infer from that revelation what must be the nature of reality; and thirdly, to contend that such a conception of reality allows an adaptation of the human soul which makes for its own highest development. If the alternative metaphysic be accepted, then the best adaptation is to be found by tacitly assuming in practice that it is not true. Phantasies and illusions, although false, are then to be advocated as so helpful as to be almost indispensable. This means that a theory has been reached which, even though it may satisfy the intellectual demand for self-consistency, does so by disregarding, or repudiating as irrelevant, every other demand of personality. It is an abstract theory and not a practical creed. A Christian metaphysic, however, offers an adaptation which in experience has been found to satisfy all the demands of full, integrating and developing personality. And the more firmly it is believed, the more fully it satisfies. The validity of objectivity both in praise and in prayer is guaranteed by the difference which its acceptance makes in the adaptation of the soul to reality. And since the needs of developing personality require the postulates of religious faith, it is contended that a metaphysic of reality which finds place for such tenets as expressive of the ultimate truth is more acceptable than a theory which at most only permits them on the clear understanding that, though our whole personality demands them, they are only to be regarded as subjective and illusory.

* Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 436–454; Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 224-256.

CHAPTER III

CONFESSION AND FORGIVENESS

THE experience of God often takes the form of a sense of sins forgiven. It is the consciousness of God as holy that first brings the conviction of sin; and afterwards it is the assurance of God as loving that also yields the awareness of pardon freely offered. As soon as wrong is brought into the presence of God it takes on a new character and becomes something quite distinct; and, accordingly, is confessed not merely as wrong-doing but as *sin*. Wrong is directed against man, but sin is directed against God. To be conscious of sin a man must be aware of God. Once the experience of God is known, much which formerly was reacted to merely as wrong is then regarded as sin against God. The religious mind is always convinced that "against Thee, Thee only have I sinned." The conviction of sin, therefore, as distinct from the acknowledgment of wrong, is one of the first stages in Christian experience and is the result of belief in a Holy God.

While, however, this conviction of sin is characteristic of Christian experience it is not to be assumed that all failure and imperfection is to be designated as *personal* sin. All wrong committed by man against his fellows is sin committed against God. Yet it is of the utmost importance to recognize that the manifestations of nervous and moral disease are distinct from personal sin. All sin implies a measure of responsibility; but where the personal responsibility is small, so also is the personal sinfulness. This, however, does not mean that actions cease to be sinful when committed by a person who cannot, psychologically, be held responsible. It means that the responsibility and the sin belong to the race, and that therefore salvation must be

racial as well as personal. Christ dies as the Head of the race, the Second Adam. On the other hand, it is not to be supposed that all sin can be transferred to the race so that the individual, as such, is sinless. Nevertheless, man is sinful not merely as an individual, but also as belonging to a sinful race. And Christ, by becoming fully human, accepted this burden of the sin of the race. It was owing to His personal sinlessness and moral perfection that He was able to accept and endure the load of racial guilt. The perception of racial sin depends upon freedom from personal sin; and this means that in us deliverance from personal sin brings sensitiveness to social evil. Christ, therefore, being able to perceive and accept the guilt, could also confess the sins of the race. Indeed, He alone was qualified to be the High Priest of the race, because He alone was fully conscious of the need for expiation. Accordingly, in prayer that is offered through Christ, confession of sin must include confession of racial sin and recognition of racial responsibility. Adler illustrates this point when, in writing on Dostoievsky, he says: "He reached that formula that is to be placed far above the categorical imperative of Kant—*That every person participates in the guilt of his fellow-men.*" * And while this is borne in mind, the converse must not be forgotten. It is right also that the individual should allow some of his own sinfulness to be borne and confessed, not by him personally, but by the community. The community makes such confession through the worship of the Church. Infant baptism also is an expression of this awareness of racial taint and of the need for participation in the corporate confession of the Church for the guilt of the race.

Ultimately, therefore, all wrongs, failures and imperfections are to be related to God; and are to be recognized as receiving the condemnation due to sin. As sin they must be confessed, and as sin forgiven. But the individual (let it be repeated) must not take all failure and imperfection in himself as personal sin involving full responsibility. Just as his own share in corporate guilt is acknowledged in the confession of the community, so the responsibility for some at least of his personal shortcomings is borne and confessed for him by the Church at prayer, with the High Priest Christ in the midst of her. It is a mistake for any man

* Adler, *Individual Psychology*, p. 289.

to accept too great a share of private guilt. He ought to feel that something of his own sinfulness has been accepted and confessed by the Church. A burdened conscience only means a weakened will; and, therefore, conviction of sin should immediately be followed by confession and should lead directly to consecration. Particularly in the case of nervous disease does this overbearing sense of responsibility tell against the cure of the patient.

When, however, the burden of much that is not deliberate sin for which personal responsibility must be accepted has been transferred to the community and confessed by the Church, there still remains the consciousness of inward wickedness, and for this, private confession alone will serve. By private confession through Christ, the sin of the penitent is transferred upon Christ (as we have seen) and the sinner is cleared from the stain of iniquity. Penitence, however, should be followed by amendment. Or (as we have already expressed it in psychological terms) identification with Christ must lead to transference upon Christ. Amendment and growth in Christlikeness, however, will not be the consequences of confession if those things which are the result of racial guilt or nervous disease are confessed as personal and deliberate sins. Christ is the Saviour for all our sins, for all our failures, and for all our ills; but faith in Him and receptivity to His Spirit are not increased by self-deception or absence of enlightenment. The aid of Christ for one who is a victim of nervous disease is not gained by inducing a terrifying sense of divine reprobation. Such a mistake may cause the pathetic story of William Cowper to be repeated in the sufferer. Sometimes, in such a case, the help of Christ the Great Physician is most readily made effective through the ministry of a good psycho-therapeutic doctor. And sometimes, in such a case, the help of Christ the High Priest is most easily received through the ministry of a wise priest of the Church. As the priest is necessary for corporate confession, being representative of the Church which fulfils the priestly function of the community, so he may be helpful in personal confession. That a priest is *necessary* to personal confession can hardly be maintained on psychological or any other grounds, but the possible helpfulness of the wise priest on occasions is undeniable. In guiding the penitent soul in the ways of confession; in

showing the need for corporate confession and the place for private confession; in assisting the advance from identification with the suffering Christ to transference upon the glorified Christ; in teaching the degree of responsibility that can be truly and beneficially accepted; in detecting the necessity, in special cases, for some kind of psychological treatment; and in discerning, in more extreme cases, the advisability of proper therapeutic catharsis under the direction of a skilled medical psychotherapist: in these ways at least, occasional confession through a priest who has been trained for the office is likely to result for some people in much good and can be the cause of no harm to anyone.

Confession is akin to abreaction. The repression of the idea of guilt is the cause of much inward conflict and consequent loss of power. The effort to lead a good life is frustrated by the repressed memory of past evil. The sinner is unable to tell anyone of his iniquity, and probably tries to forget it or to disguise it before his own eyes. Repression, however, is not the way to be rid of sin. By that means the idea is merely relegated to the unconscious, where its effects are disastrous. The consciousness of guilt is as a weight upon the mind; the repression of guilt to the unconscious only makes the bearing of the load still more exhausting. In the end, the repressed material may form a complex and so make for the disruption of personality. What is true of all unpleasant experience applies with double force to the experience of guilt. The idea of sin is surcharged with intense emotion and so becomes all the more harmful in the unconscious mind. Merely as a relief or prevention of repression it is well that sins should early be confessed. If the secret confession to God brings the required liberation and sense of forgiveness, then it is vain to require or even advise resort to a confessional. But if, for one reason or another, this result is not experienced, then, rather than form a repressed complex, it is advisable to seek the cathartic assistance of a wise confessor. It is not strange that in many cases the human presence, the human voice, the human understanding and sympathy should be not only helpful but even indispensable to the effective confession of sin and consequent realization of freedom from guilt. Did not Christ come in human form to aid our human frailty in approaching and experiencing the Divine Majesty? The

abuse of the confessional is seen when there is no genuine need for auricular confession; when the motive for frequenting the confessional is other than a sincere desire to acknowledge transgressions; or when the practice is indulged in too often and irrespective of any spiritual need. These dangers, however, can be guarded against by a wise confessor. And the prevention of complexes and the liberation of repressions are ends which would seem psychologically to justify the office of the confessional.

The negative effect of confession, as has been hinted already, is not the only gain that may be expected. The will to lead an amended life is strengthened when there has been checked the waste of power resulting from the repression of the idea of past sin. If this will to lead a new life is not present or is not sufficiently strong after confession, then evidently penitence is not sincere. The task of the priest in that case will be the guidance of the sinner into the gradual appreciation of the goodness and love of Christ. Repentance must always be made the beginning of amendment. The energy saved by the release of repression must not be left undirected and therefore available for further sin. It must be made to flow along the channels of consecrated service.

In the *conviction* of sin, it is borne in upon the soul that sin is directed against the God revealed in the Cross of Christ. In the *confession* of sin there is the accompanying belief that only God, as revealed in the Cross of Christ, can forgive sins. Whether the assurance of pardon comes through human lips; or whether it be experienced in the presence of God; or whether it be received through the mediatorship of Jesus Christ; it is understood by the religious mind that forgiveness can only come from God Himself. Forgiveness, both to the penitent community and to the repentant sinner, is an expression of the grace of God. Whether deliverance from the thraldom to sin, racial or personal, come through priest or physician, the religious mind is assured that it can only come from God. Except God forgave there could be no forgiveness. If a man has injured or insulted A, he cannot be forgiven by B. At the same time, if he is to receive pardon from A, he must be sure that it is A and not B whom he has wronged. Likewise, if a man is to receive from God forgiveness for par-

ticular transgressions, he must be sure that the affronts and iniquities have been committed against God. He cannot receive the liberation of God's free pardon for some particular failure which he does not regard as in any way affecting God.

By denying that some particular human failures are to be regarded as sin, the possibility of help by confession and forgiveness in such cases has been ruled out. But whether deliverance comes through the neurologist or the priest, if it is recognized as coming from God it will be accepted in greater faith and so become more effective and enduring. It is possible, of course, to distinguish between the manifestations of nervous and moral diseases and perpetrations of deliberate personal sin. The question in that case becomes one of responsibility. Where personal responsibility is small, there (as we have already said) the measure of personal sin is small. But personal sin is not the only sin: neither is personal responsibility the only responsibility. There is racial sin and there is collective responsibility: and both are accepted and borne by Christ on the Cross. The liberating power of God's grace in forgiveness is not to be denied to the sufferer because he is the victim of racial sin, and because the responsibility rests not upon himself, but upon the community. Such a sufferer, no less than the high-handed sinner, needs the consolation and confirmation of God's pardon. Unless this assurance of God's power to deal with the sin of the race, even as He deals with the sin of the individual, be experienced by the victim of failures, imperfections and sufferings for which he himself is not responsible, then he is likely to harbour the rancour of rebellion, resentment and bitterness; and this state of mind will only aggravate his affliction and prevent his spiritual development. All failure, imperfection and iniquity is sin against God, whether the responsibility be personal or social; and confession can be made to God and forgiveness received from God. God is able to deal with all human shortcomings and meets the need of man, sometimes through the physician, sometimes through the priest, but always to the end of salvation.

The experience of forgiveness, following upon the confession of sin, bears evidence to the Personality of God. The conviction of the sinner always is that it is against God only that he has sinned, and the peace and strength which

result from the assurance of forgiveness are due to the belief that only God can forgive sins. The heinousness of sin is understood because the holiness of God is known. But since the love of God is known equally, His mercy in forgiveness is also understood. And only personality can forgive: only from personality can forgiveness be received. Sin may be discovered in distrust of God; or in neglect and indifference in the face of clear duties towards God Himself; or in wrongs committed against our fellows; or in cruelty or callousness towards the animal creation; or in abuse of material things. But, in each case, our behaviour, conceived as sin, is referred to God; and inward peace can only be restored when God's forgiveness is experienced.

Behind the experience of forgiveness there lies implicit the belief that the relationship between the soul and reality beyond is morally conditioned. And this is tantamount to the belief that here is a personal relationship, a communion between personality and personality. The question discussed by the Cartesians, whether an atheist could ever know mathematics, was surely an attempt to inquire whether the knowledge of reality must not have moral as well as intellectual conditions. The answer to this particular problem might be, of course, that mathematics (and those aspects of knowledge in which understanding of mathematics is indispensable) is the only study which an atheist can pursue unhampered. But as soon as the transition is made from the abstract and partial investigations of science to the concrete and comprehensive study of reality, then more than intellectual equipment is necessary. Here sin against God, in the form of doubt, distrust and disobedience, together with its accompaniment of disintegration and arrested development of personality, is a serious handicap in that it prevents that attitude to reality which is indispensable to the knowledge of reality in terms of personality. Sinlessness alone would guarantee perfect understanding.

The theory which alone seems consistent with Christian doctrine is one which holds that reality not only allows, but endeavours to produce that relationship between the soul and the ultimate which makes possible a knowledge of perfect personality on the part of personality that is morally developing. Sin is the awareness of that relationship disturbed;

forgiveness is the consciousness of a proper attitude restored. The teaching of the Sinless Christ, His experience, and the fact of His Incarnation, are the guarantees that reality reveals itself under the form of Personality and attempts to promote a moral relationship; while the experience of forgiveness, and its effect in the integration of personality and adjustment of personality to the universe, are the confirmations of this Christian metaphysic.

CHAPTER IV

TEMPTATION AND CONSCIENCE

PERFECT personality, as exemplified in Christ, is not free from temptation; but, being without sin, is untroubled by the pains of conscience. At all grades lower than the perfect, however, temptation is not only endured but yielded to, and afterwards the soul is conscience-stricken. Obedience to conscience, while delivering man from the disintegration of personality resulting from sin, does not give immunity from temptation. Dr. Hadfield has an illuminating paragraph on this point: "So far as their purely psychological mechanisms are concerned, temptation and conscience are identical, for both are the voice of suppressed desires. Temptation is the voice of the suppressed evil, conscience is the voice of the repressed good. When our impulses are aroused by the delights of evil, we are said to be tempted; when we awaken to the loveliness of the good, our conscience is aroused. Temptation is the voice of the suppressed evil when good is dominant; conscience is the voice of the suppressed good when evil is dominant. The good man is a man who possesses sentiments such as kindliness, justice and generosity: he suppresses cruelty, avarice and injustice. But these suppressed desires crave for expression and, therefore, in so far as he is good, these desires tempt him to evil. On the other hand, the bad man is a man who has accepted as his sentiments selfishness, meanness and vice, and suppressed all that is commonly regarded as good. In him the suppressed good craves for expression, and so the voice of conscience is heard urging him to be compassionate, courageous and generous. The most hard-hearted criminals are sometimes moved with pity towards their victims. It is only if we are evil that we can be conscience-stricken, and only in so far as we are good in our dominant psychology that we can be tempted to evil. The man who is perfectly

bad could not be tempted, nor can the man completely good be conscience-stricken." *

The similarity between temptation and conscience is here well brought out. The disparity between the two desires, one good and the other bad; or one higher and the other not so high, makes for inward discord and nervous strain. For conscience is always diametrically opposed to the desire that is a temptation. There results an inward conflict issuing either in the choice of the right with consequent peace and renewed harmony; or the choice of the wrong, followed probably, sooner or later, by remorse or repentance. At this point, in the consequences of the choice, a difference between temptation and conscience becomes evident. Both voices may speak from repressed desires, but it matters greatly which of the two is followed. It must be recognized that conscience points the way of the integration of ethical personality, whereas temptation beckons backward to a more primitive state of unethical behaviour. The urge to perfection is behind one desire and against the other. Temptation is not a state of indecision between two repressed complexes. It is a state of hesitation whether to compromise the self more fully by the acceptance of another moral demand. The self is being committed by the one choice to the progression in ethical selfhood. It means the burning of more boats, the repudiation of old indulgences, the identification of the self with an exacting ideal. Hence, conscience is not to be considered as merely the voice of repressed desires of good. It is the call of the developing moral self.

Before proceeding any further a false psychology of temptation had better be noticed. It may be argued with superficial plausibility, that if repressions bring in turn complexes, neuroses and nervous breakdowns, then it must be unwise and dangerous to attempt to resist continuously the promptings of our instinctive nature. To mention the special temptation which is usually in mind when such contentions are made, continence and chastity, it is urged, are only to be maintained by repression of the sexual impulse. This not uncommon argument is easily answered. In the first place, in yielding to temptation, repression has not been avoided, for the high appeal of conscience has been repressed. If to this reminder that one of the opposing forces in the conflict

* Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, pp. 37, 38.

must be resisted when the other is yielded to, it be rejoined that the effects of repressing an instinct are greater than those of rejecting a sentiment, then it must not only be allowed but even stressed that temptation is a real conflict and that decision for conscience is often extremely difficult. Nevertheless, on the side of conscience there is the urge to complete personality and also to perfect social equity and stability. In yielding to temptation a man plays false to himself and traitor to society. And in doing these things he is doing what is of greater moment still; he is sinning against God. The strength and attractiveness of the lower appeal in temptation must be overcome by the presentation of the higher appeal in its truest, highest and most alluring form. The dignity, wisdom, authority, goodness and beauty of conscience ought to be so evident and insistent, that the demand of conscience made upon the whole manhood would more than counterbalance the prompting of the instincts, however strong that might be. At the same time, the repression of instinct due to obedient following of the dominant command of conscience need not be feared as a possible cause of neurosis. Only if conscience be falsely conceived and erroneously followed is any such result to be expected. That conscience may be, and perhaps often is, false in its claims, must be allowed; and the terrible consequences of allegiance to an erring conscience must not be disguised. But when the voice of conscience is, as it should be, the claim of the developing, integrating personality, made in the light of wide social duty, then the effects on mind and health of following conscience will be all towards greater unity and increased vitality. In substantiation of the claim that repression of the instinctive promptings in temptation leaves no permanent injury, Dr. Rivers may be quoted: "Whatever may be its mechanism, it seems certain that the process of suppression as a means of solving a conflict may take place in a healthy manner and produce a thoroughly efficient result." *

It cannot be pleaded that modern psychology sanctions the yielding to temptation as a means of avoiding nervous weakness and disease. It seemed necessary to make this clear, since there is some harmful popular misrepresentation on this point. Modern psychology is altogether on the side of conscience and the development of moral personality.

* Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 122.

Were temptation merely the opposition of incompatible desires, the authority of conscience would remain unexplained. Temptation speaks as a sly seducer, but the tones of conscience are inexorable and belong only to the pronouncement of a "categorical imperative." This authority derives in part from the ethical self, which is allied with the one desire against the other. But the peculiar impressiveness of conscience is due to its reinforcement by the consciousness of the herd. It is understood by the conscience-stricken mind that the one desire implies a flagrant disregard of the herd. To yield to it would be a concession to individualism and a flaunting of the demands of society. Behind the one desire may be all the infantile, egoistic and self-indulgent promptings, but behind the other are all the ethical, personal and social exactions. The conflict may, accordingly, be made to seem like an individual protest and defence against the unfair and humiliating demands of a persecuting and tyrannical society. In attempting self-justification, the nature of the tempting desire may be disguised, and the yielding to the lower may be made to appear as a courageous self-assertion. Such rebellion against the herd morality, however, is likely to be at the same time treachery against the ethical self. The conscience of the herd and the conscience of the self are, for the most part, in agreement: wherefore repudiation of the one is denial of the other.

There is, nevertheless, the possibility of a divergence between the conscience of the community and the conscience of the single member. That being the case, the private conscience may have fallen below the social, or it may have risen above. Modification and development of the moral code come sometimes by the clash of the self with the society. It follows, therefore, that an independent conscience and a nonconformist conviction may prove to be of the utmost value to the society. Wherefore, it behoves the community, if it has any faith in moral progress, to respect private consciences. At the same time it is a tremendous responsibility for an individual to set up his own conscience as superior to that of the society in which he has been trained.

Advance in social morality may originate with a single member, but usually reform is effected by a group within the whole. The taint of individualism in the protest is avoided when allegiance to a fellowship of kindred minds can be

effected. Morality is a product of society, and itself requires a society for its realization. Green has well said: "No individual can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him." * Individualism and independence are suspect alike in ethics and psychology. It is in the approval which the ethical self gives to the morality of the herd that conscience acquires its indispensable authority.

Conscience is the demand for integrated personality, and personality requires a society. Individualism is a refusal to acknowledge the claims of a moral society and so becomes a hindrance to the development of ethical personality. Temptation, accordingly, represents a regression to the individualistic or infantile level of feeling and behaviour. When, however, conscience is obeyed, and an ethical selfhood gradually acquired, how comes it about that temptation is still experienced? How can it be possible for perfect personality to be tempted?

Within this question two separate questions must be distinguished and answered singly. First, there is the question —How could the perfect Christ be "tempted in all points like as we are"? Then there is the other question—How is it that with developing personality, susceptibility to temptation is still present?

Christ's experience of temptation was an inevitable concomitant of His identification with the race. Aware of no personal imperfection or transgression, He was only the more intensely conscious of the sinfulness of mankind. But this awareness of the sin as sin would not bring any desire for its enactment. Sin recognized as sin is no longer desired but hated. To infer that the attitude of Christ to sin was, in default of desire for it, one of neutrality or indifference, would imply His moral insensitiveness. The active, purposive desire of good is the repudiation of evil. So long as there is contrast between good and evil, desire is involved. There is love of the one and hatred of the other. It cannot be held, in the light of psychology, that Christ was tempted to such sins as theft. There is no intention, surely, to constrain the belief that Christ as a person was tempted to commit any and every sin that besets human nature. From our own experience we know that ethical development delivers us from many desires that tempt less fully-realized

* Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 351.

personalities. In general, the teaching that Christ was tempted at all points must mean that emotionally He felt the whole difference between the innumerable sins of mankind and the Holy Love of God. As belonging to the race, He experienced the "torment of the difference," just as we feel the drag of evil against good when we are tempted. The strongest temptation, however, will arise out of the desire that is least inconsistent with the general tone of the character. Base desires will be quickly repudiated by a high-minded man or woman. Hence, in the case of Christ, what would present itself as the strongest temptation would not be anything base but something that was just lower than the highest.

In addition to the consciousness of the opposition between all the sinfulness of the race and the Holiness of God, Christ experienced personal temptation even as we do. With Him, however, temptation took the form of a choice between two degrees of spiritual attainment, the very high and the highest of all. The story of the Temptation, as interpreted by recent theology, throws light upon the psychology of Christ's person. The awful temptation that He had to face arose from the two different and incompatible views of His Mission: should He, as Messiah, identify Himself with the suffering Servant of Isaiah, or should He seek to fulfil the conception of the Son as portrayed in the Psalms and in Daniel? The analysis of the Temptation belongs to theology proper.* Here we have to notice that the nature of personal temptation to Christ as perfect was the choice between two lofty ideals, and not between the high and the base. The temptation had its force because the one ideal, the one that had to be repudiated, had the sanction of the herd. The popular conception of Messiahship was that of the Son of God Whose enemies God placed beneath His footstool. It must have been a minority of spiritually-minded Jews who saw in the Servant the higher type. Nevertheless, Christ, in rejecting the herd ideal, did not become an individualist. He came not to destroy, but to fulfil. The Law and the Prophets, however, could only be fulfilled by Christ at their highest reach. He took up the tradition of a spiritual minority. And although He carried it to a higher level than had previously been foreseen, nevertheless He maintained a continuity in development. In accepting the ideal of

* Cf. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement,* pp. 40-41.

the Servant of Jahweh, Christ fixed upon the point at which, on the highest level, the two lines of development in the Old Testament, the Priestly and the Prophetic, are met together and blended into a perfect unity. Thus did He fulfil Law and Prophets in that identification of the two ideals in the one fullness of truth which He accepted from the past and lifted into eternity. For Him the great decision was whether He should accept the herd ideal, purify that, and raise that to its highest power; or whether He should fulfil the higher ideal of the spiritual minority and lift that into perfection. Thus it will be seen that Christ's consciousness of the antagonism between sin and God, and also His personal temptation, were both due to His identification with the race.

It will now be seen how it is that man, as he rises in the scale of ethical selfhood by obedience to conscience, is, notwithstanding, still liable to powerful temptation. But it will be seen also that what is most opposed to his moral habit is the least insistent as temptation. So that moral advance does save a man from conflicts with base passions. The ethical life viewed as a scale provides deliverance from any serious temptation that has its source in a level of life far removed from that of the established character. It is a regression to a few degrees lower than the stage normally maintained that will be the most difficult lapse to avoid. A man of fixed honesty and integrity will not spend hours or days in a stormy emotional contest occasioned by a desire to steal. Similarly, all the virtues when they become the firm habits of life are not easily disturbed by any desire considerably lower in the scale. True, we are aware of sin from its basest form upwards; but with us, as with Christ, this consciousness of sin, resulting from our participation in the sin of the race, takes the form of an appreciation of the antagonism between goodness and wickedness. Personal temptation is strongest when it comes as a wish for slight retrogression from the level reached by the integrated self. But, of course, there is always in some degree a temptation to revert to earlier levels of consciousness. In the moral personality, however, the force of the temptation should decrease as the distance of the desire from present attainment increases.

It may be objected at this point that, unfortunately, pious and moral characters, to the surprise and horror of all, do

sometimes suddenly fall victims to sins of the grossest and vilest nature. And this is true. The explanation, however, is not far to seek. In the first place, some temptations have behind them an emotional energy which is very great. Some desires are so closely related to the fundamental urge to completeness that when frustrated of their normal satisfaction they become insistent and almost irresistible. For instance, the instinct of self-preservation may make it very difficult to risk life for a moral issue; or the desire for sexual gratification (as already noticed) may make purity a terrible struggle. Such being undeniably the truth, it is accordingly advisable, in so far as may be possible, to create an environment which will be favourable to the moral life. Temptation arises through a maladjustment between the inner life and the outer world. Its relief, therefore, is to be sought by treating both the self and the environment. It is desirable that all should be so circumstanced that they can lead as normal a life as may be. Some, at least, of the moral lapses of the righteous are unquestionably due to unfair pressure of the world upon the soul. Environment may prevent the slight temptation to dishonesty, but allow, or even encourage, the strong temptation to impurity. The result is that a man who would have been able to stand the one test succumbs to the other. With all this allowed, however, it will still be felt that religion ought to do more than erect external safeguards for the weaker brother; good and necessary though such preventive measures must ever be. The higher aim of religion is the upbuilding of a character that is fortified from within against the assaults of temptation.

We may say, then, in the second place, that such a lapse as is being contemplated is due also to inward instability. The established moral character will find habitual expression upon a high level and will effect a gradual ascent in the ethical scale. Failure in the integration and balance of personality, however, will result in certain features of the self belonging to a lower level than others. In some respects a good man may remain undeveloped. For instance, unimpeachable veracity may be found in a man who exhibits the most childish petulance, sulkiness and bad temper. Thus, although the rack could not induce him to the insincerity of subscribing to a creed, one clause of which he could only believe with reservations; nevertheless, some trivial annoyance might

cause him to lose his temper. In the same way, a man who has developed in all other respects may have left one instinct upon the childish level; and on occasion, despite all the rest, he may be tripped up at this point. In default, for instance, of proper sexual adjustment and sublimation, a character otherwise highly developed may fall a victim to temptation. That means that at this one point the whole self is no longer organized to repudiate the desire as being contrary to the whole trend and tenor of the developing personality. Since conscience is the voice of the ethical self re-echoing the herd, it will be weak when the self is no longer unified; and although a desire may be contrary to herd morality, the self may be insufficiently at one to pronounce with unhesitating approval the authoritative and inexorable demand of the moral law. Security from lapses to a low grade of consciousness is only to be attained by the integration and development of the whole of human nature into moral and spiritual manhood.

The problem of an erring conscience and the question of the means of educating conscience have already, in part, found their answer. Conscience is likely to be in error and to be ineffective when there is no morally unified self to interpret and acknowledge the ethical code of the herd. When there are slight divergencies of ethical demands by different groups within the herd, then it is the harmonious moral personality that will be best able to recognize the higher of the alternatives; while the less fully-developed self will be less reliable in making a choice. Mr. Shand writes on the erring conscience thus: "The conscience, though detached from the private interests of all other sentiments, has still its limitations. How much it depends on the ethics of a man's own age, country and sex, and with all their defects, is now recognized. Its *prickings* are largely confined to a man's dealings with members of his own tribe or nation; its rules are not extended to protect all men; and few of them are taken to include the lower animals." * The method of the education of conscience is no special course. An educated conscience is just the characteristic of an ethically integrated and adjusted self, of an atoned personality. There is no distinct problem here. The one need is for atonement.

On the ultimate authority of conscience a little more must

* Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 120.

be said. It has been suggested already that the herd conscience may err and stand in need of revision. A higher law may be recognized by a spiritual minority. And this consideration goes far to weaken the absolute claims of the herd. At the same time the moral law as such is imperative and inexorable. Since, however, the solemnity of the moral law, and the respect and reverence with which it ought to be regarded, spring from the association of morality with the code of the herd, any attempt to set in opposition the social and moral demands is fraught with danger. The individualistic is the antithesis of the moral. This problem of the authority of conscience is solved when it is recognized that the infallible conscience is the conscience of perfect personality. Perfect personality, as personality, has social reference and implies an ideal community: as perfect, it is raised above the errors of a law which derives from an undeveloped society. The ethics of Christ are not individual, they are the ethics of the Kingdom of Heaven. Their authority rests upon the moral perfection of Christ and upon the moral achievement of the society of the redeemed. Hence, in all disputes on moral issues, guidance is to be sought by the interpretation of the mind of Christ. Moral development in man brings with it the perception of moral perfection in Christ. The authority of the law of the Kingdom of Heaven becomes binding as soon as it is recognized as the highest moral law. Obedience to conscience is secondary and derivative. In the spiritual life it is a consequence, not a cause. To set up obedience to conscience as the requirement of religion means little more than giving religious sanction to things as they are. If conscience be the voice of the ethical self, then, although obedience is necessary to the maintenance of the moral standard and is essential as a preparation for fuller acceptance of its demands, nevertheless it is only by the higher development of the personality that moral progress can be effected. The aim of religion is the atonement and perfection of the self. To this end obedience to conscience is indispensable. But the conscience obeyed must be a Christian conscience; and this is the expression of a Christian character. Temptation may assume the very subtle form of an inclination to obey conscience at its present grade as the fixed end of duty, instead of advancing step by step towards Christlikeness. There is in human

nature not only a desire to go back a stage or two; there is also a desire not to go on any further in the moral and spiritual life. But once the higher has been seen and approved, there is inward disquiet until it has been attained. Peace is to be found only by responding to the challenge of perfection.

In maintaining that the knowledge of reality has moral conditions, obedience is made indispensable to enlightenment. And this order is in accordance with Christian teaching, where it is insisted that whoever would know of the doctrine must first do the Will of God. In advocating obedience to conscience, however, there is always a risk of merely commending the traditional standards of moral behaviour approved by the mind of society. To argue that conformity with conventional standards of popular ethics qualifies the mind for the knowledge of reality, is, of course, a ludicrous perversion of truth. By conscience must be understood something very different from the consensus of opinion in the herd. The conscience which must be obeyed if Christian experience is to be valid must be nothing less than a Christian conscience. The will that must be done, if the doctrine is to be known, is not the general will of society, but the Will of God.

The moral development of personality requisite to the understanding of the nature of reality is not acquired by practising the cult of self-improvement. It is submission to an objective standard and acceptance of a discipline imposed that must be demanded as the necessary qualification. The will by which we must be ruled is the Will revealed in Christ. Ultimately that Will is the Will-to-save. Its law is the expression of Holy Love. To be in line with the purpose of God is necessary before we can be in fellowship with the Personality of God. The moral development here specified is no calculating casuistry. It means a personality increasingly dominated by the principle of the Cross. To have a Christian conscience is to let this same mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus. The moral condition to the knowledge of God is obedience to Christian conscience.

The understanding of the Will of God may be gradually acquired. Yet it has not to be gained by the method of trial and error. It is a Will made known in Christ. Acceptance of its demands as far as understood will always bring

fuller understanding. And according to the completeness of the obedience, so will be the knowledge of God gained.

It is important to recognize the kind of obedience which gives qualification for knowledge. Performance of the moral requirements of the herd could only be taken as the condition of understanding the mind of the herd. The only obedience which would yield knowledge of the Personality of God, would be obedience to the purpose of God. But such obedience brings at once both qualification for the knowledge of God and also verification of the knowledge thus gained. By doing the revealed Will of God, we discover in its practical results that His Will must be the purpose of reality itself. And purpose, of course, implies personality. Thus we are led to the knowledge of reality under the form of personality. The results which issue from the performance of God's Will, and testify to its truth and reality, are to be found, as aforesaid, in the further development of moral personality, and therefore in the fuller qualification for knowledge of God; and also in the full adjustment between the soul and reality, an adjustment satisfactory to personality, and therefore one involving a relationship of communion.

The validity of the Will of God revealed in Christ, as the true purpose of reality conceived as personality, is established by the examination of the results which follow from the obedience to that Divine Will and Purpose. The nature of reality is purposive, and therefore personal, and the purpose is, according to the nature of reality, a revealed purpose, its end being the perfect integration of personality and its perfect adaptation to reality as a whole.

CHAPTER V

RENUNCIATION AND CONSECRATION

It is a law of life that progress means leaving something behind; that attaining to one thing means relinquishing another. In becoming a man, childish things must of necessity be put away. Religion, therefore, in demanding renunciation, is asking only what is the inevitable accompaniment of consecration. Renunciation has its moral worth, not in itself as discipline, but in the nature of the thing surrendered. Whatever is contrary to atonement, salvation, reconciliation, redemption; whatever hinders moral and spiritual advance towards an integrated, ethical selfhood; whatever prevents communion and fellowship with a holy and loving God, must be renounced, in order that the other things may be acquired.

In modern psychology the need for renunciation appears very prominently, just because it is a condition of normal advance. At each stage of life, in passing from childhood to youth, from youth to manhood, in entering upon marriage, in facing middle age, in reaching old age, and finally in awaiting and accepting death—in all the seven ages of man —something of the earlier stage has to be left behind in life, if the new phase is to be happy and normally progressive. Refusal to relinquish the pleasures of the past always involves a maladjustment to the life of the present. Inability to adapt the self to the new condition of advancing life is the cause of much unhappiness and of not a little nervous illness. But in all these progressive stages of life, the greatest contrast is that between childhood and maturity. The setting aside of childish things, though inevitable to the realization of manhood, is most uncongenial to many who have long passed the age of childhood. The principle which sways most of our infant life is pleasure. The demand of the child is always for the immediate pleasure of the self. In our very earliest days a cry brings the simple satisfaction of

the need, and our few desires are met as they arise. Gradually, however, the babe has to be weaned from the state of immediate gratification. But during this process any failure in the quick satisfaction of its wants is still directly related to pleasure and becomes its negation, pain. Thus, the whole of the early experience of life is coloured entirely by the pleasure-pain principle. The self, with its demand for pleasure, fights for its position at the centre of the universe.

Over against this state of childhood is set the condition of manhood, with its demand for self-denial and self-abnegation. Self is no longer supreme and ministered unto; it must be reduced to submission and taught to minister. Pleasure is no longer the simple rule of life and the sufficient measure of good; often pain has to be endured and pleasure renounced. The lesson must be learnt that the universe does not exist for the sake of the individual, but that the self must justify its existence by winning a place in the universe. The self must acquire a proper adaptation to reality, must learn to fit into a scheme of spiritual development, and must gain atonement and reconciliation. Not pleasure, but reality, becomes the principle of adult life. The aim of consciousness ceases to be the exploitation of the outside world for the gratification of the self, and becomes the adjustment of the self to the conditions of reality. Reality and not the self must be the pivot of life and experience.

In making this change both negation and affirmation are necessary. Reality cannot be affirmed without the self being denied. Self-assertion is the antithesis of reconciliation with a spiritual environment. Manhood, with its self-abnegation, submission and adaptation to reality, can only be attained on condition that the infantile, pleasure-seeking, egoistic self be renounced. A failure in renunciation will result in a compromise between two affirmations. The self will be identified with two opposite and incompatible ends, and the consequence will be inward conflict. Some features in manhood will almost certainly be desired, because they will be seen to be far more satisfying to human nature than anything else can be. Only in such a state, it must appear, can a man be happy and free. Yet the conditions of attaining to manhood's attitude towards life seem at the same time too hard; and the demand to forsake the pleasures of child-

hood, its self-assertion and self-gratification, seems unfair and too stern; wherefore both childhood and manhood are lost. For there can be no pressing on in life without a forgetting of those things that are behind. Renunciation is the accompaniment of consecration. The infantile, self-centred life must be abandoned. The pleasure-principle must be denied as fallacious. The reality-principle must be accepted, and all that it involves unselfishly faced.

It is well to notice that religion, in its insistence upon the necessity for renunciation, is not imposing upon men an arbitrary condition. The need arises out of the nature of all life, and is especially urgent in religion just because religion deals with the higher type of life.

Modern psychology insists upon the necessity to face reality, to adjust the self to the environment, and to live in harmony with the moral and social surroundings. Failure to acquire such an attitude means nervous instability or neurosis. The difficulty, however, lies in the need to renounce the pleasure-principle, to deny the self, to repudiate the infantile. A refusal to renounce the earlier and lower phase is the cause of a failure to advance with progressing life, both personal and social. But since renunciation is indispensable to consecration, its nature and purpose must be understood, and, if possible, the difficulty in it explained and, as far as may be, reduced.

The refusal to renounce is in many cases due, no doubt, to an insufficient appreciation of the higher good that is to be attained. The denial is looked upon as an end in itself, and the attention of consciousness is fixed upon the thing that is to be abandoned. The inevitable result of centring the mind upon the object to be surrendered is that the self becomes only the more desirous of it owing to the possibility of losing it.

Renunciation, therefore, as a single experience, as an end in itself, merely presents a psychological impasse. It requires that a thing should be denied and desired at one and the same time. In consequence, there is bound to arise a state of nervous tension which may lead in time to a nervous illness. Sometimes, of course, the moral judgment will be invoked to decide the issue, and the denial may be effected as a duty. Such a procedure, however, is ethically unsound. In the first place, it makes duty negative, the denial of desire;

and in the second place, it does nothing to replace the one object of desire by another and higher object. The subject has made no moral advance by the mere act of denial. It is sometimes urged, of course, that self-denial is valuable discipline, and so is ethically good. Such a contention, however, is false, for the simple reason that the denial of one thing ought to have led to the affirmation of another. The experience is incomplete and negative only. More fundamentally considered, however, this whole manner of viewing the subject is false. It is not denial that should come first, and then affirmation. In the true experience it is the good that should be desired, and because of the approved goodness of the new object, the renunciation of the old should follow as the accepted consequence of acquiring the higher good. The mind, that is to say, must be fixed upon the good to be gained and the desire must be there directed, in which case renunciation will be seen in its true light as the counterpart of acquisition. Mere renunciation for its own sake is an experience described in the parable where the evil spirit is cast out, the house swept and garnished, and the matter left at that; with what result we know. The more excellent way is for the soul to be rid of the old desire by "the expulsive power of a new affection." Thus, the ideal of renunciation is expressed by St. Paul when he declares that "what things were gain to me, those I counted loss—for Christ. Yea doubtless and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but refuse, that I may win Christ." The secret of true renunciation is to be found in the appreciation of the new things to be gained.

Nevertheless, in renunciation there must not be any good lost or strength unused. What has to be renounced is not desire, but a particular direction of desire. There must be effected a change in the manifestation of the inward forces. Life is not to be narrowed and checked; it is to be diverted into new and better and fuller channels. Renunciation is not the denial of life and life's expressions; it is a repudiation of unfitting and unsatisfactory outlets, and the provision of higher modes of activity. The falsity of regarding renunciation negatively should be clear as soon as it becomes apparent that renunciation then becomes a form of repres-

sion. And that means waste of energy, nervous conflict, and the defeat of the true ends of the moral and spiritual life. Instead of repression there must be sublimation. Wherever adaptation to the surrounding conditions involves repression there is psychological and ethical failure. Renunciation ought to be the acceptable consequence of sublimation. So accepted, the life force may be taught to flow along the conduits of the moral and social life and thus supply the power for driving civilization.

Since the great problem of life is the sublimation of the instincts, we must look carefully at the means by which it is effected. "Sublimation," says Dr. Hadfield, "is the process by which instinctive emotions are diverted from their original ends and redirected to purposes satisfying to the individual and of value to the community." * Freedom from conflicts and complexes is necessary by way of preparation for the effective sublimation of the instincts. Relief for repressed tendencies must, therefore, be the first concern. The situation in human nature is not adequately met merely by a scheme for providing a social outlet for the inward forces of life. Instincts buried in complexes or repressed with abhorrence defy proper sublimation, until the complex has been resolved and a right estimate of physical nature acquired. This means that sublimation must begin in salvation. If we have previously noticed the need for salvation to end in sublimation, we must now insist conversely that salvation is an essential beginning. The great problem of sublimation cannot be solved until it is first treated on the level of sin and salvation. The gradual process of atonement and reconciliation is an indispensable condition to successful sublimation. It is not enough to apply the methods of social psychology to human nature; human nature must first be treated where religion effects its work of redemption from sin. Religion is the only power that is sufficiently radical to produce the change necessary to secure a fitting basis on which to build up the sublimation of the instincts. For unless the origins of the life force are purified and regulated, the flow of vitality will be insufficient to sustain the sublimated activity, and the result will be over-sublimation followed by nervous breakdown. And over-sublimation is likely to be due to inadequate supply of energy rather than

* Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, ch. xxi.

to excessive social demands. The latter fault may be found in some cases, but can easily be rectified by reorganizing the scheme of personal life. Usually, over-sublimation is under-vitalization.

Since the force to be sublimated is drawn from the instincts that are part of our physical endowment, it is of the utmost importance (as hinted above) that this energy should not be dissipated owing to a false attitude towards the human body and towards physical nature in general. Here (once more) the Christian religion is a valuable aid to the attainment of healthy, useful activity. The body, according to Christian teaching, is honoured, even regarded as sacred, as the "temple of the Spirit." How true to fact this conception is, modern psychology reveals. Christ Himself, the very Son of God, in His Incarnation, took upon Him a full and perfect humanity. In the bodily form of man He manifested the glory of God. And by so doing he showed the sanctity of the body and the possibility of its utilization for the highest moral and spiritual ends. The true asceticism springs from this conviction that the body is a sanctuary and must therefore be used only to the praise and honour of God. False practices of asceticism notwithstanding, the main tendency of Christianity has been towards a true and pure idea of the body.

It is further of the utmost importance to recognize that different modes of sublimation are required by the varying dispositions and temperaments of men. And this is all to the good, for it means service in many directions. To expect too much uniformity in socialized activity is a mistake. In this very variety of choice in modes of sublimation lies, however, the possibility of wrong choice. Many will be led by their own inner promptings and desires to dismiss unsuitable courses and finally to adopt one which is adequate to their needs; yet, for one reason or another, through lack of sufficient knowledge of what is involved in one choice; through lack of means or of opportunities to enter upon the best course; through false advice and unjust pressure from outside; from whatever reason, wrong decisions, unfortunately, may be often made. The result is that the sublimation fails, or at least misses full success. Such errors of choice, however, can be in a measure prevented by knowledge and advice given to young people on the various callings of life. If

necessary, help can also be given by means of a short course of psycho-analysis. Moreover, social conditions can and ought to be gradually changed so that an opening may be made for all talent and ability to find its fitting sphere of service. In all cases of indecision, however, a priest might be consulted who, after due examination, ought to be in a position to offer some helpful suggestions.

Religion not only prepares the best foundation for sublimation, it also provides the highest and most comprehensive ideal for the sublimated life. Beginning with salvation, religion works towards consecration. The life of devotion to the service of God is the fruit of an atoned personality. The Kingdom of God is the great goal towards which all the activities of Christian labour must be directed. In the experience of religion there is provided ample scope for the sublimation of all the instincts and emotions of human nature. And in the Christian order of experience, the service rendered is the outcome of the salvation received. An atoned personality finds self-expression in the labour for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake. The fruits of the Spirit are well known; and their value psychologically lies in the fact that they are the *fruits* of a spirituality that is ever developing Christward. That the works of religion are the fruit and not the root of grace makes them all the more sure and satisfactory as sublimations. In relating works to grace as their source, we are dealing with an underlying power that can sustain sublimation. No insufficiency of power will be found when the Spirit of God is supplementing the energies of man. Moreover, the sublimation will be influenced by the ideal of the Kingdom, which is ever present to the religious mind.

Consecration, then, like an enlightened conscience, is a result, not a cause, in the spiritual life. It follows upon the atonement and reconciliation of personality. So conceived, the incentive to consecration is caught up as part of the great life urge to completeness and perfection. Renunciation appears as a thing not too difficult when it is discovered to be incidental to the development of manhood towards Christ-likeness. Renunciation and consecration are indispensable to communion with and knowledge of God. But they do not occasion the desire for the divine fellowship and understanding. They are consequences naturally following upon the

love for God. We are here, that is to say, dealing with the effects rather than the conditions of the knowledge of God. The inquiry was worth while, however, in order to establish this conclusion; moreover the relation between Christian experience and the knowledge of God had to be traced. When the conditions of such knowledge have been discovered and fulfilled, the consequences in conscience and consecration will issue forth as the normal growth of Christian personality.

Yet, if consecration be regarded as a consequence rather than a condition, at the same time we must remember the proposition that knowledge of God is morally conditioned. That means that, though consecration may follow upon knowledge, dedication must precede it. Or rather (as already hinted more than once), we have to consider two interacting series, each of which in turn conditions the other. From one point of view certain spiritual experiences, such as consecration, may be fittingly explained only by reference to the knowledge and love of God as the constraining cause. From another point of view certain other experiences, such as obedience to conscience, may be only fully understood when looked upon as indispensable conditions of acquiring the knowledge of God. As we distinguished formerly between obedience to conscience as a condition and enlightenment of conscience as a consequence, so here dedication and consecration may be similarly contrasted. This means that in experience we may begin a sequence the results of which in experience can only be what they are because the first experience has an effect upon God, and the second is the effect of that relationship established between the soul and God. This, of course, is far removed from Occasionalism. That theory holds that between any and every thought and its accompanying action there is an intervention of God. This theory affirms that under certain conditions (determined by the nature of reality and by the nature of the self) the mind is able to enter into a reciprocal relationship with reality conceived as God. No mind, of course, can be said to be entirely out of relation with reality, since mind is a part of reality. But there are different relationships which the mind may adopt. The two most fundamental alternatives will be examined in the next chapter, where the optional response of fear or love will be studied psychologically. Here it is enough to notice that there are different relationships possible

between the mind and reality, or the soul and God. And these different relationships have different consequences in human experience. Obviously, that relationship will be best which is most congenial to the nature of the two terms related. And further, each term must be adjustable to the other if a satisfactory relationship is to be established. The only relationship which could suffice for personality would be one of knowledge and fellowship. For this to be possible, since one term is personal, the other must not be less than personal. Here we are specifying what may be called the principle of divine accommodation. Reality must adapt itself to the inherent needs of human nature if an adequate relationship is to be experienced. The surest evidence we have that reality accommodates itself to the demands of personality is to be found in the Incarnation, the meaning of which is gathered from the teaching and experience of Christ Himself. In addition, there is the confirmatory experience of those who have believed the Incarnation.

On the other side of the equation there must likewise be accommodation of the human to the divine. And this accommodation must be conditioned by the nature of reality. Some evidence of the nature of reality may, therefore, be found by consideration of that human attitude which results in the most satisfactory adaptation of personality to reality. And the contention of this argument is that the attitude induced by Christian experience does, in point of fact, yield the most satisfactory relationship to reality as a whole. This attitude is not adopted as the outcome of experiment, but as the result of revelation believed. Yet it submits to precisely the same test as would be required in the case of a number of experimental hypotheses. The Christian attitude of soul towards reality as a God of Holiness and Love induces the most fitting adaptation to the total environment, including body, mind and spirit. Such an attitude also results in the fullest integration and development of human personality. This state of the soul is here described as consecration. And, once more, we see that consecration is a consequence of salvation, and follows upon the restoration of a proper relationship between the soul and God.

At the same time, however, moral and spiritual development is a condition of attaining to a right and adequate relationship with reality. If, as we said, reality must

accommodate itself to the inherent needs of human nature, by accepting personality: in the same way, human nature must accommodate itself to reality by becoming holy and loving. The mind that does not submit itself to the discipline of the moral and spiritual life cannot enter into relationship with a Holy and Loving God. Hence, while we urge that Christian experience does give evidence of the truth of the nature of God as revealed in Christ, at the same time we must insist that only Christian experience is qualified to provide a test for the validity of Christian teaching. If the nature of reality at its highest and most essential phase is believed to be God the Holy and Loving Father, then knowledge and communion must depend upon the acceptance of an attitude of reverent sonship and upon the soul's increase in holiness and love. If this attitude be adopted and the moral condition accepted, then the results in experience prove that a more satisfactory relationship to reality is being acquired. The relationship experienced is found to be more satisfactory to the full needs of a personality that is being developed towards its highest attainment. If by failure to adopt the attitude required, and refusal to comply with the conditions necessitated, the resulting experience bears no witness to the nature of reality as God the Father, then the explanation of that defect is to be found in the initial failure to embrace the Christian Faith. If it be asked: Why trust the one experience more than the other? —then (apart from the revelation) it must be replied that the full needs of personality are better met by the one theory of reality than by the other.

The principle of accommodation is not an extravagant assumption, once the Christian philosophy is accepted. It is only a legitimate extension of the logical axiom of the rationality of the universe. There it is affirmed that reality must be accommodated to the laws of the human mind, or the relationship A X B, essential to all knowledge, must be impossible. Christian epistemology substitutes for A, in this formula, full moral and spiritual personality in place of mere intellect. A stands now not for an aspect of mind, but for human personality. And modern psychology bears witness to the unity of personality. Intellect alone is an abstraction, and as such non-existent. Logic is really making a greater and more questionable assumption in taking A to

stand for an abstract attribute of personality. We have no experience whatsoever of the A which logic posits as indispensable to the process of knowledge. The only intellect of which we have any evidence is found in intelligent personality. Logic is constrained to demand that B shall conform to A. Christian epistemology insists that what must be our first concern is the accommodation of A to B. The intellect of logic posits intelligibility in the object. This is a very questionable assumption if all the intellect in the universe be posited as belonging to A. For intelligence to expect intelligibility where it denies intelligent purpose is to make a most unjustified demand. It is no recommendation to say that the assumption made is a minimum, if it is unreal and impossible. A Christian epistemology is warranted in looking for intelligibility, because it makes the assumption which justifies the expectation, and posits personality in B. From that it follows that the intelligibility required is the expression of a purpose. It is personal activity, and personal thinking, and personal response that the human personality knows and can understand. Hence a Christian epistemology is concerned about the moral and emotional condition of A, no less than about its intellectual qualification. It is indispensable to A X B that A should renounce all that adversely affected either itself or the attitude X which it adopts to B. The willing dedication of A to the persistent state of A X B results in a response from B which makes for the consecration of A. And this, in its turn, leads to a higher experience of A X B.

If consecration is the outcome of God's grace, at least dedication must be the constant willingness of the soul to respond. If God alone can enable us to fulfil the conditions necessary to the knowledge of Himself, then at least we must be willing to submit to the constraint of God's Holy Love. Metaphysically regarded, this means that the nature of reality must be such that it not only allows but induces harmonious relations between the soul and itself. If the nature of reality were not such that it seeks communion between itself and man, then no fellowship would be possible. The initiative must come from the whole and reflect the nature of the whole, for, if knowledge and communion were desired only by that part of reality which is human nature, then it might be ignored or repudiated by the whole. The

assumption that there is no hiatus between reality as a whole and developing personality in man involves that the whole must be prior to the part in seeking the achievement of the purpose implicit in itself. This is the Christian doctrine that it is God's grace that makes us good; not our goodness that wins God's grace. The priority of God in effecting that consecration indispensable to communion is the metaphysic behind all revelation, particularly the Incarnation.

CHAPTER VI

FAITH, HOPE AND LOVE

The psychological value of the Christian graces may be shown first by contrasting them with the opposing triad of fear, anger and hate. If perfect love can cast out fear, then in that victory faith and hope also share; and in that defeat anger and hate also are overwhelmed. The manifestations on either side are closely related and lead the one to the other. Speaking of the one triad, love is without question "the greatest of these"; yet love needs the services of faith and hope. On the other side, if hate be the most deadly, fear and anger are only the servitors of the basest of these three. Open hatred may be rarely shown; anger may be usually suppressed; but fear is too often present and uncontrolled in human nature. It may be cloaked and hidden and its kinship with the other two may be effectively disguised from the mind; but fear is, nevertheless, present to do the deadly work of anger and hate.

When the close connexion between fear, anger and hate has been understood, then the destructive power of fear becomes explicable. Anger can easily be recognized as an expression of hate. The impulse is to kill that which has aroused anger. But what is not at first obvious is that this desire to kill is closely linked with the fear of being killed. Under primitive conditions where action follows upon impulse, the attempt to kill the hated person or animal that has aroused anger is invariably accompanied by the danger of being killed, owing to the anger and hatred kindled in the enemy. Accordingly, anger flying to hatred induces the impulse to kill or be killed; to destroy or be destroyed; to injure or be injured. Failing the infliction of injury or death upon the enemy, satisfaction is derived by receiving pain or injury in oneself. Sadism and masochism,* that is to say, are always associated. The causing or enduring of

* Cf. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis, passim.*

suffering are alternative outlets for the pent-up emotion of hatred. Under civilized conditions anger is not allowed to issue in murder; but it can vent itself by the alternative means of enduring pain. This result is effected in the turning of anger upon the self. Anger, being unable to accomplish murder, attempts suicide. This second mode of satisfaction by receiving injury instead of inflicting it, is made to serve the ends of anger more fully by the trick of identification. Either the self is identified with the enemy as sufferer, in which case the self-castigation is imagined as injury to the enemy; or else the self is identified with the enemy as tormentor, in which case the suffering is imagined as inflicted by a hated enemy upon an enduring self. Whether masochism or sadism predominate, anger is appeased through the kill-or-be-killed impulse. This alternative is evident upon a physiological examination, for anger produces self-poisoning. What is first meant to kill the enemy, failing in that, is turned upon the self. The whole of the covering emotional tone with its resentment, brooding and bitterness, favours this auto-intoxication. The affinity of anger to hatred is clear enough. What, however, is likely to be overlooked is the close connexion of fear with these two. Through that association it is that fear gains its ruinous power. Both body and mind may be shattered by fear, but the destructive poison is drawn from hatred. We hate nothing that we do not fear. Consequently, where fear is overcome hatred is abolished. Love has triumphed when it has cast out fear.*

The presence of fear in the complex state produced by anger has already appeared. The impulse to kill is accompanied by the fear of being killed in the combat. To be angry is also to be afraid. No one is ever angry without being afraid. And he who knows no fear feels no anger. Fear cannot be allayed until the object of terror has been annihilated. Fear also, no less than hatred, has murderous intent. Hatred says emphatically, kill; anger says recklessly kill or be killed; fear says cautiously, if I don't kill I shall be killed. The end may be modified from murder to injury, and from physical to mental pain, but the form remains the same; if I do not cause suffering I shall be made to suffer.

* For this treatment of anger and hate see Lay, *Man's Unconscious Conflict*, pp. 306, 309.

Fear is an attitude of self-defence, an anticipation of attack by striking the first blow and so incapacitating the enemy. Blustering, boasting, insolence, bellicose disposition, suspiciousness, argumentativeness, desire for defence, and anxiety to attack, whether manifest in physical or mental activity, are all expressions of fear.

Already we have noticed the danger of fear in a community and the need for its sublimation. This consideration of the alliance between fear, anger and hatred makes all the more urgent the conquest and control of fear. Much that masquerades as daring is only disguised timidity; and much that claims applause as great courage really draws its strength from terror. All expressions of the martial ideas and demands for militarism are the outcome of fear. In the end, aggression and attack in warfare are due to the irresistible prompting of fear. And unfortunately, although in primitive life the actuation of fear is indispensable to survival, under conditions of civilization it is usually unjustified. The great problem before civilization is the sublimation of fear; and the only sufficient sublimation is in religious reverence and awe.

Apart from the evil effect of fear in the community, its baneful influence upon the individual has to be noticed. Fear is one of the most productive causes of nervous illness. The various phobias or neurotic fears are numerous, and one and all pernicious. From fear of disease to fear of mice, every fear spells wasted energy and lost health. There is fear of death, and fear of life, and fear of almost every conceivable thing in life and after death. Fear, in whatever shape or form, is not easily dispelled, just because secretly it is wished for. The thing we fear is also the thing we desire. No illness is feared that is not unconsciously desired. Notwithstanding what has been said on the association of fear with anger and hatred, the thing feared is at the same time desired. How that should be it is not difficult to explain. We must revert to the complex state of anger with the impulse to kill-or-to-be-killed; to injure-or-to-be-injured. Either of these alternatives (as we have seen) brings relief to the pent-up state of anger. So with fear, the desire to *escape* suffering means the desire to *prevent* suffering; and this prevention is sought by striking the first blow, by entering the combat. The issue of the battle may be the

defeat of the fearful enemy or it may be conquest by the terrible adversary. In either case fear has found an outlet and so is dispelled. When a thing greatly feared actually occurs, there follows a feeling of relief. The tension is over; the fear is dispelled just as if the evil had been repulsed and destroyed. Of course a new fear of a different object may arise, as when the fear of illness is allayed by the occurrence of the illness then there may follow the new fear of death. The coming of the thing feared, however, gives relief from that particular fear, and as a respite from the tension caused by fear, the happening of the evil thing dreaded is actually desired. When the worst conceivable event has taken place, for the time being we experience satisfaction. Fear of that at least is now at an end. It is often said in modern psychology that the thing feared is also desired, but how that should be so is not made clear. The explanation lies in this alternative mode of satisfaction for fear, anger and hatred; either to injure the thing feared or to be injured by it. The ambivalence of emotion likewise frequently mentioned without explanation in psycho-analytical books is due to a similar alternative relief and satisfaction. This will be of the utmost importance to us in our study. Love and hate are optional.

The same conclusion is arrived at by Mr. Shand, although both his starting point and his method of analysis are different. He discovers that the chief emotions which are organized into the sentiments of love and hate are fear, anger, joy and sorrow. And these emotions are constituents alike of the sentiment of love and of the sentiment of hate. The difference lies in the object about which the sentiment is organized. Thus hate may become love by a simple adjustment and redirection amongst the constituent emotions. As Mr. Shand says: "The same four emotional dispositions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow which are essential to the system of love are present also in the system of hate. But just as their disinterested forms were found to be aroused by different causes in love from those which arouse them in self-love, so are they also aroused by different causes in the system of hate. The health and prosperity of the loved object are causes of joy; in hatred they are causes of bitter sorrow. In place of delight in being again with one we love, is a peculiar mixture of repugnance and anger

when we find ourselves again in the presence of one we hate; the one impelling us to avoid the person, the other to attack him. Thus the joy of hate is opposite to the joy of love, being caused by the suffering, loss of power and reputation of the hated person; and the sorrow of hate is opposite to the sorrow of love, and is caused by his power, reputation and happiness. While, too, in love we fear those things that threaten suffering, injury or destruction to the object, in hate we fear those events that threaten to preserve it from suffering and final destruction. In place, too, of the anger in defence of the object, there is anger against those who defend it." * Thus Mr. Shand, on quite different lines, reaches the conclusions here arrived at: that fear draws its power from hate; that the danger of fear is only to be overcome when love is developed; and that hate and love are alternative responses and are closely related. But just how it comes about that one and the same object, without change in the object itself, can be the centre upon which either love or hate may be directed; how, in fact, the injunction to "love your enemies" has a radical basis in instinct and emotion, only becomes clear when the mechanism here analysed has been understood.

From this dark picture of fear, anger and hate, we turn now to view the opposite triad of faith, hope and love. Whereas those were negative and destructive, these are positive and constructive. Furthermore, the graces are able to gain the ascendancy owing to their vitalizing influence. First of all it must be inquired how love is able to supplant hate. And in order to understand this it is necessary to call to mind once more the mental attitude involved in fear. The object feared, and therefore hated, produces the desire to injure or be injured. Now it must be understood that the emotional strain of suspense is very great. Under the emotion of fear the whole nervous system is taut and the tension produced is painful and, if continuous, weakening. Apart from the accomplishment of the end for which the emotion was aroused, there is an urgent need to relieve the high emotional pressure of the nervous system. Quite apart from menace of the object feared there is a danger of harm to the system through the persistence of the emotion of fear. Physiologically, the production of

* Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 59.

adrenalin in the blood must not continue to the point of excess. The painfulness of the emotional state is the warning and safeguard. The condition in the self produced by the object of fear must be ended within a short time. And this strain and painfulness is relieved, either by an injury inflicted on the enemy, or by an injury sustained at the hands of the enemy. The enemy, by striking the first blow and injuring the self, may give release to the pent-up emotion, and the pain of the blow inflicted may be less than the pain of the emotion endured, so that, by the law of relativity, the injury may seem a pleasure and the enemy a benefactor. The attitude of mind towards the object of fear will thus tend to be changed from hatred to love. This transition, therefore, is not unprepared for, even on the level of emotion and instinct. The presence of desire together with fear has often enough been noticed, and if not sufficiently explained in works of psychology, an outline of explanation has been already suggested in this chapter. When we recognize that behind the state of fear there is the desire to end the state, then the receiving of a blow meets the need, satisfies the desire, and so awakens the response of love. Naturally, this result may not follow if the wound inflicted is far more painful than the emotional strain endured. Also, of course, the relief and love may be only temporary and may give place to a new fear and hate. All that has to be established, however, is the possibility of hate becoming love. And this is possible because of the alternative means whereby the emotion of fear is relieved, and because of the independent need to end the state of fear irrespective of which means leads to its termination.

The first step in the transition from hate to love is, therefore, taken on the level of instinct and emotion. Fear, by its very nature, by its inevitable association with desire, tends to become, through desire satisfied by another, love for that other, although the other be an enemy. At the most primitive stage, every object confronting the mind is likely to be regarded and reacted to as an enemy. Nevertheless, even an enemy may be a benefactor and his closer approach to end the strain of fear may be desired. At a much higher level, experience has taught the mind to regard the other self confronting it more and more in the light of one who will satisfy desire. A man learns to

modify his instinctive fear into an acquired habit of trust. Confronted with another self, the mind tends more and more to assume that the result of the meeting will be a net gain of pleasure. Coming even as an adversary the other was possibly welcome, especially if the contact brought relief from fear. This relief from fear, at a higher level, is attained, not by receiving a blow, but by discovering that no blow is forthcoming. The attitude adopted as normal is not the kill-at-sight impulse, but the alternative be-injured impulse, with this difference, that although the self is placed in the position to receive injury, no injury is anticipated. Fear has then passed into trust. Trust means the choice of the option of suffering injury rather than inflicting injury under the belief that no injury will be received. Love means placing the self unarmed, defenceless, submissive, vanquished, under the power of another. Love is the voluntary acceptance of the be-killed alternative. It is a willing surrender, a prostration to receive the wound that might be given, but is assuredly withheld. Trust and belief take the place of fear, and the attitude of subjection which was prompted by fear becomes now expressive of faith. When this stage of development is reached, emotions are being gradually raised into sentiments. That means that habitual and constant tendencies are being acquired. The tendency is acquired to respond to another with trust and belief. The alternative response of suspiciousness and caution implies that hate has become the prevailing sentiment instead of love. This reaction represents the choice of the lower of the alternatives and is due to the desire to get in the first blow. Hate as a sentiment may influence the whole of the reactions of life, just as love when it becomes the habitual sentiment determines the response that will be made under all conditions. It is the higher of these alternative responses that is argued for by Plato in the *Gorgias*:

"Socrates: To act unjustly is the greatest of evils.

"Polus: But is it really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer unjustly?

"Socrates: By no means.

"Polus: Had you then, rather suffer unjustly than act unjustly?

"Socrates: I should wish neither of these: but if I must

necessarily either act or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly." *

The sudden reversal from love to hate evident at the modern level of psychological development, and known as ambivalence, is due to the regression of the mind from the attitude of submission to the lower alternative of subjugation. When the self realizes that this state of dependence is incompatible with self-assertion, then, feeling humiliated, it expresses a protest and seeks dominance by the only alternative response, which is the way of hatred, where the cry is—subdue, conquer, kill. Such an attempt to gain the mastery is a regression to the primitive level and a choice of the lower of the optional responses. False love quickly turns to hate just because the self has never been completely identified with the love attitude. The desire is not to be dependent upon the loved ones, but to dominate. This state involves a dangerous blending of the hate response with the love response, and so is an unstable condition. Ambivalence is a sudden change from love to hate, but is followed by a renewal of love. It is most likely to occur after a display of great affection. The self, primitive and egoistic, is then made to feel that it has been too much compromised by the love response and, accordingly, it prompts a display of self-assertion through the alternative hate response. Of course, a state of love may be suddenly changed into a permanent state of hate. The explanation is the same, only the self is then more firmly allied to the primitive hate response and so does not escape any more. Love has meant too much self-denial and so is followed by an emphasized self-affirmation.

It is only perfect love that casts out fear and therewith anger and hate. Perfect love means full identification with the submissive, dependent, be-injured alternative. Imperfect love implies a desire to retain ascendancy. Only the complete identification can make love utterly true and dependable. For such love ambivalency is impossible. But perfect love which casts out fear is probably rare, since it is only possible to those in whom self-abnegation is complete. The humility and meekness indispensable to the perfect love attitude are found fully in Christ, and in varying degrees in those who are His faithful followers. But, apart from the Christian

* Plato, *Gorgias*, § 55.

religion, it is doubtful whether this complete submission demanded by love is attainable. Christ completely identified Himself with the be-killed love response, and His death upon the Cross is the great vindication of the nature of love. There He suffered in all the excruciating agony the utmost that could be endured by love in its deliberate choice of submission and death. Perfect love means the choice of the Cross. All attempt at compromise is due to the demand of the self for assertion and mastery. But this demand for self-ascendancy, this protest against self-abnegation, is just a reversion to the primitive level and a refusal to accept all that is involved in the superior alternative. What Adler terms the "masculine protest" is just an individualistic revolt against the claims of love. Ultimately the issue is between self and Christ; between conquest and submission; between the sword and the Cross; between killing and being killed.

Love, in making its momentous choice of sacrifice and renunciation, is supported by faith and hope. Faith is directed to the object of love, which is depended upon to respond to submission with a corresponding self-surrender. Hope is the anticipation that faith's demands will be widely met. Love has made the great renunciation of self, and the hope is that thereby love will be able to win many selves to the renunciation indispensable to that fellowship of personalities which is a necessity for love. Self-culture is no goal for love: only social integration will satisfy its demands. At bottom, faith and hope are claims that reality at its highest and truest reach is with love; that love's ways are God's laws.

The effect of faith upon the self is easily discernible in many ways, and is well known. The strain and anxiety resulting from a state of fear cease to drain the vitality as soon as faith has put an end to the intolerable duality in the mind by effecting the identification of the self with a positive good. The torment due to the fear of illness, for instance, is allayed as soon as the mind is set upon health as the sole end, instead of fluctuating between the two attitudes of desiring and dreading some ill. The therapeutic value of faith is so well established that nothing needs to be said either in illustration or support. A word or two, how-

ever, may not be out of place in explanation of this effect of faith.

Faith and hope operate according to the same law as love. It is the way of submission in trust instead of rebellion in distrust. For the patient suffering from a nosophobia, some aspect of reality in the form of a disease is conceived as antagonistic. Life assumes the appearance of lurking in wait to assail the victim with some illness. Hence, the attitude towards life is the response of hate and fear. There is conceived to be a persistent need to guard against assault. There is thought to be an ever-present danger of sickness. All that has been described as characteristic of fear is manifest in the reaction of the patient towards the environment, towards life and towards reality. The "injure or be-injured" choice is presented and held before a mind that suffers in terrible suspense. The active rôle of aggression upon the enemy is only possible in the unsatisfactory manner of complaint and resentment. The passive rôle of submission is unacceptable owing to lack of faith in self and in life. Now in this, as in the other cases, faith induces the love attitude of submission in trust. It is quite impossible for any man to end the tension of fear by destroying life or environment or disease or reality. Actually, the only way to escape from fear is by adopting the other alternative of surrender. Tempered by faith in life, this yielding up of the self to the larger life becomes an expression of love. Despite the prevalence of disease, danger and death, life, when trusted, is found to justify the faith. The cessation of the strain involved in fear means an increase in energy wherewith to face the life that is now believed in as good. Fear, in attempting to resist, produced weakness; faith, in accepting life, bestows strength. The wastage of nervous energy is saved and the general vitality increased.

When the evils of fear are thus portrayed, it is not to be supposed that fear can no longer serve any useful ends. On the contrary, fear of disease may be utilized as an incentive for the conquest of disease in every form. It may become a passion for scientific research. Fear of danger is valuable and necessary if we are to escape with our lives from some modern situations. An element of crude, emotional and instinctive fear is essential still. But there is no likelihood of this residue being destroyed. However

much sublimation be cultivated, the original emotions will still retain sufficient power for all the purposes of civilized life. The trouble is that some of them, conspicuously fear, have far greater strength than is ever requisite under modern conditions. The problem is to sublimate the surplus of emotional energy. As Mr. Shand has shown, fear is a constituent of the sentiment of love. When organized under the sentiment of hate it is a destructive, harmful influence. But when love dominates, then fear can be sublimated and so made to serve all the better the ends which love seeks. Sublimated fear may be used under the form of reverence to strengthen the attitude of faith towards reality. But before we pass to that we must glance at the operation of love in society.

It is noteworthy that the presence of weakness inspires the feeling of protectiveness. Babies are so extremely weak that they are easily hurt. For this very reason the response to their passivity is one of extreme gentleness. This response, so early learnt towards infants, gradually extends to all who, like them, are despoiled of power. Kindness to the sick and to the aged is developed in humanity as it advances to its higher stages. Consideration for the widow and the stranger, because both are without rights and therefore powerless, is at a certain stage taught as a positive injunction of the law. Care for the poor and the unfortunate is acquired and becomes habitual. Extension of kindness and protectiveness towards animals is characteristic of the highest stages. The tendency is, as mankind advances, to meet weakness, passivity and submissiveness with tenderness, care and protectiveness. Magnanimity is a natural reaction to supplication.

How much stronger is the appeal of submission when the surrender is made willingly; when a man despoils himself; when a strong man deliberately sets aside his power! If a man, refusing defence, ventures unarmed and unaided into the midst of foes, he must have great faith in an innate magnanimity in human nature. It needs not to recall at length how Livingstone passed unscathed through Central Africa because of his faith in the response which savages would make when approached with trust. Once anger has been awakened by the suspicion of animosity, then in the savage breast it will run its course unchecked. But self-

imposed defencelessness appeals to the sense of protectiveness. Psychologically, this means that the attitude of love is met by the response of love. Love, believing in the kindness and generosity of the other that is before it, adopts its own way of submission, and the other is thus won to abandon the reaction of fear and attack and to respond with the surrender of the self in trust. Love triumphs by inducing the other to adopt likewise the attitude of trustful surrender. In this way men are constrained to abandon the attitude of hate and attack. Love by its trustfulness awakens a trustful love.

In this venture of faith and hope, however, love runs actual risks. For one reason or another the yielding of the self defenceless in love may be taken by the other as an opportunity for self-assertion by dominance and destruction. Although this attitude is recognized as wrong in relation to infants and aged, to widows and orphans, it is still too frequently regarded as not wrong when directed to defenceless and submissive animals. But even when the way of subjugation is successful, the victory won is so cheap that it loses all value as triumph and becomes nothing better than shame. Such action, at least when human beings are so treated, is regarded with scorn and contempt; and the supposed conquest over love's defencelessness turns out to be love's triumph after all. It is the submission of love that is approved by those whose praise is sought, and the assertion of self that receives their denunciation. So love gradually triumphs either way. Indeed, its appeal becomes strongest when it faces calmly the uttermost consequences of its trustfulness and defencelessness. Thus it is that the Cross of Christ wins love's battle by submission.

The end sought by love is a fellowship in which faith and hope are realized. What prevents and ruins this integration of society is the " masculine attitude " of self-assertion. This aggressiveness of self is the result of a reversion to the primitive choice of the way of hate, the way of attack and defence. The social claims of love can only be met by self-abnegation. It is necessary to renounce the spoils of battle and assume the position of the defeated. It is by the losing of this primitive, combative, timorous, egoistic self that the ethical, submissive, courageous, altruistic self is found. An integrated moral society is one which obeys love's law. It is the only society which is true to its own nature. Associa-

tion for selfish ends is a perversion of the social and moral life. Faith, hope and love make up the fabric of true fellowship. It will be seen that the characteristically Christian teachings all bear on this great issue. Two things are fundamentally incompatible, and of these two one must be chosen. The old law said, hate your enemy: Christ enjoins the love of enemies. This is the way of non-resistance, the attitude of submissiveness. The opposition is made as sharp and decisive in Christian teaching as it is seen to be on psychological investigation. "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." A man must take up his cross and deny himself, or he cannot be a follower of Christ. The demand is for all a man possesses. And once the higher alternative has been accepted there must be no regression to the primitive response of self-assertion and hate. Having set a hand to the plough, a man must never look back. The Christian Gospel is consistent and unflinching in its command to adopt the attitude of non-resistance, the response of love. There is, accordingly, great disparity between the consistency of Christianity and the compromise of civilization. Having committed the self to the approval and choice of the higher of two alternatives, it is imperative to accept courageously all that is involved in the decision. Ye cannot serve the ethical self and the primitive self. The option lies between, on the one hand the social and moral personality, and on the other hand the individualistic and combative self. It must be self-renunciation or self-affirmation: non-resistance or aggression. Ultimately, it is the antithesis between love and hate that has to be faced. It must either be self brandishing some weapon of defence or Christ enduring the Cross. "Here as elsewhere," concludes Prof. Hobhouse, "it is the few who take the Gospel literally that leave their mark upon the world." *

Most confederations to-day are expressions of imperfect love, of social tendencies spoilt by self-assertiveness. There is apparent the attempt to make the best of both worlds, to meet the needs of the developing moral self that can only be fully satisfied in a fellowship of perfect love, and at the same time to avoid the denial of the claims of the primitive self. The moral self is essentially social and adopts the way of love. The primitive self is intensely individualistic

* Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution,* Third Edition, p. 522. One vol. 1915.

and dare not abandon the way of hate. Thus the modern order in commerce, in politics, in national and international structure and action, is a compromise. Faith is not strong enough to meet hope in the identification of the whole social order with the integrating law of love. But it is love that



fear of God which becomes resignation in trust that love of God can arise. We must call to mind how it was that

fear, aided by its associated desire, became gratitude; and then we shall understand that the fear of God is the beginning of a true, reverent love of God. To eliminate the element of the dread of God from religious worship is not only a failure to provide sublimation for fear, it is also a failure to make the love of God realizable. And it must be remembered that from the choice of the love alternative rather than the hate sprang the whole moral and social order. So from the fear of God arises reverence for the authority of His law as the law of love and also the law of holiness. The power of God's righteousness reinforcing the way of love among men is, on the other hand, weakened when respect for God's holiness has been dispelled by the absence of reverent fear and awe.

The attitude of faith, which aids submission to God, is itself made easy by the assurance that God, Who is thus met in love's way, is Himself love. The assurance that God is love and acts in love's way is verified in the revelation of God in Christ. God in Christ submits and chooses the alternative of suffering and death, because the other way is the denial of love. The fact of Christ venturing defenceless amongst His enemies and willingly allowing Himself to be killed, is taken by Christian faith as evidence that the nature of reality at its highest, truest and most essential point is love. Faith, hope and love thus come to be directed upon reality as upon a personal and perfect love. Ultimately, there are only two reactions possible towards reality; either it must be regarded with fear, anger and hate, or else with faith, hope and love. At a very early stage in moral advance, indeed at the very first step, man is committed to submission instead of aggression; to love instead of fear. The whole development of the moral life from its beginning upwards necessitates its culmination in the love of God. To adopt any other attitude is a regression to the primitive, infantile and individualistic stage. The attitude of developed moral personality is the response of love. Personality is a product of social and moral evolution, and for it the way of love is the only way of life.

The reaction to reality ought to be a reverent submission to a holy love manifest in the Cross of Christ. Even under affliction, religious faith is not lost. The suffering of God in Christ proves that God's way is the way of love. From

which it follows that God cannot be willingly afflicting His children. Trust in God is not shaken by sufferings. The pain is accepted, in the spirit of trustful surrender to love. Affliction only evokes resignation. The pleasure-principle having been renounced and the reality-principle accepted, it becomes easily believable that God is working for some higher end than individual pleasure. The purpose of God belongs to the reality-principle, and accordingly, God's failure to conform to the principle of our own individual pleasure is no disproof of His concern for the highest human ends, but rather confirms the belief that God is with us when we accept the reality-principle. The reality-principle for God is Holiness, and this principle is affirmed in the Cross, where the pleasure-principle is denied as false both for God and for man. Love means the acceptance of the demands of holiness. The attitude of submission is in keeping with the whole trend of the moral and spiritual life. It is the normal response of developed manhood. Such a bearing towards God makes for the integration of personality and becomes the characteristic manifestation of the fully-realized self.

Doubt and fear are traits of spiritual immaturity and make for inward discord and weakness. Our developing moral nature comes to its own in the adjustment of faith, hope and love. The validity of the experience is to be inferred: on the one hand, from its integrating vitalizing effect upon consciousness, and on the other, from the nature of reality which it implies. On the one side it means atonement as the highest truth for the self; on the other side it means the Cross of Christ as the highest truth of reality. Those two sides meet where the self gains atonement by the revelation of the nature of reality shown in the Sacrifice of Calvary.

The greater value in experience of the response of love over that of fear may be taken as evidence that reality conforms more fully to love's demands than to fear's expectations. Were the objects of fear expressive of the truth of reality, then fear would always be the fitting response for every mind to adopt towards the large environment of the universe, as it sometimes is to the proximate environment of some individuals. But if that were so, then the nature of reality would be opposed to the needs of developing personality and would make for the disruption of personality rather than its integration. Love, on the other hand, builds

up the social and moral personality and brings it to its perfection, and also provides an adaptation to reality more satisfactory to the inherent nature of personality. But if the attitude of love is the more satisfactory alternative, that fact bears evidence to the nature of the object in the relationship of love. If the object is to respond to love in such a way as to satisfy the full personality, then it must be itself not less than personal, and therefore loving and also perfect, and therewith redemptive. The superiority of the love response in human experience is confirmatory evidence of the validity of the Christian revelation of the nature of reality as essentially God the Father.

PART IV

THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE AUTHORITY OF CHRIST

UNDER this heading we are called upon to consider how the argument rests at last upon the authority of Christ. There must always be a limit of explanation. A series of proofs may be furnished, where each premiss is itself the conclusion of a previous syllogism, but in the end some postulate must be taken as sufficient in itself. Where the argument, however, is intended to recommend a system rather than demonstrate a single conclusion, the initial assumption will itself have inter-relations with the system as a whole. In that case, however, the choice of a starting point must not be arbitrary. For the sufficiency of the explanation will depend upon the selection of the proper centre of reference. In the argument here advanced, what is made central is the teaching and experience of Christ. But since a system is the end sought, the justification for this assumption must be looked for in the coherency which it affords.

The argument from experience, as we have already had occasion to notice, has to recognize as a weakness inherent to it, that experience is never pure receptivity. When the argument from experience is liberated from its compounded element of interpretation, as it is, for instance, in the hands of Professor Leuba, then all that is left is an undifferentiated content of consciousness from which nothing can be argued. Experience, however, always comes in the composite form of interpreted experience. Apart from a framework of explanation, the current of experience never solidifies into fixed shapes. The purpose of education is to provide those moulds into which experience may be poured and in which it may be preserved. There must be, as we contend, a common purpose in reality as a whole, to ensure that those parts of reality which stand as finite centres of experience may be able to interpret the experience which comes from other

parts of reality with a sufficient measure of truthfulness to guarantee a working adjustment. Although the framework of explanation has needed much readjustment, there cannot have been complete repugnancy between the object of experience and the explanation given by the experient; otherwise the long course of education by gradual modification and amplification of explanation must have been cut short very near the beginning. Just how it was that the understanding of the world was gradually acquired by man, need not, however, occupy our attention at present, since we have to deal, not with experience as a whole, but only with Christian experience. But, like all experience, Christian experience is of a composite nature, and the content of experience may be distinguished from the interpretation. Once more, however, let it be affirmed that the demand for a content freed from all interpretation is a demand for the abnormal, whether in religious or in general experience, and a demand, moreover, which can only be met by reducing consciousness (as in the case of mystic trance) to its lowest level. All normal adult experience is explained experience.

The argument from experience, therefore, has little to gain from the attempt to eliminate interpretation under the mistaken idea of thus purifying experience. This aim illustrates once more the pathetic belief that what is abstract must be a safer guide to truth than what is concrete and complex. The strength of the argument from experience is to be found in a clear recognition that experience without explanation is an abstraction and an abnormality. The argument, therefore, must be stated in some such form as this: Accepting this or that as the explanation of experience, the result in subsequent experience is found to be two-fold: first, a fuller integration of personality; secondly, a more satisfactory adjustment to the total environment.

Considering, now, the validity of Christian experience, what is most significant for the purpose of the argument from experience is that here we are presented with a framework for the interpretation of experience. It cannot be questioned that the nature of subsequent experience can be predetermined by explanation given in advance. To instance the well-known example, the occurrence of conversion, and the precise quality attaching to its accompanying demonstra-

tion, can be artificially induced. What we should need to examine in estimating the validity of such experience would be the prior interpretation given to the subject as a mould in which to arrest any subsequent religious emotion which should reach sufficient intensity to suggest its own appropriateness as the incipient stage of conversion. The criterion available would be first of all the application of the teaching of Christ. But here a difficulty must be faced. The person converted always believes that what he has undergone was actually produced by the teaching of Christ; what right has any one else to dispute this private interpretation? In other words, is the teaching of Christ an objective authority?

The authority of Christ may still stand as absolute, although the understanding of it may be partial and largely erroneous. But if the teaching of Christ is qualified to be used as the standard or test in deciding upon the validity of experience, then any misinterpretation of that authority ought to lead to results which would evince themselves as less satisfactory than those following upon truer understanding and application of Christ's teaching. When, for instance, it is found that some experiences of conversion lead neither to the moral and spiritual development of the subject nor to his more adequate adaptation to the total environment of mature personality, then, according to the principle, we must doubt, not the experience, but its interpretation.

Passing now to consider the character of Christian experience in general, we have to recognize that its quality is determined in advance by the teachings of Jesus Christ. What we must examine, therefore, is not the experience pure and simple, without any explanation, but rather the traditional explanation which is formative of the experience. At last, the validity of Christian experience must derive from the validity of Christ's own experience. It appears to be a mistaken method to argue that human experience proves the truth of Christian revelation. It is mistaken because it is incomplete. We cannot make human experience the authority for testing the experience of Christ, because the validity of Christ's teaching is in that case already assumed implicitly, since it is just that teaching which makes the human experience what it is. Our experience can only be used as a test if the explanation inseparable from it when so

used is itself justified. But that is the very thing that has to be proved. We assume the validity of Christ's teaching as interpretative of our experience, in order to prove the validity of that same teaching as the explanation of Christ's experience. Such an application of the argument from experience is worthless. The only legitimate use of that argument must follow from the recognition that our experience is already conditioned by the teaching of Christ, and its validity can be guaranteed only if the validity of Christ's experience is first assured. The final centre of reference is Christ's teaching, not our experience. It is there that we find our ultimate authority and our starting point for the construction of a systematic explanation of the whole of reality. We must make a stand somewhere, and there is the only possible place. Taking the teaching of Christ as authoritative, we may proceed to the construction of a metaphysic of Christian experience.

It is impossible to prove what is taken as ultimate, and there is no higher court in which to judge final authority. But our choice of a principle to serve in that capacity must not be arbitrary. We may legitimately examine an authority to ascertain its suitability to occupy the position assigned to it. We may also gauge its sufficiency from the effects of its pronouncements. And this is where the argument from experience has its place. Having first examined the qualifications which belong to Jesus Christ and uniquely fit Him to stand as the authoritative interpreter of experience, then we may proceed to inquire what is the effect in human experience of accepting the teaching of Christ as the guiding principle and formative element in religious life. If it be found that this authority, understood in certain ways, leads in human experience to the full development of personality, and to the satisfactory adjustment of such personality to the total environment, then such evidence may be taken as confirmation of the teaching of Christ. The legitimate function of the argument from experience is thus, not to prove, but to confirm what is already assumed on the other grounds.

The authority of Christ as revealer of the truth of God might be made a deduction from the theological doctrine of the Trinity. It might be reasoned that a God of Love must declare His love to all who are capable of responding in love to such an appeal. The teaching of the Personality of God

will certainly bear the inference of a revelation of the divine to the human. Again, the nature of knowledge, as here indicated, requires a revelation of spiritual values as a condition of the education and development, and as a necessity for the redemption, of human nature. Only if we are first shown a higher point of view can we afterwards learn to appreciate it. All discovery is the counterpart of revelation. And the highest discovery of all, the discovery of the nature of ultimate reality, has its initiative in the revelation of God in the Incarnation. Once more, from metaphysics, no less than from theology and epistemology, the need for revelation may be deduced. For does not the very conception of reality as graded according to values lead us to expect higher values than those which are realized in imperfect human nature? The gradation leads us to anticipate a perfected human personality. But all this antecedent probability of a divine revelation can only help us now by encouraging the belief that it is in Christ that such revelation has actually been given. Provided the credentials of Christ are sufficient to allow of the conclusion that in Him the revelation of God is granted to man, then all those other considerations come to meet and secure the belief thus ventured. From the human side, however, the question may be asked, Can Christ be accepted as our authority on the nature of God?

That question can be more easily considered if it be understood that the authority of Christ is invoked only in reference to the nature of God. The doctrine of the Kenosis includes the limitation of knowledge in the human mind of Christ. It is, therefore, no argument against the authority of Christ as revealer of God to contend (as is sometimes done) that Christ's predictions of the future were lacking in precision and accuracy. Waiving the question of textual criticism (which is, nevertheless, vital to the issue), and allowing for the moment that Christ's eschatological teaching was delivered by Him in the form in which it is recorded in the Gospels and allowing also that Christ meant by that figurative language exactly what the evangelists understood in narrating His discourses, still, even with those highly questionable admissions made, Christ's authority on the one great subject of the nature of God would not be impugned.

The authority of Christ as revealer of God must depend

upon the doctrine of His Person. We are led, therefore, to examine the experience of Christ. And we must notice that when, out of His experience, He taught as one having authority, He both accepted and rejected the explanations current in His day. What He adopted He reaffirmed with a fullness of experience never attained before. But what He repudiated was so large an element in the thinking of His contemporaries, that He could be arraigned as a blasphemer against God. Now, what was Christ's qualification for discerning so unhesitatingly between true and false frameworks for the explanation of divine experience? What guarantee can we have that Christ was not rationalizing His experience? What warrant have we for the assurance that Christ was not projecting false or inadmissible conceptions upon God? What is our defence for asserting that Christ used those forms, or moulds, which were the fittest of all the mind's furniture to receive fully and express truly the nature of God? Such questioning brings us back, of course, by an inevitable regression, upon the fact of the Incarnation. The evidence that forms and explanations forged by the mind are able to yield an understanding of God lies in the fact that God Himself took a Form and manifested His glory in the flesh. But leaving over that consideration, our reliance upon Christ as a teacher of the things of God is greatly strengthened by the conviction of His sinless perfection. For the challenge of psychology is rendered mute before the dominance of sinless and perfect personality.

When presented with the unique consciousness of Christ, without flaw or taint, and without any sense of failure or imperfection, psychology would have to allow that no vitiating influence could possibly issue from the unconscious to darken or pervert the mind. The unconscious of Christ must have been perfectly pure and completely disciplined to the will. Dr. Sanday has made the valuable suggestion that it was the subconscious of Christ which was "the proper seat or locus of the Deity of the Incarnate Christ." * Perhaps it would be preferable (as already suggested) to think of the unconscious as containing both subliminal and supraliminal thresholds. In which case the region of the unconscious conceived as the locus of Deity would be the supraliminal. The unconscious which was free from all

* Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, p. 155.

repressions and perfectly pure would, in that case, from its higher level, be the avenue of approach for the Holy Spirit to influence man. Well might it be, therefore, that the indwelling of God in the Son of Man was effected as the surrounding of a human consciousness by an unconscious which was divine, the subconscious being under the supraconscious control. This would be no violation of personality, but rather its completion, for the integration of personality advances stage by stage with organization and purification of the total unconscious in man.

If it be asked what evidence can be adduced in support of the assertion that the unconscious of Christ was perfectly pure, then the only available, or indeed possible, evidence must be drawn from the experience of the personal Christ. What is unique in Him is the complete absence of any awareness of sin or imperfection. It is also noteworthy, as Dr. Temple points out, that when confronted by real and terrible temptation, He had no thought of the possibility of sin. "As we read the record two certainties emerge: He certainly had real struggles with temptation, and He certainly had no anxiety lest He should yield to them and betray His mission by falling into sin. This is even more impressive than the total absence of any consciousness of sin committed in the past." *

The proof of Christ's sinless perfection (or, in other words, of His divinity) lies in the suitability of that characteristic in Him to be understood intuitively. The justification for taking Christ as the ultimate authority for the argument from experience lies in the possibility of an intuitive certainty here, as nowhere else. At the foundation of all understanding there must be somewhere a "scientia intuitiva," and the Person of Christ offers this ultimate conviction. The sinless perfection of Christ is the human side of the claim that He is the Incarnate Son of God, and therefore the absolute authority on the nature of God as the Father Everlasting. And the assurance of this sinlessness, perfection, divinity and authority ever has been, and ever must be, a moral intuition. Such it was to the first disciples, to St. Peter, to St. Thomas and to St. Paul. And to us its recommendation should be all the stronger just because it is presented to us as a moral postulate and a spiritual axiom.

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 148.

In the construction of our system for the interpretation of the nature of reality, is it not an intuitive certainty that we need as the focus and co-ordinate of all our varied lines of knowledge?

Yet such an intuition is not blindly held to. It is susceptible of verification. At first an intuition, its acceptance soon brings confirmation. In three directions, at least, may confirmation be sought in human experience. To begin with, there is the consideration that all the outreachings of the spirit of man, before and apart from Christ, find both their correction and their completion in Christ. It is in the light of His revelation that we can best discern the value and significance of the discoveries of God made in other religions. No more satisfactory criterion for judging the spiritual and ethical value of religious teaching can anywhere be found than the standard afforded by the teaching of Christ. On the ethical side, it may be claimed that only in Christian ethics do we find accomplished that perfect reconciliation of the two poles of the moral life, the infinite value of the individual and the universal scope of obligation. On the spiritual side, it may be claimed that nowhere else is such a clear, consistent and satisfactory idea of God presented. For the interpretation and evaluation of the teachings of the ethnic religions, the best results are obtained when Christian revelation is taken as the norm.

A second line of support may be found in the construction of a Christian metaphysic. If we accept the teaching of Christ on the nature of God and the purpose of God in creation and redemption, then, with the category of personality, a philosophical theory of life and existence can be formulated. And such a theory is able to stand the tests of metaphysics, and is able to furnish a more satisfactory explanation of ultimate reality than any which can be offered by those theories (such as monism) with which it is incompatible. The suitability of Christ's teaching to provide the foundation for a metaphysical system is no slight evidence of its inherent truthfulness.

But the third defence, and the one upon which most must be made to turn in this inquiry, is the argument from experience, as here understood. The acceptance of Christ as an authority, and the adoption of His scale of moral and

spiritual values as the rule for thought and conduct, leads in experience to two invariable consequences: first, it effects the gradual integration of personality and its development towards a full and balanced maturity; secondly, with this growth of personality there is acquired also an increasingly satisfactory adaptation of the whole self to the total environment. The evidence for this conclusion is to be found by studying the character and experience of those who have been most religious, not only the Christian saints, but the saints of every religion. It will be found, then, that those whose religious faith is most conformable to the faith of Christ, whether or not they profess and call themselves Christian, also manifest, in the degree of their conformity, a development of personality and an adjustment to spirituality. The peculiar marks of this development and adjustment, the marks which distinguish the results of Christian faith from the results of other beliefs, are to be found in the fullness and completeness of the development of personality and in the comprehensiveness and sufficiency of the adaptation to environment. The Christian religion is not the only culture, but it is the most adequate culture for the whole of personality. Art may develop one side of personality, science another, a rigid ethicism another, whereas Christianity conceives personality as a complex unity and aims at a proportionate development of the whole. Again, art and science and ethics contemplate only an aspect of reality, and so are unable to afford a guaranteed adaptation to more than a partial reality; whereas Christianity is a revelation of the nature of ultimate reality, and therefore can provide a tested adjustment to the entirety of spirituality in all the grades of its realization. What is thus promised to Christian faith is effected, of course, gradually, and according to the measure in which the faith is really accepted. The consequences of belief are seen fully in Christ, and in Him only. But an approximation is evident in the saints and is closest in those who are most Christlike. In such characters is to be found the highest confirmation which experience can offer of the validity of Christ's revelation of the nature of God.

It has been pointed out that all experience is explained experience. Professor Leuba, it has been said, was on a false scent when he tried to discover objective certainty in

an experience which would be free from explanation. Having regard, therefore, to the evidence of modern psychology that the element of explanation in experience is liable to undue influence from a disorganized and impure unconscious through the processes of rationalization and projection with false reference, what we must look for is a type of personality which will be liberated from complexes and repressions, and, by the fullness of its development, will become qualified to make true projections (in the form of a framework of explanation) upon the experiences received from objective reality. Such a personality as psychology demands, if valid understanding is to be acquired, we actually find in Jesus Christ. In Him, and in His unconscious as the locus of Deity, there is found, not only the absence of those conditions which might vitiate, however slightly, His explanations of the nature of reality; there is also found to be present that perfect and immediate communion of a full personality with the personality of God; and such communion alone could give sure understanding of the nature of the object of personal experience. Christ lived in close and uninterrupted fellowship with God, and in Him there was a fulfilment of all the conditions needful to a valid explanation of the experience which He had of God. Christ, therefore, is qualified to become the authority on the nature of God, and also the norm of personality for all who would find, in their own experience, confirmation of the explanation which He gave of His experience of God. From Christ, too, we must derive our scale of spiritual values. He alone was fully qualified to interpret the Mind of God. He was able to see the world as a process of spiritual attainment, and, by reference to the purpose of God, was able to evaluate all according to its true significance in the sight of God. We, accordingly, come nearest to the true understanding of the world when we interpret it by that standard of values afforded to us in the teaching of Christ.

CHAPTER II

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

It may be well at the very outset to recognize that the absolute of monism gives no support to the doctrine of a personal God. Such a philosophy presents the Christian religion with the dilemma: if God is the ultimate reality, then all the attributes of God must be abandoned; if the attributes are essential to the nature and existence of God, then He must be less than the ultimate. Since Christianity needs to claim both that God is ultimate reality and also that the finite spirit can enter into a relationship of personal communion with God, it finds itself very much out of place in the metaphysical environment of monistic speculation. For monism the character of ultimate reality is such that it cannot be worshipped, it cannot respond in an experience of communion—in a word, it is not qualified to be the object of the religious consciousness. At lower stages of religious development when the question of the ultimate reality of God is unasked, this or that object may suffice to evoke the uncritical religious response. From the study of religion it may, therefore, be inferred that religion is a feeling attitude, and the nature of the object is not fixed. Closer examination of religious experience, however, will disclose the important fact that the object of the distinctively religious attitude of mind is always a *symbol*. This means that it represents something beyond itself. The significance of the symbol is apprehended more and more clearly as personality develops and as intellect is able to criticize and appreciate its meaning and value. In the end the object of worship can be nothing less than a symbol of the nature of reality. If the religious experience of mature and balanced personality is to find satisfaction, then the nature of reality must be such as to provide that satisfaction. No substitute will suffice.

All this means that monism can find no place for the Chris-

tian doctrine of God. But this clear repugnancy between Christianity and a special theory of the absolute must not be taken as proof that the God of Christian worship is irreconcilable with the God of metaphysics. Such a conclusion, which would mean the disappearance of Christianity, and in due time, of all religion, would have greater justification if monism were the only reputable system of metaphysics. But even were that the case, were there no other philosophical theories which could be shown to be more consonant with Christian claims, still, even then, the conclusion would not be inevitable until it had first been established that Christianity itself, out of its own resources, was unable to construct its own metaphysic with a sufficient measure of self-consistency to guarantee it a position side by side with any alternative theory. In point of fact, there are not wanting to-day types of metaphysical speculation which lend no small support to Christian teaching. This happy position, however, should not be taken as dispensing Christianity from at least indicating what its metaphysical implications are.

Dean Rashdall * has shown that the impossibility of identifying God with the absolute does not necessitate the denial to God of ultimate being. Although distinguished from the absolute, and therefore, in a sense, only a part of the absolute, God may nevertheless be "that part to which all other parts owe their origin." † Indeed, if the terms personality and ultimate reality be both predicable of God, that is to say, if the nature of ultimate reality be personal, then what we should expect would be that God, as personal, or a centre of experience, would, in having the priority of subject over object, be more real, vital, essential, than what He experienced. If the ultimate reality be personal, then the absolute must be not just a synonym for God, but a term expressing God as the Subject of experience, together with the object of His experience. So conceived, God could never disappear in the absolute, as for monism He must. The being of the absolute would consist in its meaning for God. Far from absorbing God, it would depend on God. The absolute of monism is reached by the abstract process of logical consistency. What, therefore, must be challenged is the method of procedure

* Cf. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* vol. ii, p. 239, and *Philosophy and Religion,* p. 118.

† Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man,* p. 218.

which reduces the concrete fact of personal experience to the bare abstraction of intellectual activity. Once it is seen that experience itself, when properly qualified, is a surer guide than any single feature of experience developed and employed without due regard to the whole of which it is but an aspect, then it must be allowed that the real can no longer be estimated by the rational alone, but by the full experience of developed personality. The category which we need for the understanding of the whole of being is surely not that of intellect alone, which is itself but a part of full experience, but rather that of the wholeness of the experience of perfect personality. It is here that we reach the highest term within the range of our knowledge—and can any other term be fit to apply to the nature of reality as a whole?

When we begin our interpretation of the nature of reality with abstract intellect as the sole criterion of what is ultimately real, clearly we shall find nothing in the end but that which bare intellect requires. We have determined the nature of what we shall find by setting out with an instrument which is incapable of detecting anything that has not that particular nature. This way we shall reach, as the characteristic of ultimate being, just what is the characteristic of intellect as an aspect of personality. Reality, so discovered, will reflect the nature of partial personality, and in consequence will fail to establish for itself a claim to be personal. But when, on the other hand, we begin with the concrete fact of personality, and use that as the criterion of what is real, we have, once more, determined the nature of what we shall find by the instrument we employ. Of all the instruments at our choice, however, this is the most suitable. Either this instrument must suffice to discover the nature of reality, or (what is unthinkable and impossible) reality must be of such a nature as to preclude knowledge of itself as a whole in that part of itself which is the knowing part. If we are to know the nature of ultimate being, then surely it must be in virtue of what is most ultimate in ourselves that such knowledge will be acquired. Since personality is more ultimate than any attribute or part of personality, then it is through personality that we must seek to understand the nature of the ultimate. And one conclusion will issue at once from such an initial assumption. If personality is what is most ultimate in that part of reality which is human nature,

then reality as a whole in its ultimate being cannot be less than personal.

Monism had no place for a personal God whose will, knowledge and love are expressed in creation, revelation and communion. But Christianity, with its doctrines of God as Creator and Father, stands or falls with the reality of personality in God. Christianity must have, what monism cannot justify, a God Who is both personality and reality. It is not enough that God should be one but not the other. Without being reality He cannot be God at all. Without being also personal He cannot be the Christian God. For "the typically Christian experience is neither union nor absorption, but communion." * And communion is impossible without response. A God Who was anything less than personal could not respond in fellowship with human personality. A responsive God must be a personal God.

Although (as already said) Christianity must stand or fall, according as the personality of God is or is not allowed, yet it has no occasion to become apologetic in making its inevitable claim. The feeling of reluctance with which this claim is sometimes grudgingly admitted is due to a failure to distinguish between personalism and anthropomorphism. In declaring the personality of God to be indispensable to Christian faith, there is not being made an inexcusable declension from enlightened philosophy to the level of the personification of animism. No doubt anthropomorphism was a crude and rudimentary form of personalism. All beginnings, whether religious or not, are outreachings after higher things; and everywhere continuity is traceable between lower and higher stages. But it matters very much that the higher differs from the lower. And the difference between the personality of the Christian God and the anthropomorphism of the Jahweh of the Hebrews is of the utmost importance. It is sometimes supposed, however, that since in the evolution of the idea of God many attributes have been discarded, therefore, as the process of development proceeds, our conception of God will at last be stripped of every attribute, including personality, and will, in fact, become identical with the absolute of monism, and so, as a distinct idea, will cease to have any meaning at all. This is a false, though not infrequently heard, description of what is actually the process of

* Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, p. 160.

divine education in the race. The endeavour must always be to discover what is the element of truth in every conception of God. And however small the element of truth may be, and however entangled it may be in a network of superstition and error, the skein must be disentangled and the thread of truth left unbroken. The justification for discarding an earlier conception of God must be twofold; first, that the new conception gives expression to a necessary truth not sufficiently evident in the earlier; but secondly, that it preserves, while it purifies, the truth which the earlier conception enshrined. The truth which anthropomorphism inadequately expressed is more clearly and precisely defined as the personality of God. The transition to this higher stage of interpretation enables the mind to discard false and irrelevant ideas associated with the earlier imagery, while rescuing the permanent element of truth. The most important distinction between anthropomorphism and personalism lies in this, that in attributing to God the nature of personality, we are using the highest and fullest category of which we have any knowledge.

Here is a positive and valuable contribution to philosophy for which Christianity may claim no small credit. That Christianity should stand or fall with the truth of divine personality may show after all how securely fixed the Christian doctrine is. For if it should appear in the end (as well it may) that personality is the only appropriate category to use for the interpretation of ultimate reality, then in building upon this concrete rock, instead of upon the abstract sands of intellectualism, Christianity will evince the stability of its truthfulness by weathering those great storms which will shake all things that can be shaken, so that those things which cannot be shaken may appear. Christianity has whereof to boast in its very clear enunciation of the ultimate nature of personal experience.

One important consequence of accepting the principle of personality is that permanence is thus given to values, whereas, apart from the assumption that personality is ultimate, values have no fixity. On the view that reality is something else and not personal experience, we are still confronted with the series of values known to consciousness, all of which are relative to some centre, and that centre necessarily personal. But if personality has no place in ultimate

reality, then neither can the values implying a personal centre be ultimate and enduring. The authority of Professor Sorley may be claimed at this point: "Values," he says, "characterize personal life as completed and perfected; they are factors in the fulfilment of purpose, and purpose is an essential trait of personality." * Unless perfect and purposive personality be ultimate, then values cannot be objectively real. On the view here taken, by positing personality as expressing the nature of reality, the centre of all values is found in God. In the universe, no doubt, many values are temporary and ancillary, while others are eternal and absolute; but the estimation of their meaning and significance is only possible by the understanding of God's purpose in creation. In so far as we are able to receive the revelation of the mind of God, we are able rightly to evaluate the objects of experience. The objective reality of values depends upon the Will of a personal God, and their meaning is derived from the divine purpose. When we try to make values centre in anything but the Will of God, when, for instance, we view them as subservient to individual pleasure, or to human interest, we misinterpret their significance altogether. For the discovery of true values we must be in communion with God.

Let us now look a little more closely into the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, which is the Christian metaphysic of personality. From this doctrine two deductions must be made. In the first place, the doctrine enunciates that in attributing to God the nature of personality we mean that while He cannot be less than personal, He must also be more than personal. All that is characteristic of personality as we know it will remain as characteristic of divine personality. The communion and fellowship essential to human personality will also be essential to God. This the doctrine of the Trinity asserts in the Communion of the Holy Spirit. But in conceiving God as Three Persons in One, it is clearly understood that personality in God is higher and fuller than human personality, and different therefrom while essentially resembling it. Such a conception of God supplies all that human need craves of God in its religious response; it also satisfies the further demand that God should be more than we can conceive, should, indeed, be ultimate, beyond and above our reach.

* Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 239.

It cannot be otherwise than that personality in the infinite and ultimate should mean more than we are able to know. That experience which is foundational beyond the universe cannot but imply a subject of experience higher and fuller than the personal centres of experience found within the universe. One difficulty felt in applying the term personality to God is due to this failure to recognize that we do not imply thereby that God is a finite centre of experience, dependent upon an external object, which is other than self, for the realization of selfhood. The need for an object of experience over against the self and essentially not self, may not be a need for personality as such, but only for finite personality. In truth, personality in us is relatively unreal, and is realized only in the perfect personality of God. There can be no desire to attribute to God the imperfections and crudities of personality as belonging to human nature. We are becoming fully-developed personalities, and with our development we gain higher knowledge of the perfect personality of God. "Personality is not a possession which we inherit. It is an ultimate achievement, the ideal limit of our progress. We are not fully persons, but we are, we may hope, becoming persons; and, in that process of becoming, we may find indications of what full personality would be." *

If we recognize that what we posit of God is perfect personality, while what we know in ourselves is immature and partial personality, then some difficulties will be removed. There is a place for a reverent agnosticism in the doctrine which states that God, as personal, desires that we should know Him. A humble agnosticism is appropriate to the religious demand that the personality of God should express the nature of ultimate reality. But if the nature of reality be expressed by the Fatherhood of God, then communion is assured between the soul and reality. As Professor Webb concludes: "Religion is not concerned with the nature of the divine self-consciousness, except so far as this may be involved in the reality of our personal relations with God; so long as these are not regarded as figurative or illusory we have no religious interest in hesitating to confess without reserve that God's thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways as our ways." †

* Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, p. 175.
† Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 153.

But with all this allowed to a Christian agnosticism, nevertheless we are far from erecting an altar "to an unknown God." We pass, therefore, to consider the second deduction which must be drawn from the doctrine of the Trinity; and it is this: the highest and most characteristic manifestation of personality is love. The personality of God must be more, not less, than the immature personality of man. And since we see that human personality realizes its inherent nature most completely in the life of love, we must infer that the highest possible expression of love belongs to the perfect personality in which the nature of God is known. And the doctrine of the Trinity is the metaphysic of eternal and ultimate love. According to this Christian teaching, what is foundational is the experience of love: God the Father eternally loves God the Son through God the Holy Spirit. Love is more comprehensive than knowledge, wherefore, the conception of the ultimate nature of reality as an experience of love is more satisfactory than the conception of it as an experience of knowledge. Love, as a perfect and complete experience, includes within itself the basis for all intellectual, moral and emotional activity. It is love which, through sympathy, lifts knowledge into understanding and so achieves its completion. It is love that subsumes every other duty, provides the interpretation of all duties, and supplies the only infallible guide for the application of morality to life. To Christian ethics belongs the glory of supplying the one supreme law capable of co-ordinating all the varied claims of the moral life and safeguarding morality from dissolution into casuistry. It is love also which, by its moral stability, brings into an organized system the manifold responses of the emotional life. All experience finds its fulfilment in love.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the enunciation of love as the fullest expression of the nature of God. Therein, as we shall see in the concluding chapters, is the principle which can explain most satisfactorily not only the existence of the physical universe as a phase in the eternal experience of God, but also the creation of finite spirits within the universe, as destined to share in the experience which is God's. The law of love is able to account for the Incarnation no less than for the creation. And the law of love is the deduction from the doctrine of the Trinity. In illustration of this we cannot

do better than quote the words of Dr. Ward: "The world is God's self-limitation: self-renunciation, might we venture to say? And so God is love. And what must that world be that is worthy of such love? The only worthy object of love is just love: it must then be a world that can love God. But love is free: in a ready-made world, then, it could have no place. Only as we learn to know God do we learn to love Him: hence the long and painful discipline of evolution, with *its* dying to live—the converse process to incarnation —the putting off the earthly for the likeness of God. In such a realm of ends we trust that God is love indeed, and love creation's final law." *

Closely associated with the theological teaching on the personality of God is the philosophical implication of the transcendence of God. Without that philosophical correlate there would be no security for the doctrine of the Trinity. God conceived as immanent only yields first pantheism and later materialism. Such a conception means the reverse of the spiritualization of matter: it is the denial of spirituality and value. We must, therefore, verify the philosophical principle of transcendence.

The validity of Christian experience has been seen to depend at last upon the Christian metaphysic. Confirmation has been sought for the truthfulness of Christ's teaching about the nature of God as ultimate reality, according to the argument from experience, by a consideration of the effects which follow from the acceptance of the Christian faith, and which are discovered to be both a fuller development of balanced personality and also a more satisfactory adjustment towards reality. There is another direction in which verification may be sought. Instead of testing directly the effect in experience of accepting the teaching of Christ as an authoritative revelation of the nature of God, the more indirect way is also open whereby we should test the metaphysic which is implied when the experience of Christ is taken as valid. That may seem a compendious task; and in its comprehensiveness it cannot be so much as looked upon, or time would fail us. Instead, however, of attempting to construct and afterwards to test a complete metaphysic of Christian doctrine, we may take the brief sketch already offered, and seek to test that a little further by examining the three

* Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 453.

doctrines of Transcendence, Creation and Incarnation, all of which are essential to the Christian position. The doctrine of the Incarnation is not only essential, but unique, and it must be shown that a place is found in Christian philosophy where the Incarnation is demanded in order to complete the design of the whole.

This dual verification seems to be necessary if the authority of Christ's teaching is to receive the full confirmation possible to it. The examination of the results of Christian faith in human experience leads inevitably beyond itself. After satisfaction has been received in respect of the integrating influence of Christianity upon the whole nature of personality, there remains the further consequence of Christian faith in a more perfect adjustment to reality. This second effect can be examined from both sides of the relationship. There will be the undoubted fact that the self as a whole finds more satisfying adaptation. But this satisfaction must include the intellect, which demands that the environment to which adjustment is effected shall be truly conceived. Such and such a belief about reality may aid our adaptation to reality, and that is, metaphysically considered, no small measure of verification. Yet the question must always be asked—is that belief itself intrinsically credible? Is the metaphysic involved in such a view of reality itself acceptable? This query must be sharply distinguished from the demand for a purely intellectual criterion of reality. The sufficiency of the theory for the moral and emotional nature of man must itself be an intellectual satisfaction. But the truth apprehended by the whole of personality must give full satisfaction to the intellect which is duly balanced with will and emotion. The philosophical cogency of Christian teaching will come to clinch the confirmation of the authority of Christ offered by the argument from experience.

Turning, then, to consider briefly and in close connexion with the personality of God, the doctrine of God's transcendence, we notice first that this is needed by the religious consciousness. Professor Pratt says: "Men through all the ages have truly meant by God something genuinely transcendent." * This transcendence of God, he thinks, psychology can neither prove nor disprove. And, of course, the question is one for metaphysics. His conclusion upon

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 209.

this point is: "That while the psychology of religion must have a free hand, and while it is hopeless to look to it for a proof of anything transcendent, nothing that it can say should prevent the religious man, who wishes to be perfectly loyal to logic and loyal to truth, from seeing in his own spiritual experiences the genuine influence of a living God." * The transcendence which to psychology appears to be demanded in religious experience may, at the lower stages of religious growth, be something different from a philosophical transcendence. For an uncritical religious consciousness, any object conceived as spiritually transcending the worshippers might serve to invoke the religious attitude of reverence. When, however, in the balanced development of personality, intellect requires satisfaction no less than emotion, the demand is for an object of worship which transcends the whole world. The religious consciousness at its highest reach, as reflected in theism, requires as the condition of its belief in the immanence of God in the world, a prior belief in God as transcendent to the world. If Christian doctrine appears to be more concerned with God's transcendence than with His immanence, that is because Christ placed the emphasis there in His teaching. And, moreover, the kind of immanence which a Christian view of the world implies is an immanence dependent on God's transcendence.

If God be not transcendent to the world, then, sooner or later, He must be identified with the world. Perhaps He may be regarded as an aspect of the world, but that distinction will exist only for the human mind, and so will not be ultimate. And the same thing will happen in reference to all values; they will be aspects of the world, and relative to the human point of view. With the transcendence of God there stands as inseparably dependent thereon, the immanence of God conceived as the objectivity of values. The kind of immanence in which we believe is determined by the kind of transcendence in which we first believe. If the transcendence of God be denied, then the meaning of immanence is altogether changed. A God immanent only, and not transcendent also, must be identical with the sphere of immanence. If the universe be taken as the region of the divine presence and activity, and a God beyond the universe, on Whom the universe depends, be denied; then it must follow

* Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 458.

that degrees within the universe are relative to the human standard. The strictly logical deduction from such pantheism leads at last to the uniform divinity of the whole world. The analysis given in Pope's *Essay on Man* is inescapable. Such immanence, far from giving security to values, just merges and blurs all distinctions in a dull homogeneity and reduces all gradations to a dead level.

At the other extreme, a kind of transcendence which is the negation of immanence is equally destructive of values. Once more, the variations and differences in worth and achievement are unrelated with any object that is capable of sustaining them. As soon as human endeavour wearies, then the structure of values must fall flat. What is lacking to both theories is, in a word, the principle of sacramentalism. Neither pantheism nor deism can have any sacraments, because neither has any place for an Incarnation.

Theism requires a conception of the world which allows of the immanence in varying measure of a God Who transcends and creates the whole. This graded immanence is the objective counterpart of a scale of values. The key to the understanding of the world must then be found in the nature of God, Who, in varying phases and at different grades, manifests Himself in the world. For a Christian philosophy, the principle of sacramentalism is vital. Throughout the whole range of created being there is a progressive and ascending manifestation of higher in lower forms, everything focussing upon the highest form of all, the Incarnate Son of God. Leaving for a moment the manifestations of transcendence in Creation and in the Incarnation, let us ask in what way Christian philosophy is able to conceive of God as at once transcendent and immanent.

Recalling the previous outline sketch of Christian metaphysics, we must remind ourselves that the nature of ultimate reality is experience. Experience must be at least personal experience, since that is the highest experience we can conceive. And at its fullest attainment personal experience is love. Within love are included, together with the emotional response, the will to the good of the object of love, and the desire for the understanding of that object. Love is, therefore, at once the fullest and highest experience of personality, and is the most ultimate thing discoverable. Hence, if we do not conceive of ultimate reality in terms of

the most ultimate thing we know, then we cannot conceive of it at all. Accordingly, we posit that what must be true of ultimate reality (whatever else may also be true) is this highest experience of personality reached in love. To suggest that what is highest in that part of reality, the mind, which is itself the highest part, should not be at least a part of the truth of reality as a whole, is to imply that we have no gauge whatever by which to measure reality, and no key to the understanding of what is ultimate and eternal. But if we can have knowledge which is any measure of the truth, then it is through personality as a whole that we must seek that knowledge, and by means of the highest that is conceivably possible to fully-realized personality. Following this clue, therefore, we say that the nature of ultimate reality must be that of an experience of love.

From this definition two things follow: first, that if such be the nature of reality, then love will reveal itself to the objects of its experience; secondly, that there must eternally be both subject and object of experience. Taking this second implication, we can see at once that transcendence and immanence are alike attributes of a personal God of Love. God, as the subject of that experience which is ultimate and eternal, is transcendent: while, with reference to the necessary and eternal object of that experience of love, He is immanent. God is ultimately and inherently transcendent as the subject of foundational experience. But this implies a relative transcendence which is the correlate of immanence. Wherever there is a higher measure of spirituality there will be, in respect of what is less spiritual, a relative transcendence. This is illustrated in the distinction so common in religious thought, between natural and supernatural. Religion is supernatural, because it explains the natural by what is higher in the scale of spirituality. The meaning of the distinction is not to be found in discontinuity, but in the principle of explanation from above. But this process of finding meaning or value by a method of symbolism according to which every sign gets its significance from what is more spiritual than itself, is not an infinite regression. When the limit of the universe is reached, then that, in its turn, acquires its value from what is still transcendent, the Mind of God, to which it stands as an object of experience.

It is not, however, by trying to apprehend the sum total

of values which constitute the universe that we reach most nearly to the transcendent God. For we must first of all have found God by some other means before we can understand the values of the universe as they truly are for the Mind of God. We come most near to the God above when we approach Him through the highest of those sacramental values which the universe affords. What God most essentially is, is to be found from the highest stage of spirituality in the world. Lower values are realized in order to throw into relief and give full meaning to that value which expresses most adequately under the forms of time and place the inherent nature of the transcendent God. We need the Incarnation.

CHAPTER III

THE CREATION

We pass at this point from the consideration of God as the subject of experience, and come to the study of the object of God's experience. We pass from the thought of God's transcendence to the complementary thought, the world's dependence upon God. That the Eternal Subject of experience must eternally have an object is self-evident; while at the same time it must be apparent that the physical universe known to us is not an eternal object and therefore cannot be identical with the object of the divine experience. The universe, not being itself eternal, must be a phase or aspect of that object which is the correlate to the Eternal Subject of foundational experience. The suggestion that the universe is a moment in eternal experience, implies change from something else to the universe we know. But there is no prior reason why the content of the Divine Mind should be unchanging; rather, granting always a sufficient reason for change, it is to be expected that the Divine Will would cause whatever change is appropriate. The doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son enunciates the principle that there must be constantly and continuously an object for that eternal experience which is most fittingly termed the Love of God. But this principle also contains within itself the ground for its own increasingly wide application. Accordingly, change is possible whenever fresh application is possible. The Love of God, expressed eternally in the Love of the Father for the Son, is potentially capable of including an infinite number of responsive centres of consciousness, each becoming able to stand in a reciprocal relationship of love with God and with other souls. And this is the ground for that possible change from some other phase of experience to that phase which is our universe. The universe is only a part of divine experience and is every-

where transcended by God, but through it as a part, the experience of Holy Love, which is the basis of reality, is gradually extended in the actualization of its potentiality.

The idea of creation, with its crucial factor, the creation of free spirits, can only be studied here from the single point of view prescribed by the argument. We can attempt nothing beyond an illustration of the metaphysical category of personal experience by the examination of its applicability in this special connexion. And here, at the outset, one objection may be noticed, viz. the frequent objection that God is limited by His creation. As Dr. Ward says: "If the reality of the world be admitted, then this reality stands over against the reality of God. God indeed has been limited from without, but He has limited Himself." * And this explanation of the world as God's self-limitation is more satisfactorily offered from the metaphysic of experience than from any other. Spinoza clearly understood that all definition is negation. But negation is only justified fully when definition is shown to be essential. Consciousness which has no definite object is on the point of vanishing, and is lacking in experience. The limitation of the field of consciousness to an object is a stage in experience. Limitation of the subject by the object is inherent in the process of experience, but it is effected by the volition of the subject. There is, then, a volitional self-limitation which means a heightening of consciousness and an intensification of experience. Negation has not to be accounted for as something extraneous to the fundamental substance of reality. It is itself integral to that experience which is the substance and substratum of all things.

More acute, perhaps, must the problem seem when self-limitation by created free spirits is contemplated. But any apparent increase in the difficulty of accounting for such limitation is due to a relapse into the false method of inquiry. There is no limitation which is merely intellectual. The intellectual aspect of limitation is just an abstract view of personal limitation. And remembering that what is fundamental is personal experience, and that what is highest, most characteristic and essential in experience, is love, it will be seen that self-abnegation is vital to that fellowship and communion which is the ultimate reality. The self-limita-

* Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 243.

tion of the personality of God through communion with created spirits is to be regarded as an extension of that basal experience of love wherein the Father wills the good of the Son. The limitation involved in voluntary attention is comparable to the limitation consequent upon voluntary affection. In the act of will which is the expression of the whole personality, there is inherent a self-limitation which is at the same time an intensification of what is most essential to personality at its highest and fullest reach.

There is no legitimate objection, therefore, which can be brought against creation on the score of the implied limitation of God. Self-limitation, rightly conceived, is a deducible consequence from the postulate of personal experience. Limitation, however, must be rightly conceived; for the universe might be thought of as so limiting God as to affect His nature. Christian doctrine, however, safeguards against such a danger by its insistence upon the transcendence of God and the dependence of the world upon God. Indeed, this idea of the dependence of the world upon God is the central truth in all the teaching upon creation. The essentially Christian way of thinking of the world is to think of it as dependent upon the will of God and as sustained by His mercy. And this view, being essential to Christian teaching, is developed more thoroughly and more fruitfully in Christian teaching than elsewhere.

Since, however, many difficulties arise through misconceptions of the nature of creative process, it will be well to specify more precisely what is implied (and what is not implied) in this essentially Christian proposition. And at once it may be said that the problem of time and creation is artificial. Let it be frankly affirmed that creation is an eternal process, and that there never was, or could be, a time when God did not create. That position accepted, the whole discussion will be simplified. Creation, thought of as the activity of will, is a constant need for personality. If at any time God were not creative, He would cease to be personal, and so would cease to be the God of Christian faith. It must become evident that the activity of creation is eternal as soon as we reflect that the creation is the object of God's experience, the product of His volitional attention. But what is eternal, of course, is the process of creation and not the product of creation. This particular world in which we now

live, the physical universe of science, may very well have had a beginning. And there is no reason to doubt the probability of "the end of the world." This object of experience, like every object whose existence is willed, comes into being to serve a purpose, and when, and in so far as, it ceases to have meaning or value, it will cease to be. But God's nature, which is ever the same, is to create and sustain what is good.

The eternity of creation can be inferred from the nature of creation. As Viscount Haldane reminds us, there is "a level where thinking and creation must be contemplated as indistinguishable." * Thought is itself creative, and the essence of creation is active thought. "For mind, when in final and perfect completion, thought and creation cannot be otherwise than ultimately inseverable in conception." † That means that the Divine Mind is eternally creating its own content. The object of ultimate experience is the construction of the thought and feeling and will of a personal God. Without creating an object of foundational experience God would not be the Subject of that experience. But the transcendence of God and the dependence of the object (whether this physical universe, or some other object) follow from the necessity of the Ultimate Experient to create the object of absolute experience.

This theory of creation saves us from any need to assume some original matter as the presupposition of the physical universe. A crude dualism is altogether repugnant to the Christian belief that there can be nothing outside of, or independent of God. The nature of the creation is that of the object of ultimate experience, as the nature of the Creator is that of the Subject. What is fundamental is in no sense matter, but experience, and experience in which Subject and object are in perfect accord. The object is the thought of God; the Subject is the mind of God.

From this it follows that the creation must be a necessity for God. A mind which thought nothing would not be a mind; a will which purposed nothing would not be a will; a heart which loved nothing would not be a heart. The object of experience is the necessary reference for the personality of God. The theory of the contingency of the world

* Haldane, *The Reign of Relativity*, p. 194.
† *Ibid.*, p. 396.

must not be pressed so far as to make the world independent of the eternal purpose of God, or accidental to the Mind of God. But as an explanation of the dependence of the world upon God, it may be understood as being a variant of the doctrine of creation. Rightly used, the theory should express the necessity for the world to have its ground in the Nature of God, as it has its origin in the Will of God. The teaching of the utter dependence of the world on God is not contradicted by the belief in the necessity of the world to God. For the world's necessity of God is quite different from God's necessity of the world. This is well brought out by Dr. Temple. "The Love which prompts creation," he says, "is the very nature of God. Because He is Love, He is and must be self-communicating; in principle there is, and always was the Word, eternally in close relation with God, eternally God (John i. 1). In this sense the universe is necessary to God. Being God, He must create. But there is no reciprocal interdependence. The way in which God is necessary to the universe is utterly different from the way in which the universe is necessary to God; for in each case the ground of the necessity is in God. God is necessary to the universe in the sense that, apart from God, the universe would not exist: the universe is not necessary to God in that sense at all; it is necessary to God only in the sense that, being what He is, His nature leads to its creation." * The creation eternally reflects the nature of God, and is the realization of His purpose. It must, therefore, be assimilated to revelation and redemption. It is not an act, but a process: it is not an end, but a means to the end of spiritual communion. Creation, together with revelation and redemption, must be lifted from the plane of the temporal and given its place in the eternal necessities of the nature of God.

As soon as we begin to question the wherefore of the world there is only one answer possible. It is Christianity alone which has any adequate explanation to offer as a reason for the world's existence. We must use the terms will and purpose, terms which are only applicable when the category of personality is used for the interpretation of reality. On the principles of the metaphysic here adopted we not only *may* ask, but *must* ask, why the world exists. For to have no meaning is to lack all existence. The world exists because

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 275.

of its meaning for God. It is a revelation of the Mind of God. It is a part of that revelation which culminates in the Incarnation wherein revelation becomes effectual redemption.

Considered for the moment apart from its effect upon created spirits, creation, thought of as the active experience of God, can only be understood as the realization of values. The object of the divine experience must be the whole scheme of values in holiness and love which reflect the nature of the Eternal Experient. The definition of meaning, or the expression of value, must be the reason for the objectification of the Mind of God. And this must mean that, apart from created value, there is no value; and that, apart from achieved good, there is no good. The nature of God and the nature of good both imply that the good must be actively held, deliberately willed, intensely felt, clearly defined. The whole creation is to be understood as instrumental in realizing an idea of good or value in the Mind of God; and it is also to be conceived as somehow an essential process.

We have to recognize, however, that the creation which we know, our physical universe, exists not only for the sake of God, but also, somehow, for our sake. Its existence is no doubt for the sake of God, but for God's sake through us. The inclusion, within the sphere of creation, of free spirits capable of understanding the creation and of entering into communion with the Creator, must be a vital factor in the purpose of creation. The creation of free spirits must reflect the nature of God more fully than the creation of the physical universe. A centre of experience is more closely akin to what is ultimate than the objects which stand over against the experiencing subject. It is through the personalities of created souls, therefore, that we interpret most fully the nature of the Personal Source of all experience.

Since the highest reach of experience is love, and the most perfect love that reciprocal love of God the Father and God the Son, it is altogether in keeping with such communion that the love which finds therein its perfect self-satisfaction should, nevertheless, out of a generosity congruous with its own nature, determine to extend that experience of communion to the utmost limit of its potentiality, if indeed any limit can be set to such love. It is legitimate to infer, therefore, that while God the Father had in God the Son an eternal object sufficient to the eternal perpetuation of the divine

experience, nevertheless the glory of God could be further revealed and also increased by the expenditure of love where, unlike the love for the Eternal Son of God, it would be unmerited. This communion of spirits with God is an extension of the fellowship of the Blessed Trinity, and such an extension as at once reflects the divine nature and redounds to the greater glory of God.

We are in a position now to understand that the purpose of God in creation must include the education, through the created universe, of free spirits for participation in the divine experience of Christ as the Son of God. And it appears probable enough that the most fitting way in which a created soul can enter into communion and fellowship with God is through a gradual appreciation of the values of God by the method of contrast between things of varying degrees of worth. The universe may, then, be a display (given extensively and by gradation) of those principles of value which must be earliest learnt and can be most easily estimated. Such a view of creation shows it to be a revelation of God, but also, and more important, shows it as demanding a higher revelation of the purpose of God behind creation. For the creation, from man's point of view, must seem different from what God conceives it as meaning to Himself. Led by the Spirit of God, man slowly discovers some of the rudimentary truths about God. But he can never transcend his own point of view, and, therefore, can never gauge the adequacy of his own conceptions. The purpose of creation will, therefore, find completion only in a further revelation, given in the fullness of time, when man is prepared for the higher disclosure. This declaration by God of His own standard of values by which life and existence are to be measured, will lift man out of himself, give him the key to interpret reality, and bring him into the presence of a redeeming God.

The universe, considered as the field for the revelation and realization of values, must exhibit gradations: for the existence of degree seems to be essential to the appreciation of value. But all degrees that are true values are to be thought of as equally real. A low value, in its place, may be no less essential than a high value in its place. Wherefore, the security in reality of both high and low values must be guaranteed. There is, however, obviously a difference

between values which are intrinsic and others which are necessary as means to an end, but may themselves be only of temporary worth. The contrast between temporary and eternal values no less than that between high and low values, is an aid to the right understanding of a spiritual significance of the world. The aim to be kept ever in view is the discovery of increasing spirituality. As the mind is led higher and higher in the scale of values, until at last it reaches personality, and by use of the category of personality reaches the conception of the personality of God as the ultimate centre of all values, it is making, stage by stage, the discovery of what the nature of God inherently and most essentially must be. It is by the ladder of gradations in spirituality and divinity that the soul must climb into the presence of God. Yet it must never be forgotten that every rung in that ladder is spiritual, and in its degree divine. The temptation to disparage the low values (and similarly the temporary values) is to be resisted, while at the same time the temptation to remain satisfied with the low and temporal must not be yielded to. This danger will be avoided when it is understood that low degrees and temporary degrees are really divine, and when it is understood also that their value and significance, when they exist in the proper place, can only be truly and fully appreciated if the highest value of all is likewise seen, approved and loved. It is right, for instance, to regard animal consciousness as lower in the scale of creation than human personality; but it is wrong, and altogether a false way of understanding the purpose of creation, to despise the animals on that account. It requires a St. Francis to preach to the birds. The greater the sanctity, the greater will be the sympathy and understanding towards lower degrees of spirituality.

It may be concluded, then, that the understanding of God, and the communion with God, are the true ends for man. The universe exists to reflect the nature of God in such a way that man may increasingly come to the knowledge of God. The whole range of the scale of values, moral, æsthetic and intellectual, is at once a revelation of the nature of God and a redemptive process lifting us to the height of God. The purpose of creation is revelation and redemption. Its end is the manifestation and production of good. Nevertheless, it must be admitted, indeed it must be insisted,

that such an explanation, although the only satisfactory explanation which can be given of creation, is not apparent upon the surface, and is not discoverable apart from special revelation. Since the meaning of creation and the ground for the existence of the physical universe lie within the Mind of God, the significance and value of the world, as integral to the Divine Purpose, is only to be known in so far as the Mind of God is known. A self-disclosure of the Mind of God such as is given in the Incarnation is a necessary consummation to the whole process of creation. The universe can only have its educative value when with it is given the key to its right interpretation. The creation is, as it were, the pedestal for the Incarnation.

But, to delay the advance for a moment before proceeding to the Incarnation as the climax of revelation, there is one outstanding problem which ought to be faced. The question so often asked—What was God doing before He created the world? is crude, but not so silly as to be met by the rejoinder mentioned by St. Augustine, that He was making a hell for the inquisitive. It at least deserves the serious answer which he gave when he explained that there could have been no time before the creation of the world, because time was created with the world.* Let us, then, take the objection seriously. We may set aside the conception of time as essential to creation and so escape the crudity of the above question. But we must try to explain how it is that, though there must be an eternal object to the foundational experience of which God is the personal Subject, yet (as we said at the beginning of this chapter) the physical universe is not identical with that object. This universe we know is of a certain age, not easily discovered, perhaps, but inferred with some probability. The formless stage of nebula seems to science a likely beginning for this universe of our experience. And the cooling of the sun gives some indication that an end can at least be conjectured; and, perhaps by some concussion of mighty suns or planets, the whole stellar system may be reduced once more to incoherent, indeterminate nebula. Such a universe can of course (as already hinted) be but a phase in the eternal experience which constitutes ultimate reality. If we say that the doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son supplies us with a larger, richer and

* *The Confessions of St. Augustine,* chap. xi, sects. 12 and 30.

altogether permanent object for the Love of God, then we are led to infer that this universe is somehow a manifestation of some of the wealth drawn from the unsearchable riches of Christ. The universe we know must then be defined as God's experience of thinking out simply the things that belong to Christ, and of thinking them in such a way that we may most readily follow the thoughts of God as He declares the very rudiments of His Eternal Love towards the Son. It may be that this universe is an exposition, under the forms of space and time, of those things which are infinite and eternal. And this blackboard demonstration may be the only way in which we beginners can learn the elements of God's truth. In other phases of the eternal experience, beyond the limits of this universe, God may be revealing Christ through a creation which works in terms other than space and time. Apart from this universe, the revelation of creation may be realized through an eternal volition whereby actuality, whatever its form, is kept undeviatingly exact to the ideal. Even with our limited range of imagination, therefore, it is not inconceivable that the fundamental experience which is reality may always have an object commensurate with the Subject. The phases of eternal experience may be infinite in number, and in all of the phases there may still be a good, for the sake of which they have being in the Mind of God. But throughout all the varying and myriad processes of the eternal creation, the constant element must be the character of the Eternal Son. How Christ is revealed in other worlds is beyond our skill even to speculate.* Sufficient for our redemption, however, is the revelation given under the conditions of this world. And the nature of the revelation granted to us is symbolized in the Cross. It is through suffering that the love of God manifests itself to sinful man. Other expressions of Holy Love are conceivable as being given under conditions which are different from those set by our world; as, for instance, the experience of love in uninterrupted joy. And in the eternal experience of God there is room for this, and much more that is not possible here and now. Perchance, too, it may be the purpose of God that we should enter more and more fully into all the phases of the divine experience. Under other conditions, other spirits innumerable may be

* Cf. Mrs. Alice Meynell's poem, *Christ and the Universe.*

led along a different way to the understanding of the Mind of God. Such things are possible in the eternities. Meanwhile, within the prescribed bounds of this physical universe, we are taught, through the revelation of Christ, sufficient of the Mind of God to enable us to rise to the full height of our personality, and to enjoy the satisfaction of communion with God the Father, in the Holy Spirit, and through Jesus Christ our Lord.

CHAPTER IV

THE INCARNATION

THEISM in general makes use of the principles of transcendence and creation, but the principle of the Incarnation is unique to Christian theism. From this it follows that even at the many points where Christian teaching coincides with and finds confirmation in the philosophy of theism, it has, nevertheless, a distinctive interpretation to offer, since it must derive all from the doctrine peculiar to itself, the doctrine of the Incarnation. This doctrine is not merely one additional line of argument appended to a system of speculation. It is fundamental to the whole construction of Christian thought. The philosophy of the Incarnation does not first conceive the nature of reality apart from the manifestation of the Son of God, and then, as an afterthought, infer that a place can be found for such a manifestation. That apologetic line of approach to the Incarnation, though valuable in its way, must be distinguished sharply from a Christian metaphysic. Such an apologetic is an attempt to reconcile general philosophy with a specifically Christian principle. The philosophy of Christianity, however, has no need to reconcile any theory of reality with the fact of the Incarnation. Its theory of reality is the Incarnation. For a Christian metaphysic it is the very essence of reality to be self-revealing. The highest experience of perfect personality is an experience of love. And love must declare itself. The purpose of creation must be the manifestation to created spirits of the love of God for the world. This love is shown in the giving of His only begotten Son for the redemption of those spirits whom He has created in order that they may reciprocate the love in a communion of fellowship and understanding.

In the Incarnation of the Son of God we may look for the solution to the riddle of life and existence. The words of Professor Pringle-Pattison are worthy of much consideration: "We are far too apt," he tells us, "to limit and mechanize the great doctrine of the Incarnation which forms the centre of Christian faith. Whatever else it may mean, it means at least this—that in the conditions of the highest human life we have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine. *God manifest in the flesh* is a more profound philosophical truth than the loftiest flight of speculation that outsoars all predicates and, for the greater glory of God, declares Him unknowable." * This truth of the Incarnation, that it is through the highest development of personality that we can learn the nature of God (together with its obverse, that it is through the perfect and sinless personality of Christ that God is most fully manifest to man), is the principle adopted throughout this thesis. The qualification for knowing God is to be found in fully-developed moral and spiritual personality: while, at the same time, the development of personality depends upon the knowledge of God. Such an interacting series requires a continuous revelation on the part of God in order that human redemption may be accomplished. But, in order that man may be raised to the full height of his potentiality, there is needed a revelation of God given at just that supreme height to which man is to attain. Therein is man's full and final redemption alone made possible.

We have said, hitherto, that Christ's knowledge of God was valid because of the sinless perfection of His personality. That was the conclusion reached from the human side. From the side of the divine, the complementary truth may now be supplied, and we may infer that Christ's unique character as sinlessly perfect was due to His nature as the Eternal Son of God, the object of God's love from everlasting to everlasting. His knowledge of God was valid because He was God. As God the Son He was integral to that foundational experience which is the ultimate reality, eternal and absolute. God the Son is the object of the divine experience of God the Father. And in Christ as the manifestation of God the Son under the conditions of this universe our world touches ultimate reality. The experience

* Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 157.

of Christ is valid because it is integral to that fundamental experience which is the substance and structure of all reality. In the experience and teaching of Christ we find the explanation and the evaluation of all life and of all existence, because His experience is the most ultimate and eternal factor in the whole constitution of the universe. In Christ we have the completest manifestation of God the Father which is at all possible under the conditions of the created universe. In Christ there is given to us, within that phase of the eternal experience which we call our world, a perfect revelation of the nature of God.

Taking Christ, then, as the summit of spirituality and the standard of values, we are able to gauge all worth and to measure all achievement by reference to Him. When we accept the Incarnation as the principle of interpretation, then, in a most satisfactory way, all things fall into their place within the graded whole, and all things look towards that place of unique supremacy for the occupation of which Christ alone is qualified. Confirmation of the Christian revelation is to be expected and welcomed from other sources than those of definitely Christian origin. And in constructing a complete metaphysic, Christian teaching will always have to borrow, as it always has gladly and gratefully borrowed, from general philosophy. But the principles of construction and the dominant ideas are to be deduced from the experience and teaching of the Incarnate Son of God. It is Christ's authority which must be regulative alike over the choice and use of contributions from elsewhere. All creation is revelation, but the clue to the understanding of revelation is in redemption. "All that exists is the self-utterance of God's will," says Dr. Temple, and continues: "His fullest and completest utterance was through human nature which He assumed in His Incarnation." * A clear recognition that, on the one hand, general philosophy, like human experience, is confirmatory only, and that on the other hand, the teaching and experience of Christ are ultimate and authoritative, will save us from imputing to Christianity ideas that are foreign to it and falsify its own genuine speech. It is unfortunate, for instance, to impose upon Christianity a metaphysic, such as the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen, which was originally formulated without taking

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 192.

into account what is unique in Christian experience. Conceptions which belong only to Aristotelian or Platonic philosophy have in this way sometimes crept in to the confusion of Christian teaching. These conceptions can be declared false on the authority of the Incarnation. But on that authority other philosophical principles can with equal assurance be claimed as true. And mention must now be made of some of the most vital of these principles derived on the authority of the Incarnation.

Since all these principles in question have already been made use of in sketching the brief outline of Christian metaphysics which seemed necessary as a background for any detailed study of the validity of Christian experience, little needs to be said in conclusion beyond what is just sufficient to show that the final reference and authority in each case is to be found in the Incarnation.

Already we have noticed the connexion between a Christian epistemology and the Incarnation. The nature of reality, conceived as God, is such that it encourages knowledge of itself on the part of man according to the principle of accommodation whereby it discloses itself in terms of human nature. The postulate of the intelligibility of the universe is expanded into the principle of the accommodation of reality to human need. This assumption is freed from all appearance of exaggerated claim because, on the one hand, the nature of reality is such that it must reveal itself in love, and the purpose of the universe is to bring man to the knowledge of God: while, on the other hand, the perfect adaptation between mind and reality is only effected when personality is developed to the full measure of its moral and spiritual stature. As a corollary to this theorem it must, therefore, be added that the accommodation of reality to personality, of divinity to humanity, is only possible fully under the conditions of the sinless perfection of humanity. While, therefore, all creation is revelation and is, accordingly, a means towards the end of bringing man to the stage of knowing and enjoying communion with God, only in Christ does revelation reach the level of an infallible, self-explanatory, interpretative and authoritative manifestation of the nature and purpose of God. All true knowledge must be, ultimately, knowledge of God: and all valid understanding must be the appreciation of the significance and value

of all things as seen according to the purpose of God. We only know things as we know them in God; and what the meaning of their existence is to God can only be known to us infallibly if God reveals His mind and manifests His purpose to us. This He does by assuming our full human nature. Without revelation there can be no discovery. The solution to the epistemological problem is to be found only in the Incarnation. But in Christian doctrine that problem is solved by the application of the one category which is alone sufficient, the category of personality: and this philosophical principle is derived directly from the Incarnation. For the only guarantee that we are justified in using the principle of personality in the discovery of the nature of ultimate reality is to be found in the fact that God Himself in revealing the nature of His own reality chose the form of personality. Therein we have proof that God must be at least personal, and that it is through personality that we shall receive the fullest confirmation of the truth revealed in Christ. Our discipline for the understanding of the divine must be such a development and integration of personality that we shall become conformable to the perfect and sinless person of Christ. In this way, by responding to the principle of accommodation in the Incarnation, we shall find on our part (in the attainment of a full and satisfactory adjustment and adaptation to reality as a whole) verification and confirmation of the validity of Christ's teaching and experience.

The solution to the problem of knowledge is also, in part, the solution to the moral problem. The highest moral value cannot be anything else than perfect personality. And the security of this value is attained by the subsumption of personality into ultimate reality. The point in the universe where reality in its most concentrated essence and highest spirituality is revealed is the point where the world's highest value is expressed. When the permanence of personality is assured, then all other values which depend upon personality for their continuance are also assured. If they are temporary needs, they are secure as long as they are required: if they are enduring needs for perfect personality, they are eternally secure. The moral problem is raised by the question whether it is possible for man to attain to that perfection of personality which will seek and desire those values which are eternal in Christ. Clearly, the only standard of values to

which ultimate reality can conform without suffering distortion is the standard which is set by the Mind of God and which qualifies the divine experience. This standard we learn in so far as we enter into the mind of Christ, Who gives us the only revelation which we can bear of the eternal experience of God. Thus the Incarnation, which solves the epistemological problem by bringing revelation, solves the moral problem by offering redemption. By learning from Christ we become like Christ. By accepting His standard of values we receive condemnation upon our own sin, imperfection and ignorance: we also receive deliverance from the bondage of the sinful and false way of thinking, feeling and willing. The revelation of the Incarnation reaches its climax in the redemption of the Cross. And because the conditions of the knowledge of God are moral, only those who are being saved are in a position to receive knowledge. A Christian metaphysic finds its centre in the morally and spiritually regenerative power of the Cross.

Here, too, in solving the problem of knowledge and the moral problem, the Incarnation also meets the insistent problem of pain. If at the outset of the inquiry the nature of reality be so conceived that it cannot possibly lead to suffering, then it will be a hopeless task to attempt later to reconcile the fact of suffering as part of reality with the previous conception of reality as incompatible with suffering. Clearly, that way, suffering can never be related to the purpose of God in reality. For Christian philosophy, however, suffering is included within the nature of reality, where alone it can have its proper meaning. Experience is itself, at least potentially, an experience of suffering. When raised to the height of love it becomes actually a willingness to suffer on behalf of the loved one. And whenever the loved one falls short of the highest good possible, then love must reveal itself as suffering. In such a universe as this, where spirits are attaining to perfection but have not yet attained, it is inevitable that the love which created them and purposed for them the supreme good of communion in holiness, in declaring itself, should show itself as suffering. In the experience of love, the accompaniment of shortcoming must always be suffering. But the suffering of love is always redemptive and so is part of the great purpose of God. It may almost be claimed that for Christian philosophy suffering

ceases to be a problem because the redemptive purpose of the universe, as a phase in the eternal experience of God, is the revelation of Christ through suffering. And we see that in such a universe Christ could only be so revealed. Christianity boldly takes the Cross and imprints it upon the very face of reality. That is an eternal aspect of the nature of God; it is His nature under the conditions of this universe. This is a suffering universe and the symbol of its meaning is the Cross. But the suffering Christ stands for something beyond suffering—for some good which is more than worth the suffering, and which could not be had without the suffering. The joy of the knowledge of God and of communion with Him outweighs the suffering. And we can conceive of no other way in which God could make Himself known to us and train us for fellowship in Himself, except in a suffering universe and through the redeeming revelation in a suffering Christ.

"Sacrifice," says Dr. Temple, "is the root principle of reality because it is the characteristic activity of God." * The Lamb slain before the foundation of the world means that the principle of sacrifice reflects the eternal nature of God and is therefore a constant factor, while the creation of this universe is but a moment in the experience of God. Sacrifice, however, need not mean suffering. In essence it is the giving of self on behalf of the loved one. It is the negation of self-centredness. The doctrine of the perpetual sacrifice of Christ upon the altar bears witness to the truth of God's nature as an experience of love, a self-giving. God as Subject of fundamental experience reveals Himself in the object of His experience as sacrificed in the Eternal Son, the Lamb of God. This sacrifice, in its perfection, is a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving—a true and eternal eucharist. But it is not real sacrifice unless it is potentially an endurance of suffering for the good of the loved one. And it is not inconceivable that the eternal sacrifice of the love of God the Father towards God the Son, should fulfil itself in becoming actually through this temporal universe, what it is potentially throughout eternity, a sacrifice of suffering. The good to be gained for and by Christ as the object of God's love is that through His suffering there should be brought, together with Christ, those also that are His, to

* Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 272.

the end that the glory of the Son might be increased by bringing many sons to the glory of the knowledge and love of God the Father.

In all this it must be evident that the principle of the Incarnation is the principle of sacramentalism. Wherefore, it must follow that in using the principle of the Incarnation as the method of explanation throughout the universe, we are pledged to regard things as sacraments or symbols of other things which have greater value and higher spirituality, until in the end we find that all else gets its meaning from the Cross, which is the symbol of the purpose of God in the world. This procedure is an application of teleology and assumes that explanation must always be from above. The implication of the principle of sacramentalism is that the whole universe is a graded system with the Incarnation as its highest value. Every level of existence finds its fulfilment in a higher level until the consummation of all is reached in personality. And for personality there can be no ultimate value until perfection is attained. All moral effort and growth in spirituality is an outreaching towards Christ. There is no rest for the spirits "till their heart and soul applaud perfection, nothing less." But what is thus true of the intrinsic value of personality is *not* applicable in the same way to those things which exist because of their value for personality. The physical universe, though constructed according to varying strata of value, has its meaning (and therefore its existence) both in part and in the whole, as means towards the fulfilment of the purpose of God. And although some parts are of lower value than other parts, yet all things reflect in their measure the glory of God. It is just because their existence is the realization of a gradation of values, that all things redound to the greater glory of the supreme value. Existence at varying levels of value may be an ultimate necessity to the eternity of value as such. Degree is essential to supremacy. But in that case the varying degrees must be seen according to the true standard and understood as necessities to the spiritual richness of reality. Some values may be only temporary, but, even so, they are good in their time. Other values must be eternal. And it is for us so to learn Christ that we shall know how to appreciate the spiritual values in such a way that we may set our affections upon things which are above.

The recognition, however, that everything is sacramental will save us from under-estimating, or despising, things of less value by thinking of them as things of no value. All things get their value from Christ, and in their kind are symbols, tokens, sacraments of the unsearchable riches of Christ. Just as we should be wickedly at fault in failing to enjoy a wild rose because it was less than a garden rose, or in failing to appreciate animals because they are lower in the scale than men—equally should we be wrong in supposing that any part of the universe is other than divine. There is no eternal matter set over against God. All is part of God's eternal experience, the objectification of His own nature. Existence everywhere is dependent upon the meaning which it has for God. To understand all things as expressing in a measure the nature of God, and as indicating and magnifying His glory by existing as degrees in glory, is to understand aright. There is a terrestrial glory and a celestial glory, but all glory is from God and unto God.

The adoption of sacramentalism, as the true principle of interpretation, brings us back always to the Cross of Christ as the ultimate standard of reference. That explanation is found to fit and satisfy as no other explanation can. A bare theism is less successful than the religion of the Incarnation in propounding a theory of the universe, just in so far as it fails of being Christian theism. The abrogation of the sacramentalism derivable from the Incarnation of the Son of God leaves a theism that is not definitely Christian confronted with insoluble problems. It has to face the fact that Nature does not everywhere give an equally adequate revelation of God. But it lacks any objective standard of reference by which to test the level of revelation at different points. It is always open to the criticism that it is imposing a merely human scale of values. Theism can only fulfil its own promise by becoming the philosophy of the Incarnation.

The more completely we are able to share the experience and understand the teaching of Christ, the more fully shall we be able to read the Mind of God as reflected in the universe. The increasing knowledge of reality gained through Christ brings a progressive development of personality and a more and more satisfactory adjustment, intellectual, moral and emotional, towards reality as a whole.

Error must still cling to our theories and interpretations in so far as our standard of spiritual values falls short of the true standard revealed in Christ. Until our personality attains to the fullness of the measure of the stature of Christ, we shall inevitably be disqualified from perfect understanding. It cannot be thought that we have yet attained, but we press on. Meanwhile, there must continue some problems which will appear inexplicable until the whole purpose of God in the universe is clearly grasped. One problem, for instance, which still almost baffles the mind, the sufferings of animals, calls forth from Dr. Gore this confession: "I confess," he says, "that the glint of pain in an animal's eye remains, if not a valid argument against belief in God's goodness, yet, as often as my mind dwells on it, a source of unrelieved discomfort." * Although, in such a case, the meaning is far from transparently plain, yet the illumination of the Cross brings more enlightenment than can elsewhere be gained. Is not the revelation in Christ a revelation of love suffering? Does not the Cross show us that we must think of the pain in the world not as inflicted, but as endured? Somehow, therefore, suffering must be integral to the purpose of the universe. By way of slight explanation it may be said that the bewilderment felt in the presence of unaccountable suffering may at least lead to a sympathetic love. That the sufferings of Christ, and of the whole creation, should be necessary to quicken our spiritual sensitiveness and awaken our responsive love, is an appalling thought—utterly humiliating. But love when reached is the height of experience and the essence of reality. And as for the humiliation, we must remember that, according to the standard of values taught by Christ, it is the meek who shall inherit the earth, just as it is the pure in heart who shall see God. And when with a pure heart and meek spirit we are so adjusted to truth and reality as to be the inheritors of all the riches of this earthly life, and are so developed in the fullness of our manhood that we are able to understand the meaning of the Incarnation of the Son of God, then, at last, we shall see all things in God and God in all things: and, in fellowship and communion, we shall share that experience of Holiness and Love wherein all that is estranged from God shall be reconciled and God shall be

* Gore, *Belief in God*, p. 161.

all in all. Then shall we not only believe but know that the essence of truth and reality is expressed in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. And in that knowledge then, as in that belief now, we shall be saved; for our life will be discovered to have been hid with Christ in God, and through Christ, as the eternal object of the experience of God, to have attained to the reality of Eternal Life.

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